Explanations for behaviour

Recent years have seen substantial claims emerging in the field of social cognition. First and foremost, claims are made concerning people's understanding of their mental processes and their actions. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) conclude in a classic paper on this issue that ‘one has no more certain knowledge of the workings of one's own mind than would an outsider with intimate knowledge of one's history and of the stimuli present at the time the cognitive process occurred’ (p. 257). This claim implies a significant discovery: the finding that people do not know the workings of their own minds. And does this assertion reflect an empirical finding, or is it merely opinion? The authors claim that it is an empirical finding, certified by evidence: ‘The evidence indicates it may be quite misleading for social scientists to ask their subjects about the influences on their evaluations, choices or behaviour. The relevant research indicates that such reports, as well as predictions, may have little value except for whatever utility they may have in the study of verbal explanations per se’ (p. 247). Scientific investigations, according to this view, show that people's explanations of their actions have little value for understanding their behaviour (Wilson, 1985).