Philosopher Ditte Marie Munch-Jurisic reflects on the disgust felt by some perpetrators in the face of atrocity. This emotional phenomenon, Munch-Jurisic argues, raises fundamental questions about human nature and the foundations of morality. Many philosophers and psychologists have celebrated disgust as an emotion of great moral significance, seeing it as a crucial source of moral judgment as well as moral action. Some advocates of this view interpret the perpetrators’ disgust in moral terms, not only as an embodied aversion to killing, but also as evidence of a biologically grounded moral sensibility. Critics of this interpretation counter that such disgust has nothing to do with morality or any sense of wrongdoing; the perpetrators are simply reacting to the physically repulsive sights, sounds, and smells of mass murder. Both of these interpretations, writes Munch-Jurisic, obscure the ambiguous nature of disgust, which can both signify aversion toward violence and exacerbate it. As a result, we fail to recognize not only how disgust can distort moral judgment, but also how it feeds into the perpetrators’ aggression and inspires some of their worst atrocities. Perpetrator disgust, Munch-Jurisic concludes, is rarely a moral emotion; more often, it is a morally destructive one.