In view of its strategic plight in 1940–1, Britain had a vital interest in the continuance of Spanish neutrality. Franco's shaky regime, too, clung to its non-belligerency as a lifeline in the context of its grave domestic crisis. Spain's political, economic and military weakness forced it to abstain from any decisive intervention in international affairs. Britain, in its unequal contest with Germany, clutched at Spain's very debility as at least one barrier against the further deterioration of its own perilous strategic position. This common vulnerability drove Britain and Spain together, despite mutual suspicion and ideological antipathy and, ultimately, tended to defuse the recurring tensions in their relations, in 1940–1. The British Government contemplated offensive military action against Spanish territory several times in that period, but drew back from the brink each time. The Spaniards, too, after the autumn of 1940, restricted themselves to propaganda attacks on Great Britain. This basic identity of interest between the British Government and the Franco regime concerning Spain's international position determined the essential pattern of their relations. This is not to ignore the fact that each side, occasionally, seriously considered moving against the other: Spain being prevented from doing so by the chilly German response to its initiatives, in June and September 1940, and Britain being saved from precipitate action, principally, by Halifax's intervention, in December 1940, and Churchill's second thoughts, in August 1941.