Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 Britain and and the birth of Franco's Spain, 1936–39
- 2 Defining a policy
- 3 Opposition
- 4 The Spanish scene
- 5 Strategic diplomacy: September–October, 1940
- 6 Economic diplomacy: September–December, 1940
- 7 The Tangier crisis
- 8 The limits of attraction
- 9 The exhaustion of diplomacy
- Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
1 - Britain and and the birth of Franco's Spain, 1936–39
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 November 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 Britain and and the birth of Franco's Spain, 1936–39
- 2 Defining a policy
- 3 Opposition
- 4 The Spanish scene
- 5 Strategic diplomacy: September–October, 1940
- 6 Economic diplomacy: September–December, 1940
- 7 The Tangier crisis
- 8 The limits of attraction
- 9 The exhaustion of diplomacy
- Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
On 19 June 1940, a Labour member of Britain's new wartime coalition government, Hugh Dalton, conferred with Rear-Admiral T. S. V. Phillips, Vice-Chief of Naval Staff. During the course of their conversation concerning Britain's blockade of Nazi-dominated mainland Europe, the admiral was moved to denounce the political blunders which had placed his country in such mortal danger by successively antagonising Germany, Japan, Italy and Spain. Phillips was particularly critical of British policy towards the recent Spanish Civil War:
To have Spain as an enemy would jeopardise the whole of our control both of the western Mediterranean and the Atlantic sea routes. It is unthinkable that we should have been brought to such a point. We backed the Bolsheviks in Spain in 1936 and '37 against the only man who, in modern times, has been able to make Spain strong.
The admiral was mistaken in both assertion and assumption. Far from favouring the Republican camp in 1936–7, or afterwards, the British Government were almost all sympathetic towards the Spanish Nationalist cause. However, unsure as to the ultimate victor in the contest, and cautious lest precipitate action should prejudice British interests on its termination, His Majesty's ministers refrained from any spectacular support for Franco. They sought security in non-intervention, there by hoping to ensure that whichever side won it ‘should not enter upon its inheritance with any serious grudge’ against Britain.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Diplomacy and Strategy of SurvivalBritish Policy and Franco's Spain, 1940-41, pp. 10 - 25Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1986