Introduction to the Introduction

The Introduction to the Principles can be divided into roughly three parts. The first part, §§1–6, suggests that scepticism is not due to a defect in, or the limitations of, human faculties, but is an illusion fostered by the mistakes of philosophers and, in particular, mistakes about language. Implicit here is Berkeley’s view that the whole edifice of the mechanical philosophy discussed in the previous chapter, which is itself the source of scepticism, is a delusion born of misunderstanding ordinary language. One particular mistake is singled out by Berkeley, namely, the philosophical ‘opinion that the mind hath a power of framing abstract ideas’ (PHK I §6). The second part of the Introduction (§§7–18) consists of his celebrated critique of these abstract ideas. The remainder identifies the cause of the mistaken belief in abstract ideas as language, discusses some different functions of language, and warns against the general danger attendant to the ‘embarras and delusion of words’ (PHK I §25).

Berkeley worked very hard on the Introduction. We have a draft version that is much longer than the published version, and both it and the published version are philosophically rich and interesting. But the Introduction is also deeply puzzling. Abstraction, materialism and the scepticism generated by materialism are somehow connected. Thus, in the main body of Principles Berkeley tells us that the ‘opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that … sensible objects have existence … distinct from their being perceived’ (PHK §4) ‘depend[s] on the doctrine of abstract ideas’ (PHK §5). But just what these connections are is, to say the very least, extremely opaque. Indeed, the relation between the Introduction and the main body of the Principles is quite generally puzzling: as Jonathan Dancy writes ‘Perhaps the greatest mystery of the Principles is the relation between the Introduction and the main text.’ In this chapter we shall confine ourselves to understanding the Introduction itself. First, we discuss Berkeley’s view of the sources of scepticism. Then, we examine his critique of ‘abstract ideas’, before turning to his general remarks on language. Later on in this book we shall connect these various themes with the main body of the Principles and try to dispel some of the mystery.