During a negotiation, there is seldom the time or capacity for parties to reach a full and complete agreement on a comprehensive legal framework for postconflict governance. Instead, the parties often agree to a preliminary set of principles coupled with a general governing framework. They then set forth an agreed process for negotiating, designing, and implementing a national dialogue, the drafting or amending of a constitution, and elections. This chapter explores the puzzle of whether and how to address constitutional modification during peace negotiations in a manner that promotes a durable peace. It reviews the peace processes related to conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, East Timor, Guatemala, Iraq, Kosovo, Macedonia, Nepal, Northern Ireland, Somalia, South Africa, Syria, and Yemen to explore whether and how to address constitutional modification during the peace process; the timing of determining and executing a postconflict constitution-drafting process; whether to draft an interim constitution; whether to accomplish constitutional reform through amendments or by drafting a full constitution; how to approve and finalize constitutional modifications; and whether and how to incorporate issues of human rights.

This chapter describes common successes and pitfalls that have been known to occur during the disaster planning process.

Integrity in government is one of the most important preconditions for progress towards a low-carbon future. It is founded in the public trust principle according to which all public officers – politicians and public servants – are entrusted with putting the public interest ahead of other interests. Climate is a public interest, held in common. Corruption threatens the integrity of any system of government, undermining local, national and global action on climate change. The risks are not only from the most egregious corruption such as accepting illegal benefits coincident with making decisions favouring donors, but across a spectrum extending to subtle flouting of the public trust principle. Evidence of the risks to a healthy climate posed by corruption are illustrated by the environmental performance of corrupt states, buying influence and votes in democracies and procurement practices that defy government obligations under Paris Climate Change Agreement commitments. Strategies are outlined that can be implemented by nations to honour their Paris Agreement commitments and proactively reduce risks of corruption which undermine action on climate change.

This chapter introduces the book and its main arguments. It first discusses the International Relations debate over China’s rise, and its limitations. The debate is polarised between those depicting China as a revisionist actor, or as supporting the status quo. The debate is at an impasse because evidence exists on both sides. What is needed is a framework that can account for both sorts of behaviour. This requires rejecting the assumption that China is a monolithic actor pursuing a coherent grand strategy. In reality, since the late 1970s, the Chinese party-state has become fragmented, decentralised and internationalised, greatly expanding the range of actors involved in China’s foreign affairs. Because these actors are only loosely coordinated within a Chinese-style regulatory state, this produces a wide range of international outcomes that do not necessarily reflect top leaders’ intentions. The chapter also outlines the structure and contents of the rest of the book.

This chapter presents the book’s first case study: the South China Sea (SCS). Typically, the SCS is seen as a geopolitical struggle for sovereignty and territory, prompting military tensions and power balancing, and as a major security flashpoint that could spark World War III. This chapter shows that Chinese conduct in the SCS is shaped less by a detailed strategy determined in Beijing and more by struggles for power and resources within the transformed Chinese party-state. Reflecting the model described in Chapter One, Chinese conduct is only loosely guided by the poorly-defined nine-dash line and an injunction to balance the maintenance of stability and the protection of maritime rights, which are often contradictory objectives. This has created wide latitude for maritime actors – including the navy, coastguard agencies, the national oil companies and the Hainan provincial government and associated fishing interests – to promote their sectional interests, with often very negative consequences for China’s wider diplomatic objectives. Xi Jinping’s efforts to rein in competing actors has only partially succeeded. Although China’s position in the SCS has overall strengthened, it has done so in a rather unplanned manner and consequently at considerable cost.

The concluding chapter draws out the implications of our findings for scholars and policymakers. First, it identifies key patterns in our findings and proposes hypotheses for further research. Inductively, it suggests that the degree of Chinese policy coherence reflects whether coordinating mechanisms are deployed and effective, and whether powerful domestic interests align. It argues that our conceptualisation of the Chinese party-state does not necessarily mean that Chinese behaviour is unproblematic – but that it may emerge for reasons not anticipated by traditional models. And it emphasises the crucial importance of partner/recipient countries in shaping the outcomes of Chinese overseas engagements. Secondly, the chapter draws out recommendations for policymakers in China and elsewhere. We argue that responding to China’s rise as though it was a strategically guided monolith is clearly mistaken, requiring a more nuanced and sophisticated approach. We also urge Chinese policymakers to be more open about the limitations of Chinese governance and to attempt more decisive state reforms. In a final postscript, we offer some thoughts about what light the state transformation framework can shed on the COVID-19 pandemic.

Hydrogen could help transition the global energy system to a low-carbon future by providing an energy-dense, carbon-free fuel suitable for a wide range of applications. Hydrogen is already used extensively by industry; however, the current supply chain is relatively simple and relies heavily on fossil fuels, resulting in greenhouse gas emissions. The value chain for a future hydrogen economy will be more complex and require different technologies to be further developed and scaled up, including low-emission hydrogen production, large-scale storage and transport, and new energy and industry applications. Hydrogen produced with zero carbon emissions has the potential to be a major new globally traded commodity, which could enable countries with limited renewable energy potential to decarbonise their economies, diversify the global energy supply, and increase energy security. The emergence of the hydrogen economy faces economic, social acceptance and regulatory challenges. Governments around the world have a role to play in providing policies to address potential market failures, socialising the widespread use of hydrogen and establishing international governance and regulations.

This chapter elaborates the theoretical and methodological approach used in this book. Guided by Gramscian state theory, we trace the post-1978 rise of a powerful, though divided, cadre-capitalist class, and the associated, uneven and contested fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation of China’s party-state. We then elaborate a theoretical model capable of explaining how policymaking and implementation work under these changed conditions: the Chinese-style regulatory state. In this model, rather than making detailed, binding decisions and strategies, top leaders try to loosely steer and coordinate a plethora of actors towards favoured ends. But other actors can influence, interpret and even ignore these policy frameworks. Chinese behaviours thus represent an ongoing struggle within the fractured party-state. Outcomes are further shaped by socio-political dynamics within the other countries in which Chinese actors operate. The chapter also explains our method and case selection, and canvasses and rejects some predictable objections to our argument: that China’s state transformation is nothing new, and that recentralisation under Xi Jinping has made the state transformation argument outdated.

The availability of finance is a key requirement for action to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Several studies show that companies responding to ESG (environement, sustainability and governance) principles generally outperform others financially. There is strong growth of the sustainable finance sub-sector but off a low base. Fiduciary duty now is generally understood to include the need to take into account climate chage in decision-making and the exposure of company directors is growing exponentially. With falling prices, renewables are now being adopted by many leading companies for their own energy requirements. Green bonds and other climate-friendly financial instruments are in growing demand but large global financial institutions continue to direct a larger proportion of funds to fossil fuels than to ESG-rated investments including renewables. The present rate of growth of sustainable finance is not sufficient to meet climate goals for limiting emissions. The chapter recommends actions by governments to change this situation.

This chapter introduces three cross-cutting themes that illustrate the relationship between artificial intelligence and international economic law (IEL): disruption, regulation, and reconfiguration. We explore the theme of disruption along the trifecta of AI-related technological, economic, and legal change. In this context, the impact of AI triggers political and economic pressures, as evidenced by intensive lobbying and engagement in different governance venues for and against various regulatory choices, including what will be regulated, how to regulate it, and whom should be regulated. Along these lines, we assess the extent to which IEL has already been reconfigured and examine the need for further reconfiguration. We conclude this introduction chapter by bringing the contributions we assembled in this volume into conversation with one another and identify topics that warrant further research. Taken as a whole, this book portrays the interaction between AI and IEL. We have collectively explored and evaluated the impact of AI disruption, the need for AI regulation, and directions for IEL reconfiguration.

This chapter introduces three cross-cutting themes that illustrate the relationship between artificial intelligence and international economic law (IEL): disruption, regulation, and reconfiguration. We explore the theme of disruption along the trifecta of AI-related technological, economic, and legal change. In this context, the impact of AI triggers political and economic pressures, as evidenced by intensive lobbying and engagement in different governance venues for and against various regulatory choices, including what will be regulated, how to regulate it, and whom should be regulated. Along these lines, we assess the extent to which IEL has already been reconfigured and examine the need for further reconfiguration. We conclude this introduction chapter by bringing the contributions we assembled in this volume into conversation with one another and identify topics that warrant further research. Taken as a whole, this book portrays the interaction between AI and IEL. We have collectively explored and evaluated the impact of AI disruption, the need for AI regulation, and directions for IEL reconfiguration.

The chapter explores the paradoxes of the abundant sources for the west, where only a limited proportion of the population understood the dominant written language of communication, Latin; and until the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the reams of fiscal and judicial records which survive come mostly from a fairly narrow band of senior clerics. But the clergy were not monolithic, and their impact on the actual practice of governance varied north and south of the Alps. Much depended on the extent to which principles of Roman law and the habit of living in towns persisted. Yet there is striking consistency both in the prerequisite virtues of a ruler propounded by clerical writers and in the essentials of inauguration ritual. The law which a king swore to uphold at his coronation was not made at will: he was expected to govern consensually and heed good counsel. Who could give such counsel and what constituted reasonable constraints on the king’s volition changed over time. In some realms, assemblies developed the authority to approve taxes and become law-makers in the late middle ages: the monarch’s exercise of his authority was tempered by popular demand.

Public administration might be viewed as a potential victim of populist-inspired backsliding. This chapter argues that when considering how to respond to populism public administration needs to recognize that some of its practices may have created an opening for the populist charge. Public administration may be a victim but also may have been an unwitting harbinger of the populist surge. The public administration reforms in vogue over the last two decades helped to create the conditions for populism. Performance management, citizen consultation, and evidence-based policymaking were popular managerial tools, but the evidence presented in this chapter suggests they may have encouraged a loss of public trust due to the way they were put into practice. The threat of democratic backsliding, driven by populism, should stimulate public administration not to hunker down but to search for better ways of operating in order to rebuild public trust. There are some positive signs of new thinking and practice.