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Chapter 10 focuses on issues related to colonialism and commerce, examining how activities of colonizers have shaped opportunities, business institutions, and competitiveness throughout Africa. This chapter also discusses the implications of colonial portfolio approaches for law and commerce, as well as how attitudes about governance have shaped the construction of the public and private throughout former colonies in Africa.
Over recent years, economists, lawyers and regulators have become increasingly interested in the role played by ‘network effects’ in the digital economy: namely, the phenomenon whereby a platform becomes increasingly valuable to its users, the more users it succeeds in recruiting. Whether user-generated content on Youtube and Facebook, proprietorial messaging services such as Whatsapp, or two-sided markets such as Uber and Airbnb, it is now widely recognised that many of today’s most successful technology businesses enjoy a dominance based upon achieving a critical mass of users, which makes it near-impossible for less well-used platforms to compete. What is less widely recognised is that data-driven personalisation operates in a comparable (albeit not identical) manner: as the volume of users increases, personalisation becomes ever more sophisticated, generating a ‘second-order’ network effect that can also have significant implications for the viability of competition. This paper unpacks the distinction between first-order and second-order network effects, showing how both can create significant barriers to competition. It analyses what second-order network effects imply for how governments can and should regulate data-driven personalisation, and how states might help their citizens to regain control over the value that they create.
This article examines a patenting conflict between the Halliburton Oil Well and Cementing Company and an independent inventor named Cranford Walker. It argues that Halliburton’s effort to lower the barriers to entry into the oil well depth measurement industry facilitated the re-emergence of materiality as a pre-condition for the patent eligibility of inventive processes. In 1941, Walker sued Halliburton for infringement of three of his patents, and Halliburton responded with an aggressive defense aimed at invalidating them. Over the next five years, the courts handling this conflict adopted very narrow legal theories developed during the Second Industrial Revolution to assess the patent eligibility of inventions that involved mental steps—processes such as mathematical computations, which people can perform in their minds. The resulting legal precedent cleared the path for Halliburton’s short-term industrial goals and continued to shape patent law for the rest of the century.
The social intelligence hypothesis states that a complex social life is cognitively challenging and thus a driving force for mental evolution. Support for the hypothesis comes mainly from studies on primates, and more recently also from birds, specifically corvids. In this paper, I review what is known about the socio-cognitive skills of common ravens, a corvid species that has been intensively studied over the past twenty-five years. The findings show that temporary foraging groups are composed of individuals with different degrees of familiarity and structured by different types of social relationships. Familiar ravens show profound knowledge about their own and others’ relationships, and they appear to use this knowledge selectively and strategically in cooperative and competitive settings. The studies on ravens may thus inform our understanding of what constitutes social complexity and which cognitive skills are selected for.
The findings of this book reveal that at the multilateral level there is a pressing need for rules that address the realities of cross-border trade in energy and tackle energy trade regulation in a proper and proactive manner. The concluding chapter therefore offers suggestions for enhanced energy governance from an institutional angle. It explores this question at three levels. First, it discusses the pros and cons of the WTO as a forum for tackling energy issues more proactively. It then contemplates possible scenarios for interaction between the WTO and the ECT for that purpose. Lastly, it briefly considers the possibility of innovating energy regulation through PTAs.
Envy is often confused with jealousy, because they are both rivalrous painful emotions, which are directed at a competitor and are concerned with a good. But envy is about the potential or actual lack of the good, while jealousy is about the potential or actual loss of the good. This distinction is not always clear cut, as a section devoted to ambiguous, hybrid, and transitional cases shows. In the end, envy is defined as an aversive response to a perceived inferiority or disadvantage vis-à-vis a similar other, with regard to a good that is relevant to the sense of identity of the envier.
Chapter 6 first tests the main premise of the project – that external threats should make private trade-promoting policies more likely – using the large sample of markets represented in the survey data. It then assesses whether (and how) competition mediates the role of these threats. Just as important, the chapter uses the survey data to assess alternative explanations that have been posited but rarely tested in the context of private governance with a sample of this size. The key finding is that markets facing government threats – i.e., those on local government land – are more likely to be governed well. This relationship between land type and private governance, however, is not uniform. It depends on the diversity of products sold in a market. Public land markets are governed better when they sell a variety of products, since traders are in less direct competition with each other.
The chapters thus far have dealt with the process of goal-setting and goal pursuit to maximize our self-control efforts to achieve our goals. Yet as noted, self-control is an iterative process that we engage in over time. Given the inherent difficulties of any goal pursuit, the need to create a support system seems implicit to attain self-control success in the long term. This chapter focuses on the social and contextual factors that facilitate a progression toward goal attainment in an attempt to encourage us to establish a support system that can bolster our attempts at goal attainment.
This paper investigates the views on competition theory and policy of the American institutional economists during the first half of the 20th century. These perspectives contrasted with those of contemporary neoclassical and later mainstream economic approaches. We identify three distinct dimensions to an institutionalist perspective on competition. First, institutionalist approaches focused on describing industry details, so as to bring theory into closer contact with reality. Second, institutionalists emphasized that while competition was sometimes beneficial, it could also be disruptive. Third, institutionalists had a broad view of the objectives of competition policy that extended beyond effects on consumer welfare. Consequently, institutionalists advocated for a wide range of policies to enhance competition, including industrial self-regulation, broad stakeholder representation within corporations, and direct governmental regulations. Their experimental attitude implied that policy would always be evolving, and antitrust enforcement might be only one stage in the development toward a regime of industrial regulation.
This final chapter looks at the alternatives between unilateral digital services taxes and a multilateral consensus on international tax reform. It analyses the key features of digital services taxes and contrasts the advantages and disadvantages against a multilateral solution. Then it goes on to analyse five key future international tax trends that form part of the 2020s compromise and considers the tax implications in the light of the COVID-19 crisis.
Public service innovation, defined as the adoption of new technology and methods of service delivery, is at the heart of public management research. Scholars have long studied public and private sector innovation as distinctive phenomena, arguing that private sector innovation aims to increase firms' competitive advantage, while public sector innovation purports to improve governance and performance. The public-private dichotomy overlooks the complex way how organizations interact with each other for service delivery. Public services are increasingly delivered through the web of collaborative networks, in which organizations compete and cooperate simultaneously. This Element explores how coopetition, namely the simultaneous presence of competition and collaboration, shapes innovation in the health care sector. Analyzing panel data of 4,000+ American hospitals from 2008 to 2017, this Element finds evidence that coopetition catalyzes the technology and service process innovation and offers practical implications on managing innovation in competitive environments.
Chapter 5 of The Cambridge Companion to Sappho considers the relationship between Sappho and her contemporary, the poet Alcaeus, examining the literary and visual evidence and the different ways that scholars have interpreted it.
Miami Beach was the nation’s premier winter resort between the 1930s and the 1950s. The city attracted a diverse crowd of visitors, some interested in a peaceful respite from the frigid north, others drawn by the drinking, dancing, and musical entertainment offered by its many bars and nightclubs. As part of an elaborate effort to sustain the city’s lively symbiotic urban leisure-services economy, the Miami Beach City Council addressed three types of market failures: chaotic competition, interproducer conflicts, and monopolistic business practices. This article demonstrates how these practices expressed a coherent vernacular philosophy of regulated capitalism arising from the city’s identity as a collective economic enterprise.
The final chapter notes that Alphabet’s megacorporate existence could, further to the ideological reasons detailed in Chapter 8, potentially be brought to an end by two sets of considerations that are readily apparent right now. The first set of considerations relates to discord amongst the megacorporation’s employees, and the second to anti-monopoly sentiment. Taken together, these considerations suggest that, in the short term, Alphabet’s capacity to remain a megacorporation will likely turn on its capacity to account for disruptive elements from within; and its capacity to avoid being undermined by anti-trust threats from without. The chapter’s summary then brings the book to a close by emphasizing that, even if Alphabet’s existence comes to an end sooner rather than later, the megacorporate concept it is an example of, the identification of the infinite times ideology that informs it and the philosophical perspective that I have used to discuss it, remain of value: for they all help reveal that corporate influence over society is more profound than is commonly recognized.
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) is legally designated the country’s independent central statistical authority with formal responsibility for all official statistics. Despite formal emphasis on statistical centralisation in Australia, there has been significant growth in official statistical production outside the ABS in recent decades. I argue that this is partly a product of a perceived tension between maintaining depoliticisation and meeting the needs of policymakers for new information, a tension managed by restricting ABS responsibilities to core statistical programs and creating new statistical agencies and programs to meet policymaker needs. ABS statisticians have exacerbated this trend by insisting on their absolute impartiality and sacrificing their claim to policy usefulness. ABS has a strong bias towards the production of economic indicators, reflecting the institutional settings it has operated in, including its formal location within the Department of the Treasury. The latter has relied on the ABS to bolster its own credibility in economic policy and has actively hindered the ABS from expanding into other statistical subject areas.
In 1994, many responsibilities of Statistics Sweden were transferred to new statistical units operating within policy areas. Statistics Sweden has gradually accrued greater formal powers to oversee and coordinate official statistics in the country, leading to a partial reversal of the decentralisation reforms. Chapter 4 shows how credibility imperatives and institutional settings have shaped these developments. Decentralisation emerged following the end of social democratic political hegemony, when centrist and new-right governments demanded greater responsiveness and efficiency and sought to break up bureaucratic monoliths. Depoliticisation pressures, driven by the EU context, have resulted in a political push for recentralisation of authority. Statistics Sweden historically pursued credibility by emphasising competency, but shifted to stressing usefulness and demystification of official statistics. Sweden’s statisticians enjoy formal independence thanks to constitutional provisions that protect the autonomy of Swedish government agencies, but continuous informal dialogues are used to secure policymakers’ influence over statistical agendas.
The USA has a decentralised statistical system of 13 ‘principal statistical agencies’ and numerous smaller official statistical programs. Formal arrangements for autonomy differ between the agencies, including various models for appointing agency heads. The Chief Statistician has a unique role, not directly overseeing statistical production but with power to review and veto existing and proposed data collection initiatives in the federal government. There is a strong political imperative to steer statistics in support of policy agendas, resulting in practice incremental expansion of statistical collections to meet new needs. Support for statistical autonomy has a pronounced partisan flavour. The US separation of powers creates a greater number of political access points into statistical programs, but also a higher degree of transparency that discourages political meddling. Administrative traditions create an imperative to secure access to the White House, and the office of the Chief Statistician acts as a gatekeeper for this access, channelling statisticians’ demands for new resources and authorities to key central agencies in the executive.
Chapter 7 expands on the ideas already introduced in Chapters 4 and 6 on community assembly rules, understood as any constraint restricting the number and identity of the species observed in an assemblage. The different ecological processes behind such rules are discussed, together with the expected effects of these rules on trait patterns (trait convergence vs trait divergence) at different ecological scales. The importance of defining a proper reference species pool for assessing these mechanisms is explained. A further discussion is provided on the difficulty of ascertaining the specific ecological processes leading to observed patterns of trait variation without experimental approaches. This leads to introducing how null models and data randomizations can provide valuable insight into different assembly rules mechanisms, when proper care is given to considering the effect of scale and an adequate reference species pool. The R examples accompanying this chapter provide different tools to implement a variety of null models in combinations with functional diversity indices.
Intraguild predation is the killing and consuming of a heterospecific competitor that uses similar resources as the prey, and also benefit from preying on each other. We investigated the foraging behaviour of the gallmidge, Aphidoletes aphidimyza, a predator of aphids used for biological control that is also the intraguild prey for most other aphid natural enemies. We focus on how aphid alarm pheromone can alter the behaviour of the gallmidge, and predation by the anthocorid bug Orius laevigatus (O. laevigatus). We hypothesised that gallmidges would respond to the presence of (E)-β-farnesene (EBF) by leaving the host plant. Since feeding by Aphidoletes gallmidge larvae does not induce EBF emission by aphids, this emission indicates the presence of an intraguild predator. We found that gallmidge larvae reduced their foraging activities and left the plant earlier when exposed to EBF, particularly when aphids were also present. Contrastingly, gallmidge females did not change the time visiting plants when exposed to EBF, but lay more eggs on plants that had a higher aphid density. Lastly, EBF reduced the number of attacks of the intraguild predator, O. laevigatus, on gallmidge larvae, potentially because more gallmidges stopped aphid feeding and moved off the plant at which point O. laevigatus predated on aphids. Our work highlights the importance of understanding how intraguild predation can influence the behaviour of potential biological control agents and the impact on pest control services when other natural enemies are also present.