This chapter describes how romantic partners navigate the disagreements that necessarily result from their interdependence and how partners recover when they intentionally or unintentionally hurt each other. Specifically, it reviews the ways in which goals and desires conflict to produce disagreements and how disagreements provide a diagnostic situation in which people make inferences about their partner’s thoughts, feelings, and commitment. Next, it describes typical conflict topics, how conflicts tend to be experienced, and typical conflict prevalence over the course of a romantic relationship. Next, the chapter covers how people manage interpersonal conflicts and highlights specific conflict behaviors that are typically destructive (e.g., hostility, withdrawal) and specific conflict behaviors that are typically constructive (e.g., intimacy, problem solving), as well as how the adaptiveness of conflict behaviors can change depending on the situation. Finally, this chapter reviews how partners can recover from destructive conflicts and other relationship transgressions by accommodating rather than retaliating, sacrificing, and forgiving.

The concept of accommodative coping refers to a "family" of processes by which goal blockages, losses, and similar threats to quality of life are coped with by adjusting individual goal and valuation structures, i.e., in particular by devaluing or "letting go" of threatened or blocked goals and upgrading and pursuing alternative, more attainable goals in their place. While the functionality of accommodative regulatory processes in older and older adulthood has long been elaborated theoretically in several compatible modeling approaches and well studied empirically, accommodative processes in childhood and adolescence have only recently attracted scientific attention. It is helpful here to distinguish the efficacy of accommodative processes in childhood and adolescence itself from the developmental conditions for accommodative processes in adulthood and old age. Combining these perspectives opens up the prospect of an actual lifespan perspective on developmental regulation.

This chapter discusses the design of zoo enclosures and briefly considers important stages in the history of zoo design. Animals must be safely contained within zoos and the nature of the containment varies between species. From time to time containment methods fail and animals escape, sometimes with fatal consequence for them and the people they encounter. There is an ongoing debate about the appropriate amount of space required for some species, especially large carnivores and other wide-ranging taxa. Minimum space requirements for taxa are arbitrarily determined, and usable space and enclosure shape should be considered when enclosures are designed. A number of studies have examined enclosure use by zoo animals, the need for shade and an appropriate substratum. Visitor behaviour may affect enclosure use in some taxa. Enclosure design is a compromise between the need that animals have to avoid the gaze of the public and the desire of visitors to see the animals.

Chapter 1 introduces the concepts and ideas I discuss throughout this book. First, I provide a summary of the experiences of both individuals with disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities in the workplace. This summary exposes the difficulties these two groups have when trying to meet the expectations of their employers. Second, I introduce some of the laws and legal concepts that are discussed throughout the book—the Americans with Disabilities Act, reasonable accommodations, sex discrimination under Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act. Third, I briefly explain my proposal for reform. Finally, this chapter provides a brief outline of the structure of the rest of the book.

Individual speech sounds are modified by the phonetic environment in which they are found in connected speech. In this book, the term accommodation is used generically for any and all articulatory modifications that arise from the phonetic environment. The term assimilation is used for accommodation that crosses phonemic boundaries, and coarticulation is used for sub-phonemic accommodations. Accommodation occurs not due to laziness, but through these forces: (1) the fundamental constraints on producing a number of segments in rapid, connected succession, and (2) the efficiency of speech production – not producing gestures, or extending gestures beyond what is required for the production of highly intelligible speech. Accommodations might be informally called shortcuts, and some shortcuts are required by physical constraints and some are not; others are required by the grammatical rules of the language in question, defined by language-specific rules.

This chapter starts with a discussion of empirical testing based on structural versus reduced models in quantitative studies. Structural models consist of formulas that represent the relation of every dependent variable to its independent variables on various levels, whereas reduced models exhibit the net or overall relation between the dependent variable and the ultimate independent variables. Many quantitative studies published in management journal, especially those that use archival databases, belong to the reduced model category and thus seldom directly test the mechanisms in question. Another popular practice by quantitative researchers is post hoc hypothesis development where they develop hypotheses after they have obtained the results of data analysis. In the process, they may fudge their arguments to fit the results. A replication avoids all the shortcomings of post hoc hypothesis development because its hypotheses, which are the hypotheses of the original study, pre-exist data collection and analysis. Moreover, a replication helps to identify errors in the original study. A multi-method approach enables researchers to study a phenomenon more rigorously and may reveal unanticipated phenomena.

In this chapter, I argue for religious freedom as a first-class right, and I criticise the views of some distinguished scholars who react against traditional conceptions of religious freedom and deny the right to any special protection of religion by legal systems. I focus primarily on Ronald Dworkin and Brian Leiter’s views and arguments. I conclude that Dworkin’s approach to religion belittles the idea of God. Yet conviction about the existence of God and the holding of profound ethical and moral convictions are not so independent as Dworkin argues. Leiter’s approach belittles the idea of religion, which cannot be reduced to a matter of commands, a lack of evidence, and consolation. I argue why religion is more than a matter of conscience and a personal decision about ultimate concerns and questions. Religion cannot be reduced to moral conscience, let alone ethical independence in foundational matters. An increasingly globalised and pluralistic society demands a more comprehensive approach that fully protects all religions and creeds.

This chapter presents the most influential linguistic approaches to presupposition. Going beyond the traditional analyses of the problem of presupposition projection, it also considers recent developments in linguistics that link the analysis of presuppositions to general processes of cognition and reasoning, such as attention, probabilistic reasoning, theory of mind, information structure, attitudes and perspectival structure. I discuss some outstanding questions: whether presuppositions form one coherent group or should be thought of as different types of phenomena, why we have presuppositions at all, and why we see the presuppositions that we see (aka the triggering problem). Overall, the chapter stresses the need to consider the intricacies of the interaction of presuppositions with the broader discourse context.

This chapter discusses response evaluation theories (RETs), which foreground a process of response evaluation. It zooms in on the goal-directed theory of Moors (2017a), which proposes a goal-directed cycle as the causal-mechanistic explanation of the phenomena called emotions. The cycle starts with the detection of a discrepancy between a stimulus and a first goal, which activates a second goal to reduce the discrepancy. This reduction can take the form of assimilation (of the stimulus to the goal via overt action), accommodation (of the goal to the stimulus by changing the first goal), and/or immunization (reinterpretion of the stimulus as less discrepant). Assimilation requires further selection of the action with the highest expected utility. This in turn activates a third goal to engage in the action, leading to overt somatic and motor responses and feelings. The goal-directed theory can account for continuity, a rich form of Intentionality, phenomenality, bodily aspects, heat, control precedence, and irrationality. This wide scope is combined with parsimony in that presumed emotions and non-emotional phenomena are explained by the same mechanism. The goal-directed theory does not deliver discrete emotions, but can nevertheless make sense of them. Empirical research that tests the goal-directed theory is discussed.

Christians have wrestled with conscience from Christianity’s beginning to the present. Does it exist? Do religious and nonreligious people have it? Is conscience a subjective or objective reality? Christians have asked if it is God’s voice, human beings’ own voice, or the voice of the community. Is conscience found in natural law? Is it a combination of the mind, will, heart, and/or the soul? Is it a divine judgment or a self-evaluation? What are the consequences of following an erroneous conscience? Lately, questions have arisen about conscience in a pluralistic society. What ought to be the relationship between conscience and law? Commentators also struggle with questions about accommodating institutions’ conscience claims. Which institutions might qualify and why? Lawmakers also contend over conscience claims made by individuals concerning military service, or over state laws about family matters increasingly at odds with Christian commitments. This book explores sources having lasting influence upon questions about conscience, including the New Testament, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Roger Williams, US federal and state constitutions, and Pope Benedict XVI, among many others.

Nathan Chapman considers the link between free exercise and freedom of conscience in the US Constitution and legislation. Some theorists emphasize the similarity between religion and other moral or philosophical commitments and insist there is no reason to privilege the former over the latter. However, for the founding generation, freedom of conscience meant religious freedom, exercised as a response to one’s duty to God. Courts and legislatures often negotiate different relationships between freedom of religion and of conscience. Speech, press, and association rights have been employed to protect conscience. And some state and federal statutes accommodate religion and other commitments under the label of conscience. However, the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses have not been interpreted to prioritize nonreligious conscience. The Supreme Court has interpreted the law about conscientious objection to military service to include non-theistic beliefs. Some statutes accommodating religion also protect nonreligious beliefs or practices, for example, statutes governing abortion, physician-aided suicide and capital punishment.

This chapter explores the various responses of enslaved individuals to slavery, ranging from accommodation to full scale rebellion and everything in-between. It also examines the ways that slave-owners attempted to control their slaves, including brutal mistreatment (whipping) and positive incentives to loyal service such as the promise of liberation.

In Chapter 1, based on the notion of emerging adulthood, we define adult entrenched dependence as a failure to emerge. Children’s dependence on their parents can be characterized as functional or dysfunctional. We propose ways to differentiate between the two. We clarify that the goal of our approach is not fostering "independence" (which we view as a rather problematic goal) but helping transform dysfunctional into functional dependence. The main changes we try to promote are: (a) developing a time perspective that allows parents to strive for better functioning; (b) helping parents transition from personal effacement into presence; (c) releasing parents from their "sacrifice mentality" in favor of recommitment to wellness; (d) helping parents counter the adult-child's entitlement; and (e) identifying and resisting various forms of violence, blackmail and exploitation.

In Chapter 2, we argue why parental NVR is well-suited to treating entrenched dependence. We describe why attempts at individual therapy for the adult-child or traditional parental counseling usually fail. These failures have different forms, such as: (a) the adult-child refuses therapy; (b) the adult-child accepts therapy, but entitled dependence persists; (c) the parents are advised to show unconditional acceptance, but the dependence remains unaffected; or (d) the parents are advised to be tough, but are daunted when they stumble on frightening escalation. We argue that parents are almost invariably the motivated partners, that they deserve to be viewed as clients in their own right, and that involving the adult-child would distract the parents and the therapist from their job. We elaborate some central insights underlying parental NVR, such as: (a) that the parents' narrative of total responsibility actually prevents improvement; and (b) that parental accommodation aggravates and perpetuates the problem. The chapter concludes with a description of treatment goals and of what changes can be realistically expected.