According to regulatory fit theory (Higgins, 2000), when people make decisions with strategies that sustain their regulatory focus orientation, they “feel right” about what they are doing, and this “feeling-right” experience then transfers to subsequent choices, decisions, and evaluations. The present research was designed to link the concept of regulatory fit to functional accounts of counterfactual thinking. In the present study, participants generated counterfactuals about their anagram performance, after which persistence on a second set of anagrams was measured. Under promotion framing (i.e., find 90% or more of all the possible words) upward counterfactual thinking in general elicited larger increases in persistence than did downward counterfactual thinking in general, but under prevention framing (i.e., avoid failing to find 90% or more of all the possible words) upward evaluation (comparing reality to a better reality) elicited larger increases in persistence than did upward reflection (focusing on a better reality), whereas downward reflection (focusing on a worse reality) elicited larger increases in persistence than did downward evaluation (comparing reality to a worse reality). In all, the present findings suggest that the generation of counterfactuals enhances the likelihood that individuals will engage in courses of action that fit with their regulatory focus orientation.

People often assess the reasonableness of another person’s judgments. When doing so, the evaluator should set aside knowledge that would not have been available to the evaluatee to assess whether the evaluatee made a reasonable decision, given the available information. But under what circumstances does the evaluator set aside information? On the one hand, if the evaluator fails to set aside prior information, not available to the evaluatee, they exhibit belief bias. But on the other hand, when Bayesian inference is called for, the evaluator should generally incorporate prior knowledge about relevant probabilities in decision making. The present research integrated these two perspectives in two experiments. Participants were asked to take the perspective of a fictitious evaluatee and to evaluate the reasonableness of the evaluatee’s decision. The participant was privy to information that the fictitious evaluatee did not have. Specifically, the participant knew whether the evaluatee’s decision judgment was factually correct. Participants’ judgments were biased (Experiments 1 and 2) by the factuality of the conclusion as they assessed the evaluatee’s reasonableness. We also found that the format of information presentation (Experiment 2) influenced the degree to which participants’ reasonableness ratings were responsive to the evaluatee’s Bayesian rationality. Specifically, responsivity was greater when the information was presented in an icon-based, graphical, natural-frequency format than when presented in either a numerical natural-frequency format or a probability format. We interpreted the effects of format to suggest that graphical presentation can help organize information into nested sets, which in turn enhances Bayesian rationality.

“Waste not want not” expresses our culture’s aversion to waste. “I could have gotten the same thing for less” is a sentiment that can diminish pleasure in a transaction. We study people’s willingness to “pay” to avoid this spoiler. In one scenario, participants imagined they were looking for a rental apartment, and had bought a subscription to an apartment listing. If a cheaper subscription had been declined, respondents preferred not to discover post hoc that it would have sufficed. Specifically, they preferred ending their quest for the ideal apartment after seeing more, rather than fewer, apartments, so that the length of the search exceeds that available within the cheaper subscription. Other scenarios produced similar results. We conclude that people may sometimes prefer to be wasteful in order to avoid feeling wasteful.

Protecting tropical forests from deforestation is important for mitigating both biodiversity loss and anthropogenic climate change. In Amazonia, a common approach to protected area (PA) impact studies has been to investigate differences among broad PA categories, such as strictly protected, sustainable use and indigenous areas, yet these may be insufficient for the management of PAs at local scales. We used a matching method to compare impacts and carbon emissions avoided during 2011–2016 of individual PAs in the state of Acre (Brazil). Although most PAs had a positive impact and effectively prevented forest loss, we observed substantial variation among them in terms of impacts, pressures and emissions during our study period. The impacts varied from 3.6% avoided to 15.6% induced forest loss compared to expected levels of deforestation estimated for each PA using the matching method. All but a few PAs helped avoid substantial amounts of emissions. Our results emphasize the need for more PA impact studies that compare multiple PAs at the individual level in Amazonia and beyond.

The effectiveness of many widely used conservation interventions is poorly understood because of a lack of high-quality impact evaluations. Randomized control trials (RCTs), in which experimental units are randomly allocated to treatment or control groups, offer an intuitive way to calculate the impact of an intervention by establishing a reliable counterfactual scenario. As many conservation interventions depend on changing people's behaviour, conservation impact evaluation can learn a great deal from RCTs in fields such as development economics, where RCTs have become widely used but are controversial. We build on relevant literature from other fields to discuss how RCTs, despite their potential, are just one of a number of ways to evaluate impact, are not feasible in all circumstances, and how factors such as spillover between units and behavioural effects must be considered in their design. We offer guidance and a set of criteria for deciding when RCTs may be an appropriate approach for evaluating conservation interventions, and factors to consider to ensure an RCT is of high quality. We illustrate this with examples from one of the few concluded RCTs of a large-scale conservation intervention: an incentive-based conservation programme in the Bolivian Andes. We argue that conservation should aim to avoid a rerun of the polarized debate surrounding the use of RCTs in other fields. Randomized control trials will not be feasible or appropriate in many circumstances, but if used carefully they can be useful and could become a more widely used tool for the evaluation of conservation impact.

Evaluations of generic advertising programs by commodity check-off programs involve analyses of counterfactual scenarios in which advertising and promotion expenditures are set to zero over the program's history. In actual practice, the counterfactual is rarely realized. We present a case in which such a natural experiment occurred when generic advertising and promotion expenditures for U.S. orange juice were cut nearly to zero. Using structural econometric and autoregression models, we estimate losses in consumption and sales revenue and examine the time required for the market for orange juice to recover from the check-off's strategy of going nearly dark.

To design effective food safety programmes we need to estimate how many sporadic foodborne illnesses are caused by specific food sources based on case-control studies. Logistic regression has substantive limitations for analysing structured questionnaire data with numerous exposures and missing values. We adapted random forest to analyse data of a case-control study of Salmonella enterica serotype Enteritidis illness for source attribution. For estimation of summary population attributable fractions (PAFs) of exposures grouped into transmission routes, we devised a counterfactual estimator to predict reductions in illness associated with removing grouped exposures. For the purpose of comparison, we fitted the data using logistic regression models with stepwise forward and backward variable selection. Our results show that the forward and backward variable selection of logistic regression models were not consistent for parameter estimation, with different significant exposures identified. By contrast, the random forest model produced estimated PAFs of grouped exposures consistent in rank order with results obtained from outbreak data, with egg-related exposures having the highest estimated PAF (22·1%, 95% confidence interval 8·5–31·8). Random forest might be structurally more coherent and efficient than logistic regression models for attributing Salmonella illnesses to sources involving many causal pathways.

Deontic meanings have frequently been considered in relation to epistemic meanings and the present paper introduces a novel framework for investigating this relationship. The paper first introduces the basic ideas in Deictic Space Theory (DST), illustrating the geometrical elements involved with respect to counterfactual conceptualisations. This framework is then used to explore deontic conceptualisations in relation to epistemic conceptualisations. Following the implications of the geometrical structure logic of DST, epistemic concepts are taken as fundamental and as presupposed in deontic meanings. It is argued that counterfactuality, which can be modelled as a geometrical reflection transformation, is crucial to the modelling of the conceptual space of obligation concepts expressed in English modal verbs. It is further argued that a second-order reflection transformation can model permission concepts. Deontic ‘force’ is modelled in a natural way as force vectors, an already assumed ingredient of DST's geometrical framework. Finally the paper considers ways in which this framework does and does not run counter to existing claims about deontic and epistemic meaning in Cognitive Semantics.

The human imagination remains one of the last uncharted terrains of the mind. People often imagine how events might have turned out “if only” something had been different. The “fault lines” of reality, those aspects more readily changed, indicate that counterfactual thoughts are guided by the same principles as rational thoughts. In the past, rationality and imagination have been viewed as opposites. But research has shown that rational thought is more imaginative than cognitive scientists had supposed. In The Rational Imagination, I argue that imaginative thought is more rational than scientists have imagined. People exhibit remarkable similarities in the sorts of things they change in their mental representation of reality when they imagine how the facts could have turned out differently. For example, they tend to imagine alternatives to actions rather than inactions, events within their control rather than those beyond their control, and socially unacceptable events rather than acceptable ones. Their thoughts about how an event might have turned out differently lead them to judge that a strong causal relation exists between an antecedent event and the outcome, and their thoughts about how an event might have turned out the same lead them to judge that a weaker causal relation exists. In a simple temporal sequence, people tend to imagine alternatives to the most recent event. The central claim in the book is that counterfactual thoughts are organised along the same principles as rational thought. The idea that the counterfactual imagination is rational depends on three steps: (1) humans are capable of rational thought; (2) they make inferences by thinking about possibilities; and (3) their counterfactual thoughts rely on thinking about possibilities, just as rational thoughts do. The sorts of possibilities that people envisage explain the mutability of certain aspects of mental representations and the immutability of other aspects.