Overprecision is the most robust type of overconfidence. We present a new method that significantly reduces this bias and offers insight into its underlying cause. In three experiments, overprecision was significantly reduced by forcing participants to consider all possible outcomes of an event. Each participant was presented with the entire range of possible outcomes divided into intervals, and estimated each interval’s likelihood of including the true answer. The superiority of this Subjective Probability Interval Estimate (SPIES) method is robust to range widths and interval grain sizes. Its carryover effects are observed even in subsequent estimates made using the conventional, 90% confidence interval method: judges who first made SPIES judgments considered a broader range of values in subsequent conventional interval estimates as well.

According to the time-saving bias, drivers underestimate the time saved when increasing from a low speed and overestimate the time saved when increasing from a relatively high speed. Previous research used a specific type of task — drivers were asked to estimate time saved when increasing speed and to give a numeric response — to show this. The present research conducted two studies with multiple questions to show that the time-saving bias occurs in other tasks. Study 1 found that drivers committed the time-saving bias when asked to estimate (a) the time saved when increasing speed or (b) the distance that can be completed at a given time when increasing speed or (c) the speed required to complete a given distance in decreasing times. Study 2 showed no major differences in estimations of time saved compared to estimations of the remaining journey time and also between responses given on a numeric scale versus a visual analog scale. Study 3 tested two possible explanations for the time-saving bias: a Proportion heuristic and a Differences heuristic. Some evidence was found for use of the latter.

“Waste not want not” expresses our culture’s aversion to waste. “I could have gotten the same thing for less” is a sentiment that can diminish pleasure in a transaction. We study people’s willingness to “pay” to avoid this spoiler. In one scenario, participants imagined they were looking for a rental apartment, and had bought a subscription to an apartment listing. If a cheaper subscription had been declined, respondents preferred not to discover post hoc that it would have sufficed. Specifically, they preferred ending their quest for the ideal apartment after seeing more, rather than fewer, apartments, so that the length of the search exceeds that available within the cheaper subscription. Other scenarios produced similar results. We conclude that people may sometimes prefer to be wasteful in order to avoid feeling wasteful.

Several scholars have recognized the limitations of theories of moral reasoning in explaining moral behavior. They have argued that moral behavior may also be influenced by moral identity, or how central morality is to one’s sense of self. This idea has been supported by findings that people who exemplify moral behavior tend to place more importance on moral traits when defining their self-concepts (Colby & Damon, 1995). This paper takes the next step of examining individual variation in a construct highly associated with immoral behavior — psychopathy. In Study 1, we test the hypothesis that individuals with a greater degree of psychopathic traits have a weaker moral identity. Within a large online sample, we found that individuals who scored higher on a measure of psychopathic traits were less likely to base their self-concepts on moral traits. In Study 2, we test whether this reduced sense of moral identity can be attributed to differences in moral judgment, which is another factor that could influence immoral behavior. Our results indicated that the reduced sense of moral identity among more psychopathic individuals was independent of variation in moral judgment. These results suggest that individuals with psychopathic traits may display immoral behavior partially because they do not construe their personal identities in moral terms.

Difficulty making decisions is one of the symptoms of the depressive illness. Previous research suggests that depressed individuals may make decisions that differ from those made by the non-depressed, and that they use sub-optimal decision-making strategies. For this study we constructed an instrument that aims to measure a variety of decision-making styles as well as the respondent’s view of him or herself as a decision-maker (decisional self-esteem). These styles and estimates of decisional self-esteem were then related to depressive symptoms. Depressive symptomatology correlated negatively with perception of self as a decision-maker. Those with higher depression severity scores characterized themselves as being more anxious about decisions, and more likely to procrastinate. They also reported using fewer productive decision-making strategies, depending more on other people for help with decisions, and relying less on their own intuitions when making decisions. Further research is needed to determine the extent to which these decision-making styles are antecedents to depressive symptomatology or are instead products of, or aspects of, the phenomenology associated with depression.

Considerable research has pointed towards processing differences as a viable means for understanding the strength and likelihood of a framing effect. In the current study we explored how differences in processing may emerge through diurnal patters in circadian rhythm, which varies across individuals. We predicted that during circadian off-times, participants would exhibit stronger framing effects whereas framing effects would be relatively weaker during on-times. Six-hundred and eighty five individuals took part in the study; the findings supported our hypothesis, revealing a diurnal pattern of risk responding that varies across the 24-hour circadian cycle.

Scholars in economics and psychology have created a large literature studying reward, punishment and reciprocity. Labor markets constitute a popular application of this body of work, with particular emphasis on how reciprocity helps regulate workplace relationships where managers are unable to perfectly monitor workers.

We study how idiosyncratic features of the labor market (compared to most scenarios in which reciprocity applies) affect the nature of worker reciprocity. In particular, we show how having an excess supply of workers (simulating unemployment) and managers who can observe the reciprocal behavior of workers and hire/fire them on that basis (simulating the reputational concerns inherent in labor market transactions) profoundly alters worker reciprocity. In the absence of reputational concerns, workers tend to reward kind behavior and punish unkind behavior by managers in approximately equal measure. In the presence of reputational concerns, workers exhibit a marked increase (decrease) in the propensity to reward kind (punish unkind) behavior by managers. We demonstrate how this is a consequence of workers and managers responding to changes in the strategic incentives to reward and punish.

Conflict over Iran’s nuclear program, which involves a US-led policy to impose sanctions on Iran, is perceived by each side as a preeminent challenge to its own national security and global peace. Yet, there is little scientific study or understanding of how material incentives and disincentives, such as economic sanctions, psychologically affect the targeted population and potentially influence behaviour. Here we explore the Iranian nuclear program within a paradigm concerned with sacred values. We integrate experiments within a survey of 1997 Iranians. We find that a relatively small but politically significant portion of the Iranian population believes that acquiring nuclear energy has become a sacred value, in the sense that proposed economic incentives and disincentives result in a “backfire effect” in which offers of material rewards or punishment lead to increased anger and greater disapproval. This pattern was specific to nuclear energy and did not hold for acquiring nuclear weapons. The present study is the first demonstration of the backfire effect for material disincentives as well as incentives, and on an issue whose apparent sacred nature is recent rather than longstanding.

As the study of moral judgments grows, it becomes imperative to compare results across studies in order to create unified theories within the field. These efforts are potentially undermined, however, by variations in wording used by different researchers. The current study sought to determine whether, when, and how variations in wording influence moral judgments. Online participants responded to 15 different moral vignettes (e.g., the trolley problem) using 1 of 4 adjectives: “wrong”, “inappropriate”, “forbidden”, or “blameworthy”. For half of the sample, these adjectives were preceded by the adverb “morally”. Results indicated that people were more apt to judge an act as wrong or inappropriate than forbidden or blameworthy, and that disgusting acts were rated as more acceptable when “morally” was included. Although some wording differences emerged, effects sizes were small and suggest that studies of moral judgment with different wordings can legitimately be compared.