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In this paper, we introduce the Team Effectiveness Model for Science (TEMS) and describe a multiphase set of interventions for forming a new team or developing an existing team. TEMS uses a shared mutual learning mindset as the model’s central and guiding element. It shows how team mindset leads to behavior and to results and how this affects the characteristics of effective team functioning. TEMS addresses two related questions: What are the variables that contribute to effective teams? and How do the variables need to be designed to make their relevant contributions? Team models often answer the first question without fully answering the second. By addressing three gaps, TEMS contributes to enhancing science team effectiveness. Gap 1 is the absence of explicit core values, assumptions, and norms that serve as the foundation for developing and maintaining science team effectiveness. Gap 2 is the absence of a process for integrating the science and relationship aspects of a science team. Gap 3 is the absence of team processes and structures that are derived from the team’s values, assumptions, and norms. Using TEMS to design new or intervene with existing teams focuses on shifting mindset, developing behavioral skills, and designing processes and structures congruent with the new mindset.
In the first chapter of Recognizing Resentment, I historically situate the debate about the passions and their role in sociability to which Joseph Butler responded at the outset of the eighteenth century. I correct the mischaracterization of the seventeenth cenutry as the age reason reigned supreme, highlighting instead how a host of philosophers in the rationalist tradition began to pay particular attention to the importance of passion in moral and political motivation and obligation. For rationalists and psychological egoists like Thomas Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza, and John Locke, passions were influential but socially destabiizing and “vicious.” The same was true of the philosophy of the father of the natural law tradition, Hugo Grotius. However, Grotius's disciple, Samuel von Pufendorf, and the heir to the egoist tradition in the eighteenth century, Bernard Mandeville, began to view the passions in a new light. However vicious they might be, Pufendorf and Mandeville believed passions positively contibuted to our ability to live together in large, diverse societies.
Resentment has a bad, but undeserved rap, in both political theory and popular culture today. But this book has shown that liberal political theorists were not always so dismissed of resentment as a moral motive because of its psychological features, most importantly, its basis in equal recognition. But I have also demonstrated the limitations of sympathetic resentment throughout the book. In this conclusion, I consider how commercial institutions like competition and free exchange might ameliorate our prospects for spectatorial resentment, as well as what the empirical research on resentment, empathy, and perspective-taking might teach us about how to improve sympathetic resentment. Finally, I reflect on what persistent injustice in liberal societies might suggest about the value of the theory of sympathetic resentment I have offered in this book.
Political theorists and social scientists alike agree that passions matter for politics, but disagree about which passions matter most and how they contribute to political flourishing. I make the case that resentment, contrary to its traditional associations with violence and injustice, in fact makes us alive to the suffering of others and leads us to aid them in seeking restitution. When we adopt the resentments of others by sympathizing with them, we implicitly recognize their equal moral and political status, too, key commitments of liberalism. I argue that liberals of all stripes should embrace sympathetic resentment as a proper moral motive for justice.
Although an Anglican bishop, Joseph Butler was the first thinker in the liberal tradition to argue that resentment could be morally justifiable, specifically when it was deliberate and sympathetically experienced on behalf of another person. Contrary to his egoist predecessors and also unlike eighteenth century theorists who took human sociability to be the product of our benevolent natures, Butler believed the resentments we adopted on behalf of those familiar to us were morally good motives for action and indeed the clearest evidence of our common humanity. Butler believed our sympathetic resentment was based on our belief in the equal status of victims, too. And, finally, Butler advanced a limited view of the nature and scope of our political duties, grounded in his moral psychology.
There is no eighteenth-century moral philosopher more reknown for his work on the passions than David Hume, but political theorists have only recently began to explore Hume's myriad, important contributions to the study of moral and political motivation and obligation. The study of Hume's political thought has always been plagued by a so-called “motivational dilemma” related to his theory of justice, which suprisingly appears to rationally established. I argue in this chapter instead that the affective components of Hume's theory of justice, including his treatment of sympathetic resentment, are just as central. Hume not only builds on Butler's account of sympathy but also nuances resentment's tie to injustice, as both an alert to injury and as a motive subject to partiality. Hume explains when and why we are likely to be partial in our sympathetic resentments, as well as what kind of instutions might counteract such partiality.
Like his predecessors, Adam Smith saw the value of resentment as a motive for justice and an emotion that best captured our belief in the equality of others, but he offered the most comprehensive account of how the passion of resentment might be made into a moral (or proper) passion. Through his innovative impartial spectator theory, which explains how–and why–individuals refine their own emotions and learn to better recognize the emotions of many, varied others, Smith developed a theory of justice based on spectatorial resentment that avoided the pitfalls of partiality and while leveraging resentment's potency as a motive and intimate connection to injustice. More than any other thinker, Smith was also attuned to the psychological toll that the refinement of spectatorial resentment imposed on victims and spectators of injustice alike, however, casting his social and political theory in a somewhat tragic light. Smith thus offers a therapeutic view of religious belief as one means available to liberal citizens who must cope with lingering resentment in an unjust world.
We typically think of resentment as an unjustifiable and volatile emotion, responsible for fostering the worst political divisions. Recognizing Resentment argues instead that sympathy with the resentment of victims of injustice is vital for upholding justice in liberal societies, as it entails recognition of the equal moral and political status of those with whom we sympathize. Sympathizing with the resentment of others makes us alive to injustice in a way no rational recognition of wrongs alone can, and it motivates us to demand justice on others' behalves. This book rehabilitates arguments for the moral and political worth of resentment developed by three influential thinkers in the early liberal tradition - Joseph Butler, David Hume, and Adam Smith - and uses these to advance a theory of spectatorial resentment, discussing why we should be indignant about the injustice others face, and how such a shared sentiment can actually bring liberal citizens closer together.
The study of rhetoric has recently undergone a revival in political theory as a response to deliberative democratic approaches that value reason over affect in the political sphere. Most rhetorical revivalists look to Aristotle and develop accounts of ethos (character) that privilege the epistemic dimensions of trust, while overlooking the importance that considerations of propriety play in shaping the political speech of democratic leaders. We reconsider the rhetorical approach by integrating the regulative standards suggested by two political thinkers who also were theorists of rhetoric: Cicero and Adam Smith. Committed to character's role in collective judgment, Cicero and Smith both hold that sincerity and context shape decorum or propriety: Leaders rely on decorum to shape their rhetorical appeals, and audiences look to the fit between speech and character to gauge moral trustworthiness. Smith, however, goes beyond Cicero to develop a rhetorical theory more relevant for democracies by highlighting the importance of political context for rhetorical appeals and evaluations. We conclude by suggesting that attention to these components of decorum moves beyond Aristotelian accounts of rhetorical character in a way that is consistent with much empirical research on how voters judge the character of elected officials.
Radial Velocity (RV) plots of emission lines, including Hα, from non-magnetic Cataclysmic Variables (CV), are usually fit with a sin curve. This sin fit sometimes does not prove to be the best fit for some non-magnetic CVs with accretion discs. An analytical model is created based on our 3D Smoothed Particle Hydrodynamic (SPH) numerical code in order to simulate the RV curves. The observational target is WW And, a long period non-magnetic CV. The model takes into account disc ellipticity and inclination angle that provide good non-sinusoidal fits to the observed RV data.
To explore patients' understanding of decision making in the treatment of advanced cancer and to determine the factors they believe important to these processes in their care.
Surveys were distributed to consecutive outpatients with advanced malignancy attending a comprehensive cancer treatment center.
Patients believed that the medical condition (94%), their doctors' experience (81%), and the medical literature (73%) are the most important factors for decisions made in their care. They also value their relationship with the doctor (63%) and their own (the patients') values (63%), and just over a third considered their family's values and the doctors' personality important. Most did not believe the doctors' values should influence decisions made. They were mindful of the uncertainty involved in decisions in the setting of advanced cancer.
Significance of results:
Overall, patients were satisfied with the decision-making processes and they understood and highly regarded the incorporation of factors, other than their medical condition, in their care.