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Intentional vehicular assaults on civilians have become more frequent worldwide, with some resulting in mass casualties, injuries, and traumatized witnesses. Health care costs associated with these vehicular assaults usually fall to compensation agencies. There is, however, little guidance around how compensation agencies should respond to mental and physical injury claims arising from large-scale transport incidents.
A Delphi review methodology was used to establish expert consensus recommendations on the major components of “no fault” injury claim processes for mental and physical injury.
Thirty-three international experts participated in a 3-round online survey to rate their agreement on key statements generated from the literature. Consensus was achieved for 45 of 60 (75%) statements, which were synthesized into 36 recommendations falling within the domains of (1) facilitating claims, (2) eligibility rules, (3) payments and benefits for clients, (4) claims management procedures, (5) making and explaining decisions, (6) support and information resources for clients, (7) managing scheme staff and organizational response, (8) clients with special circumstances, and (9) scheme values and integrity.
The recommendations present an opportunity for agencies to review their existing claims management systems and procedures. They also provide the basis for the development of best practice guidelines, which may be adapted for application to compensation schemes in different contexts worldwide.
The mythology of the Market is strongly evident, indicated by the corporate camouflage of existential desire by the wide range of constructed desires. This mythology has materialised in the personalisation of the idea of the corporation. Its functioning is revealed by the commodification of individuals within models of regulatory capitalism and by the structural embedding of debt as credit. These trends have been promoted by the digitisation of corporate function, by algorithmic profiling of individuals as consumers and by the exploitation of Big Data. This has morphed into surveillance capitalism. The non-mythological way forward would start with focusing on all shareholders, including all citizens on whom the corporation impacts. This is the reimagining of corporations on purpose-based, fiduciary principles. This in turn would require the redrafting of competition and consumer protection law, as well as shifting the control of personal data to the individual. It would also require changes to employee relations strategies.
The State has been a mythological entity through its history, from its sovereign phase to its present dispersed, nodal, regulatory phase. This dispersal raises important questions about gradual disappearance of public accountability. It also points to such other key issues as the dilution of personal responsibility, especially when considered in the context of the determinative implications of neuroscientific research. These trends are further emphasised by the increasingly avaricious, non-consensual digitisation of the State and the threat to democratic values posed by such trends as data brokering and algorithmic friendliness. The consequential move to a non-mythological State can be produced by the reimagining of agencies as purpose-based and which operate on existential, fiduciary principles in a manner that avoids Pettit’s republicanism. How this transition can take place is evidenced by the difference between mythological and non-mythological criminal justice, a model for which is presented.
This work will address the problems of contemporary accounts of privacy by placing them in a new context of the mythological social dynamic that has constrained the West. This dynamic has driven a trajectory of failed mythological magnitudes – Deity, State, Market and now Technology – by which we have tried to avoid existential reality rather than embrace it. This avoidance is why privacy is vulnerable to the imminent impact of the latest form of that dynamic, neuroscience: while ‘privacy’ comes from early forms of this dynamic, neuroscience is now its most powerful form and will overwhelm that sense of privacy. Privacy needs to be removed from this dynamic, reconceiving it through existential, respectful self-responsibility. It will then survive this challenge and will, counterintuitively, embrace neuroscientific benefits, including their promotion of this new privacy through the technological control of the citizen. We will examine the dynamic, how it produced present notions of privacy through a singular form of normalisation, and how it is being re-formed by the mythological algorithms of neuroscience. To disengage privacy, we will need new ethical principles and reimagined social infrastructure – law, State and Market, these best understood by reconceiving regulation. That will provide the necessary support for self-responsibility.
Any new account of privacy, especially one with the unusual combination of elements as is presented here, will require a conducive institutional environment. The environment proposed here is based on a new notion of regulation, in the broad sense of social control rather than the narrower sense of subsidiary legislation and despite the successes claimed for that latter form. In this broad sense, present regulation derives from the spread of power from sovereign institutions as means by which that sovereign power is transformed but still empowered and which can be seen in such shapes as biopower and the algorithmic determinism of human behaviour. The presently dominant form of regulation, responsive regulation, is best seen as mythological, especially through the manner in which it is informed by the republicanism of Pettit. In response, the new sense of regulation as social control focuses on the reimagining of institutions and the promotion of the existential interests of the individual to centre-stage. This is the reverse of current priorities.
We need to understand neuroscience as an emanation of artificial intelligence. By that, a range of methods is being used to understand not only how the brain functions but also how it might be brought to function. Such neural change will increasingly come from connecting the brain to external sources of intelligence, both artificial and human. Yet the algorithms that are driving these developments are not neutral. As the world is itself increasingly being claimed to be algorithmic, we need to see not only that algorithms – and the data they interpret – are designed but that this design carries personal and cultural presumptions. We are re-creating the world through algorithms and that is both a form of idealism and one which is, because of that cultural frame, mythological in the sense of the dominant social dynamic. That is, because algorithmic designs are not determined by each individual, they are technologies of subjection, willing embraced or imposed. They are formative not only of the world but also of the individual self. This process is as evident in virtual and augmented realities as it is in clinical neuroscience.
The illegitimacy of present accounts of privacy is revealed by the manner in which normalisation has long taken place through a series of social transitions. Other historical perspectives of societal evolution have been adopted, but the mythological analysis here is distinctive. Following Christian confessionalism and pastoralism, we see the methods of governmentalizing discipline that led to the civilising of the sovereign State through the rise of the bourgeoisie; then the liberalism and neoliberalism that ultimately promoted the dominance of the Market over the State, by which the consumer has been constructed; and now the Technological ‘algorisation’ of social and individual perspective and practice. Many of the elements that have accumulated in this long process are thereby being brought to bear in technologies of the self as self-creation. Each of these regimes was founded on the distancing and camouflage of existential reality, inducing subjection to the ideas and practices promoted within these mythological magnitudes and primarily for the benefit of their respective dominant interests.
A valid new sense of privacy would need to be founded on the principles of the existential, respectful self-responsibility of all individuals and the promotion of which would need to be complemented by a reimagined State, Market and technological design principles. This will allow the embrace, not the denial, of the value of technological development, especially in neuroscience. In this context, each individual would have an evolving personal technology strategy with progressive/enhancement and conservative/protection elements. From that, respectful self-responsibility would require both sharing information and acquiring it, all typically under the individual’s control, including through data and algorithms that are designed and applied under their direction. The initiatives undertaken by the IEEE and MyData are moves in the right direction, but they remain prey to mythological interpretation. The principles of this new sense of privacy are then tested by application to standard and well-known privacy dilemmas, including on case law.
In developing a new ethic as a foundation for a non-mythological notion of privacy, we need first to put aside the informational ethics of Floridi, as that is founded on the conception of the individual as, ontologically, information. We demonstrate that this is a mythological position. Capurro has seen the errors of that argument in the dehumanisation of the individual. In moving forward, we examine the value of the full range of the standard ethical qualities on which our relationship with technology is said to be best based and thereby how we should manage its intrusions into privacy. These include dignity, liberty, identity, responsibility, democratic principles, equality, human rights and the common good. However, each of these is shown ultimately to be vulnerable to a range of shortcomings. It is argued that only respectful self-responsibility – that is, responsibility to and for oneself which is respectful of others and which relies on existential values – can act as a solid ethical foundation, although these other principles can be claimed to be of secondary value. We conclude the argument here by pointing out how that principle would not fall prey to bourgeois aspirations.
Law by its very nature tends towards the constraint of the decision-making of individuals, and so has an inherent – but not inevitable – mythological disposition, especially when in combination with both the sovereign and regulatory power of the State. Thereby it reflects shifting forms of – most recently neoliberal – power and truth. A non-mythological law will need to be framed constitutionally but will also require a rethinking of the rule of law, which is currently mostly comprised of anatomical lists of preferred characteristics. There are alternative approaches in the form of teleological accounts – preferred here – and prominent amongst which is that of Krygier. However, he does not go far enough, settling for a critical exploration of social traditions and seeing the arbitrary use of force as the dominant target. This tends to ignore the spread of sovereign power into regulatory forms, which are as intrusive as arbitrary power, albeit in a different manner. An existential rule of law would be founded on purpose-based, fiduciary principles which committed agencies to promote the non-mythological interests of self-responsible individuals. Trust would play a valuable but secondary role in such arrangements.
Part I has been concerned with the significance of emerging neuroscience for the idea and practice of privacy and with a range of contextual factors through which that significance needs to be understood.
Examining privacy theory begins with what is absent from present accounts, that is, the central importance of our personal concerns about our existential reality. These concerns, and the disposition to seek ways to distance and camouflage them with constructed concerns, is at the heart of the inducements of what emerged as the mythological trajectory of Deity, State, Market and Technology. The impact of the ideas and practices left behind by these failed but persisting magnitudes is what is normalised in us and comes to comprise what we see as our private world. However, these ideas and practices are mythological subjections. There are two dominant present accounts of privacy, the ‘Constitutional’ (which is sourced from the ideas and practices of Deity, State and Market), which is primarily a bourgeois account, and the ‘Selected Flow of Information’ account (which is inspired by the movement of information within a social context, especially in the technological age). Given the mythological content of both accounts, the way forward needs to take an entirely different approach. This will relocate existential reality to the centre of its frame but also emphasise an ethic which rejects subjection, one framed by respectful self-responsibility.
Neuroscience has begun to intrude deeply into what it means to be human, an intrusion that offers profound benefits but will demolish our present understanding of privacy. In Privacy in the Age of Neuroscience, David Grant argues that we need to reconceptualize privacy in a manner that will allow us to reap the rewards of neuroscience while still protecting our privacy and, ultimately, our humanity. Grant delves into our relationship with technology, the latest in what he describes as a historical series of 'magnitudes', following Deity, the State and the Market, proposing the idea that, for this new magnitude (Technology), we must control rather than be subjected to it. In this provocative work, Grant unveils a radical account of privacy and an equally radical proposal to create the social infrastructure we need to support it.
This round-table discussion, edited by Eva Urban and Lisa FitzGerald, took place on 5 July 2019 as part of the conference ‘New Romantics: Performing Ireland and Cosmopolitanism on the Anniversary of Human Rights’ organized by the editors at the Brian Friel Theatre, Queen’s University Belfast. Lisa FitzGerald is a theatre historian and ecocritic who completed postdoctoral fellowships at the Centre de Recherche Bretonne et Celtique (CRBC), Université Rennes 2 and the Rachel Carson Centre for Environment and Society, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. She is the author of Re-Place: Irish Theatre Environments (Peter Lang, 2017) and Digital Vision and the Ecological Aesthetic (forthcoming, Bloomsbury, 2020). Eva Urban is a Senior Research Fellow at the Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security, and Justice, Queen’s University Belfast, and an Associate Fellow of the Institute of Irish Studies, QUB. She is the author of Community Politics and the Peace Process in Contemporary Northern Irish Drama (Peter Lang, 2011) and La Philosophie des Lumières dans le Théâtre Breton: Tradition et Influences (Université de Rennes, 2019). Rosemary Jenkinson is a Belfast playwright and writer of five short story collections. Her plays include The Bonefire (Rough Magic), Planet Belfast (Tinderbox), White Star of the North, Here Comes the Night (Lyric), Lives in Translation (Kabosh Theatre Company), and Michelle and Arlene (Accidental Theatre). Her writing for radio includes Castlereagh to Kandahar (BBC Radio 3) and The Blackthorn Tree (BBC Radio 4). She has received a Major Individual Artist Award from the Arts Council of Northern Ireland to write a memoir. Tom Maguire is Head of the School of Arts and Humanities at Ulster University and has published widely on Irish and Scottish theatre and in the areas of Theatre for Young Audiences and Storytelling Performance. His heritage research projects include the collection Heritage after Conflict: Northern Ireland (Routledge, 2018, co-edited with Elizabeth Crooke). David Grant is a former Programme Director of the Dublin Theatre Festival and was Artistic Director of the Lyric Theatre in Belfast. He has worked extensively as a theatre director throughout Ireland and is co-investigator of an AHRC-funded research project into Arts for Reconciliation. He lectures in drama at Queen’s University Belfast.
Evidence indicates that Antarctic minke whales (AMWs) in the Ross Sea affect the foraging behaviour, especially diet, of sympatric Adélie penguins (ADPEs) by, we hypothesize, influencing the availability of prey they have in common, mainly crystal krill. To further investigate this interaction, we undertook a study in McMurdo Sound during 2012–2013 and 2014–2015 using telemetry and biologging of whales and penguins, shore-based observations and quantification of the preyscape. The 3D distribution and density of prey were assessed using a remotely operated vehicle deployed along and to the interior of the fast-ice edge where AMWs and ADPEs focused their foraging. Acoustic surveys of prey and foraging behaviour of predators indicate that prey remained abundant under the fast ice, becoming successively available to air-breathing predators only as the fast ice retreated. Over both seasons, the ADPE diet included less krill and more Antarctic silverfish once AMWs became abundant, but the penguins' foraging behaviour (i.e. time spent foraging, dive depth, distance from colony) did not change. In addition, over time, krill abundance decreased in the upper water column near the ice edge, consistent with the hypothesis (and previously gathered information) that AMW and ADPE foraging contributed to an alteration of prey availability.