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16 - Modal logic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2014

James W. Garson
Affiliation:
University of Houston
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Summary

This chapter is an introduction to the natural semantics for modal logics. A pleasing result is that the basic modal logic K expresses the standard truth condition for □, where the accessibility relation R is defined as this is done in canonical models for modal logic (Section 16.1). Extensions of K such as the logics (M=T, S4, and S5) are treated in Section 16.2. Here we learn that some modal axioms involving □ (such as (M) and (4)) express their corresponding frame conditions, but others involving ◊ such as (B) and (5) do not. A more detailed treatment of the natural semantics for ◊ rules follows (Section 16.3). It shows that the interpretation of ◊ is novel and doubly intensional. Section 16.4 reveals how complications that arise for the completeness of quantified modal logic may be explained by the fact that the natural semantics for the quantifiers differs from the substitutional and objectual readings. The chapter closes (Section 16.5) with the description of an interesting but failed project. It is to modify the definition of validity to more faithfully capture what is expressed by natural deduction rules that involve the use of modal (or boxed) subproofs. Though clean results on the natural semantics of those systems are not available, we hope the reader will find the discussion an inspiration for further research using variations on the definition of validity.

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What Logics Mean
From Proof Theory to Model-Theoretic Semantics
, pp. 255 - 270
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

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  • Modal logic
  • James W. Garson, University of Houston
  • Book: What Logics Mean
  • Online publication: 05 June 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139856461.017
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  • Modal logic
  • James W. Garson, University of Houston
  • Book: What Logics Mean
  • Online publication: 05 June 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139856461.017
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Modal logic
  • James W. Garson, University of Houston
  • Book: What Logics Mean
  • Online publication: 05 June 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139856461.017
Available formats
×