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  1. Home
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  3. What Logics Mean
  • Cited by 16
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
June 2014
Print publication year:
2013
Online ISBN:
9781139856461
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139856461
Subjects:
Cognitive Linguistics, Logic, Philosophy, Language and Linguistics
Information

Book description

What do the rules of logic say about the meanings of the symbols they govern? In this book, James W. Garson examines the inferential behaviour of logical connectives (such as 'and', 'or', 'not' and 'if … then'), whose behaviour is defined by strict rules, and proves definitive results concerning exactly what those rules express about connective truth conditions. He explores the ways in which, depending on circumstances, a system of rules may provide no interpretation of a connective at all, or the interpretation we ordinarily expect for it, or an unfamiliar or novel interpretation. He also shows how the novel interpretations thus generated may be used to help analyse philosophical problems such as vagueness and the open future. His book will be valuable for graduates and specialists in logic, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of language.

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Contents

Contents
References
References
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