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3 - Criticisms of presidentialism and responses

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Matthew Soberg Shugart
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
John M. Carey
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
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Summary

Having defined what presidentialism is, as well as what other types of regimes have popularly elected presidents, we now turn to the scholarly debate about the merits of presidential regimes. In this chapter we concern ourselves primarily with the ideal type of presidentialism that we defined at the beginning of Chapter 2. We address the criticisms of this regime type, then offer responses. Our purpose here is to determine whether it is even worth considering presidentialism as a viable option for democracies, especially new democracies. For, if scholars such as Di Palma (1990) are correct that regimes with elected presidents are “dangerous,” especially for new democracies, then there would be little point in considering possible advantages of such regime types. In short, we do not find the criticisms of presidentialism, which have been launched in a nearly one-sided debate thus far, to be unassailable. After responding to these criticisms as they relate directly to pure presidentialism, we turn to the ways in which premier-presidentialism addresses the criticisms, and perhaps offers remedies for some of presidentialism's more dubious qualities.

THE CASE AGAINST THE PRESIDENT

The myriad criticisms brought against presidentialism have been elaborated in various combinations in a number of recent essays criticizing the system. We understand presidentialism's problems, as described in the current literature, to fall into three broad categories. The fundamental deficiencies of the system are its:

  1. temporal rigidity;

  2. majoritarian tendencies;

  3. dual democratic legitimacies.

Type
Chapter
Information
Presidents and Assemblies
Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics
, pp. 28 - 54
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1992

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