Justice as fairness makes moral demands on all citizens. For example, Rawls holds that there are natural duties on all individuals that include, among others, duties “not to harm or injure another,” “not to cause unnecessary suffering,” and “to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us” (TJ 98, 99). But justice as fairness also holds that when individuals accept certain positions with special responsibility and authority, they put themselves under obligations that are more demanding than the moral requirements that apply to ordinary citizens (TJ 97). As an exercise in ideal theory, justice as fairness assumes that all individuals have a sense of justice (and are motivated to comply with it) at least above a certain minimal threshold. In this respect, they are all equal. However, even as part of ideal theory, Rawls notes that “individuals presumably have varying capacities for a sense of justice” above this threshold (TJ 443). And a higher-than-ordinary sensitivity to concerns of justice may be a qualiication for certain social positions.