Introduction

Hegel's views on morality have attracted much controversy, particularly with regards to his criticisms of Kant's moral theory. Famously, Hegel accused Kantian morality of being overly formalistic and lacking in content. Kant's defenders have argued that Hegel's criticisms fall wide of the mark, while Hegel's admirers, such as F. H. Bradley, claim his criticisms ‘annihilated’ Kant's theory. Both sides offer a compelling picture and the debate between the two is seemingly intractable, with neither side willing to concede much ground.

This chapter offers a new position on this old debate. I agree with Kant's defenders that Hegel's criticisms are at best uncharitable. Hegel redefines ‘morality’ and then he uses this new redefinition as a vantage point to criticize the views of others. We should hardly be surprised to find that other moral theories are found wanting by his account. Nevertheless, Kant's project centres on the derivation of universal moral principles which we should all honour. Hegel's primary criticism is that his understanding of what constitutes such principles cannot perform the work that Kant wants them to achieve. We might then be misled into thinking that Hegel's complete view is that the Kantian project is a complete failure, although this would be a mistake. There is a space in Hegel's theory of the state for universal principles, namely, within the relationship between religion and the state. We can best situate Kant's moral theory in relation with Hegel's larger philosophical vision, despite Hegel's criticisms of Kant's theory.