The reception of Hegel'sPhilosophy of Right

It is perhaps ironic that the Anglo-American reception of G. W. F. Hegel's the Philosophy of Right first published in 1821 has developed along its own dialectical path. In essence, Hegel's dialectic unfolds in the following way: we begin with an initial standpoint, we then next move toward a consideration of its opposite standpoint, and then we arrive at a middle position between these initial two extremes. The ensuing reception of the Philosophy of Right curiously follows a similar tale of moving from one position to its opposite, only to settle at a middle position between the two earlier extremes.

The first great debate on the Philosophy of Right was over its political sympathies. From its first appearance, it had been charged with endorsing a dangerous conservatism bordering on totalitarianism and fascism. For example, Karl Popper described Hegel as ‘the father of modern historicism and totalitarianism’. Hegel's defenders later argued not only that these charges were untrue, but that, in fact, Hegel's views are consistent with liberalism. The debate on whether Hegel's political philosophy is either conservative or liberal is now over. Today, the overwhelming majority of commentators accept that Hegel's views are best viewed as politically moderate, in between the extremes of conservatism and liberalism. Thus, the history of the first debate is a movement from one standpoint to its opposite, only to settle at a middle position between the two earlier extremes.