Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- AUTHOR'S NOTE
- PART ONE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS IN COMPARATIVE LAW
- CHAPTER 1 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION AND THE LEGISLATOR
- CHAPTER 2 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS' INTERFERENCE WITH THE CONSTITUENT POWER
- CHAPTER 3 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS' INTERFERENCE WITH THE LEGISLATOR ON EXISTING LEGISLATION
- CHAPTER 4 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS' INTERFERENCE WITH THE LEGISLATOR REGARDING LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS
- CHAPTER 5 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS LEGISLATORS ON MATTERS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
- PART TWO NATIONAL REPORTS
- ARGENTINA
- AUSTRALIA
- AUSTRIA
- BELGIUM
- BRAZIL
- CANADA
- COLOMBIA
- COLOMBIA
- COSTA RICA
- CROATIA
- CZECH REPUBLIC
- FRANCE
- GERMANY
- BELGIUM, FRANCE, GERMANY
- GREECE
- HUNGARY
- INDIA
- ITALY
- MEXICO
- NETHERLANDS
- NORWAY
- POLAND
- PORTUGAL
- SERBIA
- SLOVAK REPUBLIC
- SWITZERLAND
- UNITED KINGDOM
- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- VENEZUELA
- PART THREE SYNTHESIS REPORT: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS IN COMPARATIVE LAW
- APPENDIX
- INDEX
GREECE
Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2017
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- AUTHOR'S NOTE
- PART ONE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS IN COMPARATIVE LAW
- CHAPTER 1 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION AND THE LEGISLATOR
- CHAPTER 2 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS' INTERFERENCE WITH THE CONSTITUENT POWER
- CHAPTER 3 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS' INTERFERENCE WITH THE LEGISLATOR ON EXISTING LEGISLATION
- CHAPTER 4 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS' INTERFERENCE WITH THE LEGISLATOR REGARDING LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS
- CHAPTER 5 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS LEGISLATORS ON MATTERS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
- PART TWO NATIONAL REPORTS
- ARGENTINA
- AUSTRALIA
- AUSTRIA
- BELGIUM
- BRAZIL
- CANADA
- COLOMBIA
- COLOMBIA
- COSTA RICA
- CROATIA
- CZECH REPUBLIC
- FRANCE
- GERMANY
- BELGIUM, FRANCE, GERMANY
- GREECE
- HUNGARY
- INDIA
- ITALY
- MEXICO
- NETHERLANDS
- NORWAY
- POLAND
- PORTUGAL
- SERBIA
- SLOVAK REPUBLIC
- SWITZERLAND
- UNITED KINGDOM
- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- VENEZUELA
- PART THREE SYNTHESIS REPORT: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS IN COMPARATIVE LAW
- APPENDIX
- INDEX
Summary
In international comparison, Greek courts recognized the judicial power to review the constitutionality of legislation very early on the basis of constitutional supremacy. However, from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century, Greek courts generally deferred to the political branches of government, and in practice, they have rarely challenged legislative or executive acts on constitutional grounds. Situated between the American and the European models, constitutional adjudication in Greece eludes neat definition in terms of both the system of review and its concrete application by the courts. Following an overview on the system of judicial review in Greek constitutional law (see section I), this report examines its concrete application. It focuses on the development of the interplay between judicial self-restraint and judicial activism, in addition to positive legislation through judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation and its limits (see section II).
THE SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial Organization
The Greek judicial system is divided into functionally different subsystems, each with its own high court. The courts are divided into administrative, civil, and criminal courts (Art. 93 § 1 Const.). The Areios Pagos Court (Áρειος Πάγος) sits at the apex of all civil and criminal courts; the Council of State (∑υμβούλιο της Επικρατείας), modeled on the French Conseil d'État, functions primarily as the supreme administrative court (Art. 95 Const.). The Constitution also provides for a third high court, the Court of Audit (Ελεγκτικό ∑υνέδριο), to which no lower courts correspond, and which has comparatively limited judicial responsibilities.
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- Information
- Constitutional Courts as Positive LegislatorsA Comparative Law Study, pp. 539 - 574Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011