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7 - Informal Logical Fallacies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

By
Jane Risen  and
Thomas Gilovich
Edited by
Robert J. Sternberg ,
Henry L. Roediger III  and
Diane F. Halpern
Jane Risen
Affiliation:
Cornell University
Thomas Gilovich
Affiliation:
Cornell University
Robert J. Sternberg
Affiliation:
Yale University, Connecticut
Henry L. Roediger III
Affiliation:
Washington University, St Louis
Diane F. Halpern
Affiliation:
Claremont McKenna College, California
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Summary

Premise 1: All good chapters begin with a pithy quote.

Premise 2: We do not begin with a pithy quote.

Conclusion: This is not a good chapter.

Is this a valid conclusion? According to formal logic, it is. Formally, an argument is valid if the conclusion follows from the premises (whether or not the premises are true) and is invalid if it does not. Thus, formal logic is only concerned with the rules for drawing conclusions from a given set of premises (Baron, 1994). It does not specify a standard for evaluating the premises themselves (except, of course, to the extent that the premises were derived as conclusions from other premises).

This chapter focuses on informal logic. Unlike formal logic, informal logic seeks standards for the generation and evaluation of premises. Thus, if Premise 1 is not supported by sufficient evidence, then, according to informal logic, the conclusion about the chapter is not valid. So don't despair: This chapter may have more promise than our opening syllogism would compel you to conclude.

A second difference between formal logic and informal logic is that formal logic deals with certainty, and therefore does not offer a way to weigh the reasonableness of multiple valid or invalid conclusions (Baron, 1994). For instance, if the first premise were, “Some good chapters begin with pithy quotes,” the conclusion would be invalid.

Type
Chapter
Information
Critical Thinking in Psychology , pp. 110 - 130
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

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