REALISM, SCIENCE, AND ETHICS

It is often said that Bernard Williams opposes ethical realism. And so he does. But what does this mean? The term “realism” has a notorious and bewildering variety of uses. What does Williams oppose? The first and most basic thing that needs to be emphasized is that what he opposes is just what its name implies: realism about ethics. This highlights something that is becoming increasingly standard in philosophical uses of the term “realism,” namely, its relativization to a subject matter. Granted such relativization, a realist about history may or may not be a realist about mathematics, say. Indeed, we shall see in due course that Williams' opposition to realism about ethics is to be understood precisely in contrast with his acceptance of realism about science.

But here already there is a complication. For the term “realism” is also sometimes used without relativization. We sometimes hear it said of a given philosopher that he or she is a realist tout court. More to the point, we sometimes hear it said of Williams. Moreover, I think this is an appropriate thing to say of him, properly understood. I also think it is an appropriate point of leverage in the attempt to understand his position.

Williams' realism – tout court – receives famous and memorable expression in his book on Descartes, where he writes, “Knowledge is of what is there anyway.”