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6 - Formal SoCs and Informal Political Manipulation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2009

Ellen Lust-Okar
Affiliation:
Yale University, Connecticut
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Summary

The formal institutions that incumbents create to structure government–opposition relations also influence their choices of informal mechanisms through which they manage individual opposition groups. Authoritarian elites treat opponents differentially. They can allow some opponents to organize more openly, thus gaining political strength, while simultaneously repressing others. They also influence the choices of entrepreneurs by opening some political spaces while simultaneously closing others. This chapter examines how incumbent elites attempt to minimize the challenges that they face by influencing the strength and weakness of opposition groups with different political preferences.

As we shall see, although the strategies of manipulation are equally available to all incumbents, the creation of unified or divided SoCs has important implications for which strategies they choose. In unified SoCs, incumbents attempt to limit challenges by strengthening moderates with competing ideological preferences. Furthermore, they want to strengthen moderates and co-opt radicals in order to keep the oppositions' demands close to the status quo. In divided SoCs, incumbents try to control the opposition by strengthening radical groups, but they do not co-opt these opponents.

OPPOSITION PREFERENCES, GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES, AND SoCs

Incumbents choose between two strategies to manage their opposition. They may try to fragment and moderate political opposition groups, promoting a balanced set of opposition forces with moderate, but diametrically opposed, political demands. Alternatively, they may try to reduce the threats to their regime by strengthening ideologically radical political opponents.

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Structuring Conflict in the Arab World
Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions
, pp. 153 - 168
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

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