This chapter explores how cost structures in the unified SoC affects the level of contestation between opponents and the ruling elites. Government–opposition relations in the unified SoC are consistent with the conventional wisdom: As governments become weaker vis-à-vis their opponents, the opposition is more likely to demand reforms. In prolonged economic crises, then, the opposition is increasingly willing to challenge the government as the crises continue. Furthermore, once moderates demand reforms, they remain willing to do so (ceteris paribus) until their demands have been met. Groups with diverse interests thus join together to put pressure on the government.

The underlying logic is simple. Opponents in the unified SoC do not expect to be repressed more severely when they join with more radical groups to demand reforms than they are if they mobilize alone. Where all opposition groups have been excluded from the system, they have little to lose; and where all have been included, mobilizing in concert with other included opposition groups does not cross agreed-upon boundaries. Rather, moderate opponents should prefer joint conflicts to independent ones. The probability that they succeed in obtaining reforms should be higher in this case, and the costs of mobilizing may be lower. Because moderates can expect their demands to be met before more radical demands (recall our discussion in Chapter 1), they should continue to escalate the conflict until their demands are met.