Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-4hvwz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-28T18:31:31.843Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

4 - A Fictive Ethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2022

Stefan Lorenz Sorgner
Affiliation:
John Cabot University, Italy
Get access

Summary

In this chapter I analyse the most important ethical issues concerning transhumanism. Michael Sandel argues that gene modification and gene selections need to be rejected. However, his main reason is not that they are morally wrong, but that they imply vicious character traits. Parents who employ these technologies do not possess the central parental virtue, namely that of unconditional love. I will argue in the first section of this chapter why neither do I share Sandel's communitarianism nor is it the case that his conclusion is a necessary one, given his own premises. Instead, it is more plausible to hold that using gene technologies can demonstrate a parental virtue.

In all of the aforementioned arguments, the question of the good life is a central one. Is any general judgement concerning the good life possible in a naturalist world, a world without a personal God? Is anything permissible, is nothing forbidden, or can anything be said concerning the good life, given these circumstances? There are various transhumanist takes on this issue. In the second section I will show that all the widely used ways of demonstrating transhumanism in the public media are implausible. Superman on Viagra, or Wonderwoman with Botox, is not what all transhumanists subscribe to as a central goal, and not what they should subscribe to either, given their own initial premises. I show why a radically pluralist concept of the good is more plausible. No non-formal judgement concerning the good is plausible.

Section three will be dedicated to the question of what counts as morally right from a transhumanist perspective. Even though any concept of the right is regarded as fictive, this does not imply that it is arbitrary. We do have criteria for evaluating moralities. These criteria are historically and culturally embedded, but this does not mean that they are meaningless. They are meaningful for our lives. Here, I will present central aspects of what a non-anthropocentric, a non-essentialist, and a non-dualistic concept of personhood would have to consider. Thereby, I also distance myself from Singer's suggestion and present a more inclusive alternative.

Type
Chapter
Information
We Have Always Been Cyborgs
Digital Data, Gene Technologies and an Ethics of Transhumanism
, pp. 109 - 184
Publisher: Bristol University Press
Print publication year: 2021

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • A Fictive Ethics
  • Stefan Lorenz Sorgner, John Cabot University, Italy
  • Book: We Have Always Been Cyborgs
  • Online publication: 30 April 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.46692/9781529219234.004
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • A Fictive Ethics
  • Stefan Lorenz Sorgner, John Cabot University, Italy
  • Book: We Have Always Been Cyborgs
  • Online publication: 30 April 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.46692/9781529219234.004
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • A Fictive Ethics
  • Stefan Lorenz Sorgner, John Cabot University, Italy
  • Book: We Have Always Been Cyborgs
  • Online publication: 30 April 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.46692/9781529219234.004
Available formats
×