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2 - On a Silicon-based Transhumanism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2022

Stefan Lorenz Sorgner
Affiliation:
John Cabot University, Italy
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Summary

In the Middle Ages, scholars discussed how many angels could dance on the head of a pin. Nowadays we talk about Bostrom's simulation argument, as it was popularized by Elon Musk. Both topics are fun. Both discourses make sense from the perspective of the specific cultural background. In the Middle Ages we had a Christian background. Now we cherish the sciences and technology. Yet, by dealing with these questions, we avoid being concerned with the most pressing issues of our times.

I progress as follows. Firstly, I will argue that there is no pragmatic need to be concerned with the simulation argument. Digitalization and automation are important developments. However, the most pressing moral issues concerning digitalization do not have to do with our being threatened by a super-intelligent AI. They have to do with total surveillance, privacy, and negative freedom. Secondly, I will show that we need to radically reinterpret the relevance of digital privacy, embrace total surveillance, and accept the collection of digital data for a democratic purpose. Thirdly, I will further reflect upon the following issue to provide some information on the question of how such a system could be structured: what could it mean to cherish negative freedom, to respect a person, and to avoid harming a person? Thereby, it will become clear that a democratic usage of our digital data is a pragmatic necessity. My philosophical ideas are intended to provide grounding for further reflections.

Transhumanism without mind uploading and immortality

I have heard transhumanists claim that mind uploading is the crux concerning whether someone counts as a transhumanist or not. This is not the case. Julian Huxley, who first coined the term transhumanism in 1951, would not be a transhumanist if you had to believe in the possibility of mind uploading. I do not regard mind uploading as impossible, and I definitely hold that we can and should use technologies to move beyond the current limitations of our existence. However, gene or cyborg technologies are far more likely possibilities of fulfilling this goal in the near future (Sorgner 2018b). Gene technologies cover the wide range of options from gene editing via gene analysis to selecting fertilized eggs after IVF and PGD (Sorgner 2016b, 140– 189).

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We Have Always Been Cyborgs
Digital Data, Gene Technologies and an Ethics of Transhumanism
, pp. 22 - 60
Publisher: Bristol University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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