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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2021

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Igor Douven
Igor Douven
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Université Paris-Sorbonne
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Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief
Essays on the Lottery Paradox
 , pp. 255 - 268
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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  • Bibliography
  • Edited by Igor Douven
  • Book: Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief
  • Online publication: 29 January 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755.013
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  • Bibliography
  • Edited by Igor Douven
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  • Bibliography
  • Edited by Igor Douven
  • Book: Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief
  • Online publication: 29 January 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755.013
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