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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2022

Amy Melissa McKay
Affiliation:
University of Exeter
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Stealth Lobbying
Interest Group Influence and Health Care Reform
, pp. 186 - 199
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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  • References
  • Amy Melissa McKay, University of Exeter
  • Book: Stealth Lobbying
  • Online publication: 14 July 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009188937.007
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  • References
  • Amy Melissa McKay, University of Exeter
  • Book: Stealth Lobbying
  • Online publication: 14 July 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009188937.007
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  • References
  • Amy Melissa McKay, University of Exeter
  • Book: Stealth Lobbying
  • Online publication: 14 July 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009188937.007
Available formats
×