Book contents
- Stealth Lobbying
- Stealth Lobbying
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Identifying the Hidden Influence of Lobbyists in Public Policymaking
- 2 Scheduling Influence and Buying Access
- 3 The Strategic Behavior of Individual Lobbyists and Their PACs
- 4 Stealth Fundraising and Legislative Favors
- 5 Stealth Lobbying, Stealth Contributions, and the Affordable Care Act
- 6 Conclusions about Money in Politics
- References
- Index
5 - Stealth Lobbying, Stealth Contributions, and the Affordable Care Act
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 July 2022
- Stealth Lobbying
- Stealth Lobbying
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Identifying the Hidden Influence of Lobbyists in Public Policymaking
- 2 Scheduling Influence and Buying Access
- 3 The Strategic Behavior of Individual Lobbyists and Their PACs
- 4 Stealth Fundraising and Legislative Favors
- 5 Stealth Lobbying, Stealth Contributions, and the Affordable Care Act
- 6 Conclusions about Money in Politics
- References
- Index
Summary
As Senator Baucus put it in his folksy Montana way, lobby groups and Members of Congress have long worked together to craft legislation that benefits organized interests. But political scientists have faced considerable challenges in determining just how common these relationships are and to what extent they are fueled by campaign money. I argue that clever lobbyists, working in stealthy conditions, achieve benefits for their organizations that do not attract negative public attention for either the legislators or the lobby groups. Lobbyists make themselves useful to Members, and Members introduce low-salience legislation requested by lobbyists. Yet collectively, these quasi-exchange relationships are like needles in a haystack of perfectly defensible legislative and constituent-oriented interactions and activities.
The theory of stealth lobbying holds that lobbying is most effective when lobbyists secure low-salience legislation without attracting public notice, and this practice allows Members to stealthily provide legislation in exchange for much-needed campaign contributions.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Stealth LobbyingInterest Group Influence and Health Care Reform, pp. 129 - 158Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022