Studies of the economic relations between Great Britain and its colonies, such as Hopkins (1988) and O'Brien (1988), have revitalised controversy about the relevance of economic factors in the history of imperialism. Some have denigrated the relevance of the Hobson-Lenin thesis that capitalists required new overseas investment opportunities to postpone the collapse of capitalism, and the argument that colonies were a paying proposition. This article assesses the economic relations between the Netherlands and its colony Indonesia. It aims to raise the profile of this connexion in the controversy mentioned above, and to explore whether and to what extent the economic relationship may be crucial to explaining «metropolitan» economic development and «peripheral» underdevelopment.

In May 1940, among panic-stricken ministers and politicians, General de Gaulle was virtually alone to reflect and proclaim that France was not vanquished as long as it retained its colonial empire, which would serve as the springboard for France's future liberation and status as a world power. Not many of his contemporaries shared his conviction, and his loneliness testifies to the detachment of public opinion and politicians vis-a-vis an empire which in extent ranked second only to the British. In spite of the headlines, newsreels, slogans, colonial exhibitions and propaganda, most Frenchmen would have probably agreed that, over the years, the mother country had spent more on its colonies than it had received.

The question of whether the possession of an empire under a regime of free trade was beneficial or not to Britain has become a serious matter of dispute in recent years amongst British and American economic historians. Nonetheless, as some of them recognise, the question they are asking is hardly a novel one: they are often consciously reviving, in a more sophisticated form, a controversy which was already dividing contemporaries in Britain at the time the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts were repealed in the late 1840s and which only lost its relevance when decolonisation began in earnest in the late 1950s. O'Brien and Davis and Huttenback are on the side of those who traditionally disparaged the economic value of empire and saw it as the preserve of special interests: Edelstein and Offer, though careful not to justify empire, are more willing to accept that the nation as a whole might have benefited materially from its possession even if the benefits were very unevenly spread. The discussion, though ingenious and highly informative has, however, been somewhat narrowly focused. So, in the latter part of the paper, it is suggested that a full assessment of the value of the empire to Britain depends upon taking account of a wider set of circumstances than has usually been evident in the current debate. In this respect, present day historians may have something to learn from the contemporary controversy where the question of the material costs and benefits of empire was always considered in the context of the social and political trajectory of the British nation.

Italy's colonial history is better known for its failures (notably the battle of Adwa, the major defeat of a Western power by an African army in the 19th century) than for its achievements. Italy succeeded in conquering a substantial «empire» only in the 20th century, when the traditional colonial powers were already in retreat1. But this has not always been the case. The Venetian republic successfully ruled for many centuries the first «colonial» empire in Western Europe 2.