Galles & Pearl (l998) claimed that “for recursive models, the causal model framework does not add any restrictions to counterfactuals, beyond those imposed by Lewis’s [possible-worlds] framework.” This claim is examined carefully, with the goal of clarifying the exact relationship between causal models and Lewis’s framework. Recursive models are shown to correspond precisely to a subclass of (possible-world) counterfactual structures. On the other hand, a slight generalization of recursive models, models where all equations have unique solutions, is shown to be incomparable in expressive power to counterfactual structures, despite the fact that the Galles and Pearl arguments should apply to them as well. The problem with the Galles and Pearl argument is identified: an axiom that they viewed as irrelevant, because it involved disjunction (which was not in their language), is not irrelevant at all.

A 1-ary sentential context is aggregative (according to a consequence relation) if the result of putting the conjunction of two formulas into the context is a consequence (by that relation) of the results of putting first the one formula and then the other into that context. All 1-ary contexts are aggregative according to the consequence relation of classical propositional logic (though not, for example, according to the consequence relation of intuitionistic propositional logic), and here we explore the extent of this phenomenon, generalized to having arbitrary connectives playing the role of conjunction; among intermediate logics, LC, shows itself to occupy a crucial position in this regard, and to suggest a characterization, applicable to a broader range of consequence relations, in terms of a variant of the notion of idempotence we shall call componentiality. This is an analogue, for the consequence relations of propositional logic, of the notion of a conservative operation in universal algebra.

Straightforwardly and strictly intuitionistic inferences show that the Brouwer– Heyting–Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation, in the presence of a formulation of the recognition principle, entails the validity of the Law of Testability: that the form ¬ f V ¬¬ f is valid. Therefore, the BHK and recognition, as described here, are inconsistent with the axioms both of intuitionistic mathematics and of Markovian constructivism. This finding also implies that, if the BHK and recognition are suitably formulated, then Brouwer’s original weak counterexample reasoning was fallacious. The results of the present article extend and refine those of McCarty, C. (2012). Antirealism and Constructivism: Brouwer’s Weak Counterexamples. The Review of Symbolic Logic. First View. Cambridge University Press.

The article looks briefly at Feferman’s most sweeping claims about categorical foundations, focuses on narrower points raised in Berkeley, and asks some questions about Feferman’s own foundations. Among many different senses of foundations, the one that mathematics needs in practice is a recognized body of truths adequate to organize definitions and proofs. Finding concise principles of this kind has been a huge achievement by mathematicians and logicians. We put ZFC and categorical foundations both into this context.

We emphasize the role of the choice of vocabulary in formalization of a mathematical area and remark that this is a particular preoccupation of logicians. We use this framework to discuss Kennedy’s notion of ‘formalism freeness’ in the context of various schools in model theory. Then we clarify some of the mathematical issues in recent discussions of purity in the proof of the Desargues proposition. We note that the conclusion of ‘spatial content’ from the Desargues proposition involves arguments which are algebraic and even metamathematical. Hilbert showed that the Desargues proposition implies the coordinatizing ring is associative, which in turn implies the existence of a three-dimensional geometry in which the given plane can be embedded. With W. Howard we give a new proof, removing Hilbert’s ‘detour’ through algebra, of the ‘geometric’ embedding theorem.

Finally, our investigation of purity leads to the conclusion that even the introduction of explicit definitions in a proof can violate purity. We argue that although both involve explicit definition, our proof of the embedding theorem is pure while Hilbert’s is not. Thus the determination of whether an argument is pure turns on the content of the particular proof. Moreover, formalizing the situation does not provide a tool for characterizing purity.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate categoricity arguments conducted in second order logic and the philosophical conclusions that can be drawn from them. We provide a way of seeing this result, so to speak, through a first order lens divested of its second order garb. Our purpose is to draw into sharper relief exactly what is involved in this kind of categoricity proof and to highlight the fact that we should be reserved before drawing powerful philosophical conclusions from it.

In the present paper we propose a system of propositional logic for reasoning about justification, truthmaking, and the connection between justifiers and truthmakers. The logic of justification and truthmaking is developed according to the fundamental ideas introduced by Artemov. Justifiers and truthmakers are treated in a similar way, exploiting the intuition that justifiers provide epistemic grounds for propositions to be considered true, while truthmakers provide ontological grounds for propositions to be true. This system of logic is then applied both for interpreting the notorious definition of knowledge as justified true belief and for advancing a new solution to Gettier counterexamples to this standard definition.

Recent accounts of actual causation are stated in terms of extended causal models. These extended causal models contain two elements representing two seemingly distinct modalities. The first element are structural equations which represent the “(causal) laws” or mechanisms of the model, just as ordinary causal models do. The second element are ranking functions which represent normality or typicality. The aim of this paper is to show that these two modalities can be unified. I do so by formulating two constraints under which extended causal models with their two modalities can be subsumed under so called “counterfactual models” which contain just one modality. These two constraints will be formally precise versions of Lewis’ (1979) familiar “system of weights or priorities” governing overall similarity between possible worlds.

In response to the paper by Cotnoir and Bacon published in RSL 2/2012, we would like to add some remarks regarding supplementation principles. It is known that in a classical mereology, the Strong Supplementation Principle (SSP) together with antisymmetry enforces the Weak Supplementation Principle (WSP). Instead, in the nonwellfounded mereology, the failure of extensionality causes the failure of antisymmetry (Cotnoir, 2010), hence the investigated model is also nonantisymmetric. Cotnoir supposes that the failure of antisymmetry implies the failure of (WSP) when (PP1) is applied, however gives no explicit argument, which we would like to supply in this paper. Additionally, when (PP2) is applied, (SSP) implies (WSP), hence the failure of antisymmetry does not necessarily imply the failure of (WSP).

It is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, but ω-consistency is less frequently required. This paper argues that ω-consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not entirely conclusive. We show that in the second-order case the consequence of adopting ω-inconsistent truth theories for arithmetic is unsatisfiability. In order to bring out this point, well known ω-inconsistent theories of truth are considered: the revision theory of nearly stable truth T# and the classical theory of symmetric truth FS. Briefly, we present some conceptual problems with ω-inconsistent theories, and demonstrate some technical results that support our criticisms of such theories.

Solovay proved the arithmetical completeness theorem for the system GL of propositional modal logic of provability. Montagna proved that this completeness does not hold for a natural extension QGL of GL to the predicate modal logic. Let Th(QGL) be the set of all theorems of QGL, Fr(QGL) be the set of all formulas valid in all transitive and conversely well-founded Kripke frames, and let PL(T) be the set of all predicate modal formulas provable in Tfor any arithmetical interpretation. Montagna’s results are described as Th(QGL) ⊊ (Fr(QGL), PL(PA) ⊈ Fr(QGL), and Th(QGL) ⊊ PL(PA).

In this paper, we prove the following three theorems: (1) Fr(QGL) ⊈ PL(T) for any Σ1-sound recursively enumerable extension T of I Σ1, (2) PL(T) ⊈ Fr(QGL) for any recursively enumerable A-theory T extending I Σ1, and (3) Th(QGL) ⊊ Fr(QGL) ∩ PL(T) for any recursively enumerable A-theory T extending I Σ2.

To prove these theorems, we use iterated consistency assertions and nonstandard models of arithmetic, and we improve Artemov’s lemma which is used to prove Vardanyan’s theorem on the Π02-completeness of PL(T).

In the topological semantics for modal logic, S4 is well-known to be complete for the rational line, for the real line, and for Cantor space: these are special cases of S4’s completeness for any dense-in-itself metric space. The construction used to prove completeness can be slightly amended to show that S4 is not only complete, but also strongly complete, for the rational line. But no similarly easy amendment is available for the real line or for Cantor space and the question of strong completeness for these spaces has remained open, together with the more general question of strong completeness for any dense-in-itself metric space. In this paper, we prove that S4 is strongly complete for any dense-in-itself metric space.

This paper is a sequel to Beall (2011), in which I both give and discuss the philosophical import of a ‘classical collapse’ result for the propositional (multiple-conclusion) logic LP+. Feedback on such ideas prompted a spelling out of the first-order case. My aim in this paper is to do just that: namely, explicitly record the first-order result(s), including the collapse results for K3+ and FDE+.

Notions of k-asimulation and asimulation are introduced as asymmetric counterparts to k-bisimulation and bisimulation, respectively. It is proved that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula iff it is invariant with respect to k-asimulations for some k, and then that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula iff it is invariant with respect to asimulations. Finally, it is proved that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula over the class of intuitionistic Kripke models iff it is invariant with respect to asimulations between intuitionistic models.

Strictly intuitionistic inferences are employed to demonstrate that three conditions—the existence of Brouwerian weak counterexamples to Test, the recognition condition, and the BHK interpretation of the logical signs—are together inconsistent. Therefore, if the logical signs in mathematical statements governed by the recognition condition are constructive in that they satisfy the clauses of the BHK, then every relevant instance of the classical principle Test is true intuitionistically, and the antirealistic critique of conventional logic, once thought to yield such weak counterexamples, is seen, in this instance, to fail.

Constant conjunction theory of causation had been the dominant theory in philosophy for a long time and regained attention recently. This paper gives a logical framework of causation based on the theory. The basic idea is that causal statements are empirical, and are derived from our past experience by observing constant conjunction between objects. The logic is defined on linear time structures. A causal statement is evaluated at time points, such that its value depends on what has been in the past. We first give a semantics that contains basic conditions that, we think, must hold for a concept of causation, on which we define the minimal causal logic. Then we discuss its possible extensions for various concepts of causation. Complete deductive systems are given.

I believe that, for reasons elaborated elsewhere (Beall, 2009; Priest, 2006a, 2006b), the logic LP (Asenjo, 1966; Asenjo & Tamburino, 1975; Priest, 1979) is roughly right as far as logic goes.1 But logic cannot go everywhere; we need to provide nonlogical axioms to specify our (axiomatic) theories. This is uncontroversial, but it has also been the source of discomfort for LP-based theorists, particularly with respect to true mathematical theories which we take to be consistent. My example, throughout, is arithmetic; but the more general case is also considered.