We study the notion of conservative translation between logics introduced by (Feitosa & D’Ottaviano2001). We show that classical propositional logic (CPC) is universal in the sense that every finitary consequence relation over a countable set of formulas can be conservatively translated into CPC. The translation is computable if the consequence relation is decidable. More generally, we show that one can take instead of CPC a broad class of logics (extensions of a certain fragment of full Lambek calculus FL) including most nonclassical logics studied in the literature, hence in a sense, (almost) any two reasonable deductive systems can be conservatively translated into each other. We also provide some counterexamples, in particular the paraconsistent logic LP is not universal.

This paper develops a (nontrivial) theory of cardinal numbers from a naive set comprehension principle, in a suitable paraconsistent logic. To underwrite cardinal arithmetic, the axiom of choice is proved. A new proof of Cantor’s theorem is provided, as well as a method for demonstrating the existence of large cardinals by way of a reflection theorem.

Questions about the relation between identity and discernibility are important both in philosophy and in model theory. We show how a philosophical question about identity and discernibility can be ‘factorized’ into a philosophical question about the adequacy of a formal language to the description of the world, and a mathematical question about discernibility in this language. We provide formal definitions of various notions of discernibility and offer a complete classification of their logical relations. Some new and surprising facts are proved; for instance, that weak discernibility corresponds to discernibility in a language with constants for every object, and that weak discernibility is the most discerning nontrivial discernibility relation.

We represent the well-known surprise exam paradox in constructive and computable mathematics and offer solutions. One solution is based on Brouwer’s continuity principle in constructive mathematics, and the other involves type 2 Turing computability in classical mathematics. We also discuss the backward induction paradox for extensive form games in constructive logic.

Traditional geometry concerns itself with planimetric and stereometric considerations, which are at the root of the division between plane and solid geometry. To raise the issue of the relation between these two areas brings with it a host of different problems that pertain to mathematical practice, epistemology, semantics, ontology, methodology, and logic. In addition, issues of psychology and pedagogy are also important here. To our knowledge there is no single contribution that studies in detail even one of the aforementioned areas.

In this paper our major concern is with methodological issues of purity and thus we treat the connection to other areas of the planimetry/stereometry relation only to the extent necessary to articulate the problem area we are after.

Our strategy will be as follows. In the first part of the paper we will give a rough sketch of some key episodes in mathematical practice that relate to the interaction between plane and solid geometry. The sketch is given in broad strokes and only with the intent of acquainting the reader with some of the mathematical context against which the problem emerges. In the second part, we will look at a debate (on “fusionism”) in which for the first time methodological and foundational issues related to aspects of the mathematical practice covered in the first part of the paper came to the fore. We conclude this part of the paper by remarking that only through a foundational and philosophical effort could the issues raised by the debate on “fusionism” be made precise. The third part of the paper focuses on a specific case study which has been the subject of such an effort, namely the foundational analysis of the plane version of Desargues’ theorem on homological triangles and its implications for the relationship between plane and solid geometry. Finally, building on the foundational case study analyzed in the third section, we begin in the fourth section the analytic work necessary for exploring various important claims about “purity,” “content,” and other relevant notions.

This paper shows how to conservatively extend a classical logic with a transparent truth predicate, in the face of the paradoxes that arise as a consequence. All classical inferences are preserved, and indeed extended to the full (truth-involving) vocabulary. However, not all classical metainferences are preserved; in particular, the resulting logical system is nontransitive. Some limits on this nontransitivity are adumbrated, and two proof systems are presented and shown to be sound and complete. (One proof system features admissible Cut, but the other does not.)

In the philosophy of mathematics, indispensability arguments aim to show that we are justified in believing that mathematical objects exist on the grounds that we make indispensable reference to such objects in our best scientific theories (Quine, 1981a; Putnam, 1979a) and in our everyday reasoning (Ketland, 2005). I wish to defend a particular objection to such arguments called instrumental nominalism. Existing formulations of this objection are either insufficiently precise or themselves make reference to mathematical objects or possible worlds. I show how to formulate the position precisely without making any such reference. To do so, it is necessary to supplement the standard modal operators with two new operators that allow us to shift the locus of evaluation for a subformula. I motivate this move and give a semantics for the new operators.

A constructive proof is provided for the claim that classical first-order logic admits of a natural deduction formulation featuring the subformula property.

Taking our inspiration from modal correspondence theory, we present the idea of correspondence analysis for many-valued logics. As a benchmark case, we study truth-functional extensions of the Logic of Paradox (LP). First, we characterize each of the possible truth table entries for unary and binary operators that could be added to LP by an inference scheme. Second, we define a class of natural deduction systems on the basis of these characterizing inference schemes and a natural deduction system for LP. Third, we show that each of the resulting natural deduction systems is sound and complete with respect to its particular semantics.

We generalize the theory of canonical formulas for K4, the logic of transitive frames, to wK4, the logic of weakly transitive frames. Our main result establishes that each logic over wK4 is axiomatizable by canonical formulas, thus generalizing Zakharyaschev’s theorem for logics over K4. The key new ingredients include the concepts of transitive and strongly cofinal subframes of weakly transitive spaces. This yields, along with the standard notions of subframe and cofinal subframe logics, the new notions of transitive subframe and strongly cofinal subframe logics over wK4. We obtain axiomatizations of all four kinds of subframe logics over wK4. We conclude by giving a number of examples of different kinds of subframe logics over wK4.