Any discussion of the relativity of categories necessarily opens up questions of prime interest for the theory of knowledge, and it appears to me that L. von Bertalanffy's paper (Philosophy of Science Oct. 1955) points to certain implications which, though they were incidental to his particular approach to the problem, might repay further elaboration.

In order to understand man's different and often contradictory ideologies we need to explore their deeper roots, analyzing ideas. We do not comprehend the nature of ideas and yet we use and oppose them, realizing that they are wonderful and dangerous entities whose action is comparable to that of drugs. They depress or stimulate the organism, leading men toward great deeds or toward individual and collective disaster. Ideas interfere with the autonomic mechanisms of the body, and are also projected into the social world, creating machines, institutions, methods and goals. Notwithstanding, we usually pay little attention to this tool, creator of all other tools and root of human activity. Assuredly a theory of the idea and of ideologies cannot be developed without the convergent effort of scientists and philosophers, but we can glimpse the possibility of its construction, conscious nevertheless, of our shortcomings and of the provisional character of the presented synthesis.

In this paper we shall discuss the relativistic space-time metric. Even if all inertial frames of reference are treated as equivalent in the formalism of the theory of relativity, there is an important difference between them if we take possible observers into account. The class of possible frames of reference for human or man-made observers is a proper part of the class of conceivable frames of reference. This subclass is privileged with respect to human knowledge: Descriptions of physical phenomena with respect to members of it have a different epistemological status from descriptions with respect to other frames of reference. This fact is often neglected in presentations of the theory of relativity. We shall attempt to show that an emphasis on the observer's position sheds light on some features of the theory of relativity.

Probability and Frequency. Aristotle frequently used the concept of probability, but apparently he did not make any persistent effort to clarify or analyze it. His description of a fortiori argument in The Topics (115a, 6–14), e.g., depends upon “the more or less likely or probable,” but he does not explore this notion. In The Rhetoric, where he applies himself to a puzzle about probability which the Sophists had advanced (1402a, 5–30), he comes closer to an analysis of probability. Aristotle quotes Agathon,

In a recent paper Copi has argued for the admission of the term “essence” into scientific terminology. His primary reason is that the increasing adequacy of scientific theories is evidence of a gradual approximation to the real essences of things. Copi is aware that the laws of modern science are not to be taken as formulations of essences. But, he claims, “that is an ideal towards which science strives… Centuries hence wiser men will have radically different and more adequate theories, and their notions will be closer approximations than ours to the real essences of things.”

The meaning of consciousness (i.e. the mind-brain problem), has interested thinkers throughout recorded time, and yet it is quite obvious that its understanding is still exceedingly remote. This is evident from the fact that even the presently used definitions give rise to contradictions. As implied by the title, the purpose of this paper is to remove some of the main difficulties concerned with this definition by using epistemological methods which have recently been developed. It is hoped that by clarifying the definition of consciousness, or, more accurately, by clarifying the process leading to a scientifically rigorous definition of consciousness, some of the paradoxes surrounding the concept might be removed.

A common type of inductive problem is to predict the nature of an unobserved finite sample of a given population on the basis of an observed finite sample of the same population. More precisely, given a class of events A, we examine a sample Sn having n members, of which mi belong to the class Bi. On the basis of our knowledge that mi/n of Sn have been Bi, we attempt to predict the ratio of members of Bi to members of A in a sample Sr containing r unobserved members of A. This type of inference has been called “predictive inference” by Carnap. It is not necessary to argue that all inductive problems reduce to this form; we merely observe that such problems frequently arise, and that they have practical and theoretical importance. In The Short Run I suggested that this kind of problem could be handled by first determining the long run probability P(A, Bi) of Bi, relative to A (presumably on the basis of the relative frequency Fn(A, Bi) of Bi, to A in the observed sample Sn) and then predicting that the relative frequency of Bi within the unobserved sample Sr (the short run) will approximate P(A, Bi) sufficiently for practical purposes. The foregoing procedure requires a rule of each of two types: a rule for the ascertainment of the values of long run probabilities, and a rule for the application of knowledge of long run probabilities to predictions in the short run. The Short Run was not concerned with the nature and justification of rules of the first type, but rather sought to justify a rule of the second type on the assumption that we already possess knowledge of long run probabilities.

Moon and Spencer maintain (p. 228) that there is a divergence between Einstein's analysis of simultaneity, as set forth in his fundamental paper on relativity of 1905, and my treatment of that concept in a recent publication. They write: “Einstein decided that simultaneity is meaningless in all cases of relative motion. … Grünbaum decided that even Einstein's restriction is not sufficiently stringent and that simultaneity is a questionable concept even with stationary observers. … Grünbaum rejects Postulate VI [which states (p. 218) that ‘If A and B are not in relative motion, the time taken for a pulse of radiation to travel in a vacuum from A to B is the same as from B to A’] and is thereby unable to synchronize clocks even when they are stationary.”

In a recent issue of this journal Dr. Cartwright attempted to defend some views of Professor Quine's by arguing that my criticism [5] of these views was based on “serious misunderstandings of Quine,” “confusions,” and “mistakes.” I shall here attempt to show that in spite of Dr. Cartwright's vigorous characterizations my criticism of Quine was well founded and neither confused nor mistaken. First, I shall briefly discuss the notion of an ideal language.

In his Concept of Nature Whitehead gives the following definition of the term “co-presence”:

Rollo Handy's recent discussion of “Personality Factors and Intellectual Production” is interesting and timely. It seems to me that one of the things he is saying is that, since we lack objective criteria for the evaluation of the various philosophies, we may be forced, reluctantly, to judge them, at least partially, on the basis of what type of person produced them. “But since we do not have generally accepted criteria for the worth of philosophic endeavors … we should at least become aware of the possible personality determinants of one's attitude toward philosophy. If certain distinguished philosophers, appearing in a psychological clinic, would be diagnosed as having severe personality disturbances, this is something we should know. The psychologists may be wrong, but then again they may be right. To say that this has no relevance at all to the worth of the philosopher's views seems ostrich-like.”