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“Other Minds”: An Application of Recent Epistemological Ideas to the Definition of Consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Edmond M. Dewan*
Affiliation:
Yale University

Extract

The meaning of consciousness (i.e. the mind-brain problem), has interested thinkers throughout recorded time, and yet it is quite obvious that its understanding is still exceedingly remote. This is evident from the fact that even the presently used definitions give rise to contradictions. As implied by the title, the purpose of this paper is to remove some of the main difficulties concerned with this definition by using epistemological methods which have recently been developed. It is hoped that by clarifying the definition of consciousness, or, more accurately, by clarifying the process leading to a scientifically rigorous definition of consciousness, some of the paradoxes surrounding the concept might be removed.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1957, The Williams & Wilkins Company

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References

1 H. Marshall, “Consciousness”, pp. 1, 2, Maxmillan, 1909.

2 Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 6, p. 282.

3 J. Wisdom, “Other Minds”, pp. 218–219, N. Y. Philosophical Library, 1952.

4 H. Margenau, “The Nature of Physical Reality”, McGraw-Hill, 1950.

5 A recent paper by Peter Caws entitled, “The Role of Definitions in Modern Physics” extends this analysis and studies carefully the types of definitions used in physical science. (This paper has not yet been published.)

6 P. W. Bridgman, “The Logic of Modern Physics”, Maxmillan, 1927.

7 Ibid., p. 5.

8 H. Margenau, “The Nature of Physical Reality”, p. 224.

9 Ibid., p. 239.

10 Ibid., Chapter 5.

11 Ibid.

12 P. W. Bridgman, op. cit.

13 Ph. Frank, “Modern Science and Its Philosophy”, Harvard University Press.

14 G. Bergmann, “The Logic of Quanta”, American Journal of Physics 15, 1947.

15 Reference 4.

16 W. James, “The Principles of Psychology”, p. 185, Vol. 1, Dover.

17 The possibility of “awareness of awareness” is essential to the arguments presented in this paper; and because of this importance, we might comment on it briefly, especially because of the apparent possibility of an infinite regress in terms of awareness of awareness of awareness … ad infinitum.

Consider a camera. Can it take a picture of itself without a mirror? Clearly the answer is no because there must be some method available to produce its exact image and this image must be displaced in space from the position of the camera. In a similar way we must rely upon memory in order to be aware of being aware, or, more accurately, to be aware of having been aware. In this analogy memory corresponds to the mirror and its function is to form an image which is displaced in lime from the observing instrument (awareness itself). In both cases it is apparent that direct observation is structurally impossible. As for the “camera and mirror” analogy of the infinite regression “awareness of awareness …” one need only go to a barber shop to observe it. (In the United States most barber shops have mirrors on two opposite walls.)

It is clear from these considerations that the infinite regress under consideration should not cause concern.

18 Reference 4.

19 G. Walter, “The Living Brain”, Norton, 1953 and an article by the same author in “Cybernetics 1956” (proceedings of conferences sponsored by the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation) both contain examples of correspondences between electrical brain activity and subjective psychic phenomena; for example, an electrical rhythm called the “theta rhythm” always accompanies anger. Even more interesting is the fact that if one observes a light which is flickering at the frequency of one's theta rhythm, one soon finds himself in an angry mood!

20 H. Bergson, “Time and Free Will”, Muirhead Library of Philosophy, 1910, p. 146–147. It is here claimed that a parallelism between psychological and physiological activity denies free will.

21 N. Bohr, “Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature”.

22 P. W. Bridgman, op. cit., p. 30. This question is one of a list of questions which are offered in order that “… the reader may amuse himself by finding whether they have meaning or not.”