From the beginnings of thought, through the period of ancient Greece and including the medieval and early modern period, knowledge was sought after and looked upon as an integrated totality. In recent years certain scientific fields have progressed at greatly accelerated rates, leading to extreme complexity. The specialization necessary for comprehension of any of these fields has tended to destroy the integration of knowledge. Yet there are some hopeful signs amid the confusion of modern philosophy. The present note attempts to sketch a perspective toward integration of a large portion of scientific knowledge, the perspective which has been opened by modern researches and was not known at the time when the old dichotomies of mechanism versus vitalism, determination versus freedom, cause versus purpose, etc., arose. The discussion was stimulated by a series of lectures at Carleton College given by Henry Margenau, lectures which seek encouragingly to reverse the trend toward rigid compartmentalization. Its substance is drawn largely from two recent books, What Is Life? by Erwin Schrödinger (1) and Cell and Psyche by Edmund W. Sinnott (2).

The central concept of Carnap's probabilistic theory of induction is a triadic relation, c(h, e), the probability or degree of confirmation of the hypothesis, h, on evidence, e. The relation is a purely logical one. The value of c can be computed from a knowledge of h, of e, of the structure of the language, and of the inductive rule to be employed.

The “International Congress for the Philosophy of Science” was held in the week of August 23–28, 1954 at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, Switzerland. The Institute enjoys a very high reputation as one of the foremost schools of its kind in the world. It was at this Institute that Albert Einstein taught at the beginning of his academic career. The Congress was arranged as the Second Congress of the “Union Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences” (U.I.P.S.) which has its permanent seat in Paris, France. The first Congress of the U.I.P.S. was held in Paris in 1949. It was then that the “International Forum of Zurich” was asked to organize five years later the Congress of Zurich.

The notion of synonymy has recently been severely criticized, and its replacement by graded, continuous notions of one or another sort urged on general grounds. At the same time, it has usually been assumed both by critics and defenders of the notion, that synonymy and indirect discourse are in the same boat, that analyzing the latter, for instance, requires no more than an acceptable decision on the former while it requires at least that. Defenders of synonymy have thus thought it sufficient to apply their interpretations of this idea to indirect discourse, while opponents have not thought to attack such application save by way of an attack on synonymy.

The problems of operations research, optimized at the tactical and strategic level, have a domain of interest much broader than many of its earlier suboptimization problems. Its appeal to scientific method requires the construction of a model from which predictions can be made. This model must have the comprehensive character of those proposed by philosophy and the sciences. Such a model is available in the form of war gaming, a traditional military training vehicle transformed in such a way as to make it a research tool of great power and flexibility and which can assume a multitude of forms. The war game as a new research tool, when applied to the important problems at a high level of optimization, carries with it the excitement of a pioneering venture and the promise of contributions of greatly increased importance to the development of military science.

Publication in this journal recently of a paper by A. Grünbaum has induced me to submit a treatment of the same subject. Like Grünbaum, I shall use the framework of special relativity, but my analysis will be different. Some of his arguments, I believe, are inadmissable. I shall pose the problem in a form different from his, but the solution to be described will be applicable to his case as well.

Contemporary philosophers interested in value theory appear to be largely concerned with questions of the following sort:

What is value?

What is the meaning of the word ‘good’?

Does the attribution of value to an object have a cognitive, or merely an emotive, significance?

The first question is metaphysical; to ask it is analogous to asking in physics:

What is matter?

What is electricity?

The others are generally treated as semantical questions; to ask them is analogous to asking in statistics:

What is the meaning of the word ‘probable’?

Does an attribution of probability express an objective fact, or merely a subjective attitude?

The Einstein law of velocity addition is well-known. Consider three inertial reference frames S, K, and M, with X axes parallel in the same sense. Let K have velocity v1 along the X axis of S, and M have velocity v2 along the X axis of K. Then, according to the Einstein formula, the velocity v3 of M along the X axis of S is

If v2 is the velocity of an object at rest in M as measured by an observer in K, then v3 is the velocity of the same object as measured by an observer in S. The formula is valid for a change in reference frame of the observer.