Beneath the appalling incidents of sexual abuse in the Church, there are key theological issues. Along with Pope Francis, I argue that central to this crisis is the abuse of power. I propose that part of the way to address this is through a discussion of the appropriate use of power; and perhaps the best way to think about the appropriate use of power is through the notion of the appropriate use of authority - as service. Here, I suggest there could be the beginning of an ecclesial response that would involve the wider Church along the developing lines of synodality that Pope Francis promotes. After an initial introduction focusing the abuse of authority and the call for a greater synodal way of relating in the Church, there is consideration of the vital foundation of authority rooted in intimacy with God. This leads to an exploration of the centrality of the example of Christ for authentic exercise of authority. Dialogue is seen as a healthy expression of authority, while living the tensions in the exercise of authority suggests a true witness to authority could be the formation of communities of discourse bearing many of the hallmarks of the synodal process.

When thinking about the life and theology of the English Dominican, Victor White OP (1902-1960), it is his formation at Hawkesyard which holds the key to understanding the direction of his life and work. This brief introduction sets White in the context of his day, showing how his formation created the conditions which drew him to the analytical psychologist, C.G. Jung (1875-1961), at the same time prompting his identification as a modern Thomist, an identification which gave him the framework to engage Jung's thought, and to influence the direction of theology at Blackfriars Oxford. In other words, I hope to show that White's formation at Hawkesyard is the turning point from which all else follows.

The account of prudence found in Aquinas's Summa Theologiae and the Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics is bound up with his endorsement of Aristotle's notion of the Natural Slave in his Commentary on Aristotle's Politics. This connection not only hobbles his account of the virtue of prudence, but also weakens other areas of his theology, including his account of providence. A creative rereading of Aquinas's biblical commentaries, however, affords Aquinas the opportunity to correct himself. Aquinas's commentaries on Paul, especially the Commentary on Philippians, provide ample resources for doing so. The Christ hymn of Philippians 2:5-11 forms the cornerstone of a thoroughly Christological, even Apocalyptic, account of prudence, which overcomes the tensions in Aquinas's account of prudence resulting from his endorsement of natural slavery. This scriptural reformulation of prudence heightens the stress on exemplification even further and in so doing makes its exercise more conducive to peaceableness. Due to the political dimensions of prudence, these shifts have an ecclesiological dimension that reveals Aquinas's affinity with Giorgio Agamben's philosophical account of mendicant life.

This essay examines the Dominican influences on the Catholic philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe while an undergraduate at Oxford University between 1937–1941. It focuses on three Thomists who formally instructed Anscombe and how one Dominican, Victor White, likely instructed her on a radically Catholic perspective regarding the morality of warfare, which would not only influence her 1940 co-authored pamphlet, ‘The Justice of the Present War Examined’, but would shape her writings on war and murder for her entire academic career.

This essay accompanies the republication of Anscombe's ‘I am Sadly Theoretical: It is the Effect of Being at Oxford,’ her earliest known published essay. She wrote this article in response to a public invitation from the Catholic Herald for Catholics between the ages of 18 and 25 to make their voices heard by their fellow Catholics. In this teenage apologia, Anscombe outlines the goals for her life, and what it means for her as a Catholic to be a witness.

This article engages with an example of Newman's reception in 20th Century thought, in Raymond Williams's Culture and Society from 1958. Williams considers that Newman's wording in The Idea of a University demonstrates a particular moment in the development of the semantic field of the word ‘culture’, which is indicated by the fact Newman does not use the word at an important juncture in his text. Williams also locates Newman in a developing trajectory of English understandings of culture at a point when (what we now term) culture was presented as a surrogate religion. Both of these points are responded to by showing that the word ‘culture’ would not have served the purpose Williams apportions to it for Newman's argument, and that Newman should not be associated with those for whom the domain of culture was emerging as an alternative to religion in the 19th Century. Moreover, this analysis will show that Newman's understanding of what we today term ‘culture’ should be understood in terms of a broader semantic cluster best captured by the word “sensibility”: a set of pervasive tendencies, predispositions, and qualities.

This article introduces Bernard Lonergan to environmental ethics through a conversation with Willis Jenkins. Jenkins represents a ripe dialogue partner for Lonergan because of his attentiveness to methodological questions within environmental ethics, as in his incisive critique of Lynn White's influence. To pursue this conversation, this article examines Jenkins's critique of White and then turns to Lonergan's thought to supplement and refine this critique. From this engagement, the article identifies the need for a “practical cosmology”: an ongoing Christian practice that can affectively motivate care for creation. It proposes that the Christian liturgy, through its rich symbolism and distinct cosmology, offers one such practice and thus can weave that care seamlessly within Christian identity. To test this conclusion, the article briefly considers the import of this conversation for contemporary ecclesial responses to the ecological crisis, such as in Laudato si’.

In the 20th century, some prominent Thomists questioned whether St. Thomas Aquinas is really committed to a theory of divine ideas. There is no doubt that Aquinas articulates such a theory in his Sentences Commentary, Disputed Questions on Truth, and Summa theologiae. Still, he seems to omit an account of divine ideas in the Summa Contra Gentiles. If St. Thomas thinks divine ideas are necessary for understanding God's knowledge, why would he skip discussing them in this ex professo work? This paper will argue two points. First, St. Thomas does articulate a theory of divine ideas in the Summa Contra Gentiles, even though he changes his terminology. His account of divine reasons (rationes) is equivalent to a theory of divine ideas. Second, Aquinas changes his vocabulary because of the more apologetic aim of the work. Use of the term ‘ideas’ would be less effective in dialogue with his Muslim and pagan interlocutors.

In the last decade, the helping professions have increasingly recognized compassion fatigue, burnout, and secondary trauma as hazards integral to care-work, and in response, they have turned to self-care to build caregiver resilience. To examine the theological and ethical assumptions implicit in self-care literature, I turn to Thomas Aquinas's account of the active and contemplative lives in the Summa Theologiae. In correlating the two lives as meeting neighbors’ needs and beholding God, Thomas offers three competing accounts. Rather than synthesizing these differences, I argue that they map a range of interactions possible between one's own wellbeing and another's: care for the neighbor can hinder, prepare for, or be referred to contemplation and its consolations. While affirming self-care's recognition of human limits, my reading of Thomas also offers a correction, insisting that divergent experiences of caregivers are possible. This depends on the particulars, among which include the grace of divine assistance.

Recent scholarship suggests that Bonaventure breaks with the Augustinian tradition, in part, by affirming that the mind's cognitive powers remain fully activated even after the fall. I suggest that this claim concerning Bonaventure's denial of the noetic effects of sin should be reconsidered. I provide evidence to show that Bonaventure did, indeed, affirm that the intellect was heavily damaged by the fall and that Bonaventure affirmed two at first seemingly paradoxical propositions: (1) the intellect is indeed damaged by the fall, and (2) that God remains the first thing known by the intellect. It is precisely Bonaventure's coupling of these two seemingly paradoxical propositions that have led some to underplay Bonaventure's affirmation of the noetic effects of sin. In other words, Bonaventure's model opens up the possibility of affirming that the results of the noetic effects of sin consists not in ignorance of God simpliciter, but in a paradoxical state of knowing-yet-not-knowing God, akin to Paul's account of Romans 1.

Natural Law theory is the theory that nature has built within it a set of objective norms or laws which are universally applicable and can be discovered by reason. It is derived from nature rather than from the rules of society in determining an objectivist moral theory. It has a long history of tradition beginning with the ancient Greeks and Romans up to the present day.

The purpose of this essay is to argue Darwin's theory of natural law can be accommodated by Aquinas’ theory of natural law. The secondary literature of both figures is vast and changing, but this essay will mostly be restricted to looking at their primary texts on the topic. From this, it will be evident they shared many thoughts in common – the primary one being that morality begins with biology. There are objections to the compatibility of their theories, but space restricts me to addressing only two of them: teleology and immutability of species.

This article argues that, without being reducible to a version of the Free Will Defence, Aquinas' theodicy and philosophical theology can offer contemporary versions of the Free Will Defence stronger metaphysical and theological foundations from which a response to Mackie's compatibilistic challenge – probably the most serious challenge against this defence – can be derived. Mackie's challenge to the Free Will Defence is the argument that the possibility of evil is not a necessary condition for the existence of free will, for God – if He existed and was omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient – could have and would have created rational and free agents such that they would always freely choose the good. I claim, following Aquinas' hylomorphic ontology, that the creation of such a will is logically impossible as it would require the creation of a will containing naturally and invariably the formality of the universal and perfect good, and so the creation of a will indistinct from God's, which is by nature uncreated.

The passion of despair, according to Thomas Aquinas, is an appetitive movement away from a future arduous good that is impossible to attain. Criticism of his account of despair abounds. Nicholas Lombardo argues that despair cannot be proper passion because the appetite cannot move away from a good. Eric D'Arcy and Susan James argue that Aquinas's description of passions as movements casts doubt on his understanding of some passions, including despair. Michael Miller and John Patrick Reid deny that despair can be morally praiseworthy and conducive to action. In this paper, I defend Aquinas's account of the passion of despair from these criticisms.

Charity plays a crucial role in Thomas Aquinas's view of faith. However, there is a tension in his writings between this fact and some passages that suggest that there may be faith without charity and that faith may merely consist of an intellectual act. In this essay, I explore this tension, which has been neglected in the literature. My thesis is that, although there are tensions and lack of clarity that characterize Aquinas's treatment of this subject, it can be said that he believed that faith is impossible without the intervention of charity, however exiguous this intervention may be.

We note how Gerald Vann's pastoral context fired his concerns, and examine part of his output, especially his Lectorate thesis, Saint Thomas Aquinas, The Divine Pity, and The Son's Course. He popularised insights drawn from Aquinas and Neo-Thomists, developed in conversation with his brethren, while critically welcoming other traditions and modern culture. He rooted creative thought in Thomist doctrine, and offered Aquinas's vision as an answer to prevalent forms of disintegration. Some of his ideas and expressions are ‘of their time’; his urging an ever fresh contemplation of Christ, and his approach to the Gospel ‘paradox’ of renouncing all things for God's sake, while sharing God's love for creatures, are recognized as a powerful statement of recurring Christian themes. Vann was ahead of his time in sharing widely the distinctively Thomist account of the Spirit's role in guiding our pilgrimage, working unity, and divinizing our perceptions through his Seven Gifts. In this Vann was faithful to the Thomist vision he developed in his formal studies, of the eternal Processions of the Divine Wisdom and the Holy Spirit lying behind the coming of creatures from God and, more excitingly still, lying behind our return to our Triune Archetype.

This article claims that the strict methodological considerations of contemporary philosophical naturalism do not hinder serious philosophical reference to the thought of Thomas Aquinas because his methodological principles are just as rigorous. The methodology of Thomas Aquinas is not explicitly stated in the Summa Theologiae. Therefore, the Summa contra Gentiles and On being and essence are referenced to clarify what Thomas seems to have thought about relationship between philosophy and theology. The work of Fiona Ellis is an example of how a contemporary philosopher can methodologically justify taking a position of qualified naturalism. Ellis calls this expansive naturalism. This methodology desires to accept a type of naturalistic philosophy. Yet, Ellis holds that expansive naturalism is able to employ theology as a resource for philosophy without falling into the trap of superstition. In order to arrive at this contemporary reflection, there is a very brief sketch of recent intellectual history concerning the relationship between philosophy and theology.