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The Absence of Divine Ideas in the Summa Contra Gentiles
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
Abstract
In the 20th century, some prominent Thomists questioned whether St. Thomas Aquinas is really committed to a theory of divine ideas. There is no doubt that Aquinas articulates such a theory in his Sentences Commentary, Disputed Questions on Truth, and Summa theologiae. Still, he seems to omit an account of divine ideas in the Summa Contra Gentiles. If St. Thomas thinks divine ideas are necessary for understanding God's knowledge, why would he skip discussing them in this ex professo work? This paper will argue two points. First, St. Thomas does articulate a theory of divine ideas in the Summa Contra Gentiles, even though he changes his terminology. His account of divine reasons (rationes) is equivalent to a theory of divine ideas. Second, Aquinas changes his vocabulary because of the more apologetic aim of the work. Use of the term ‘ideas’ would be less effective in dialogue with his Muslim and pagan interlocutors.
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References
1 See, inter alia, Gilson, Étienne, Introduction à la philosophie chrétienne (Paris: Vrin, 1960), pp. 170-183Google Scholar; Gilson, Étienne, Le Thomisme, sixth edition (Paris: Vrin, 1965), pp. 146-148Google Scholar; Gilson, Étienne, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), pp. 71-72Google Scholar; Sertillanges, A.D., S. Thomas d'Aquin. Somme théologique. Dieu: Tome II (Ia 12–17) (Paris: Éditions de la Revue des Jeunes, 1933), pp. 403-405Google Scholar; Ross, James, ‘Aquinas's Exemplarism; Aquinas's Voluntarism,’ American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1990), pp. 171-198CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Maurer, Armand, ‘James Ross on the Divine Ideas: A Reply,’ American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1991), pp. 213-220CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ross, James, ‘Response to Maurer and Dewan,’ American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1991), pp. 235-243CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Boland, Vivian, Ideas in God according to St. Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis (Leiden: Brill, 1996), p. 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 One of the prominent examples of Aquinas bucking the Augustinian tradition is divine illumination. See De veritate, q. 1, aa. 1-5, and Maurer, Armand, ‘St. Thomas and Eternal Truths,’ Medieval Studies 32 (1970), pp. 91–107CrossRefGoogle Scholar; reprinted in Maurer, Armand, Being and Knowing: Studies in Thomas Aquinas and Later Medieval Philosophers, Papers in Mediaeval Studies 10 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990), pp. 43-58Google Scholar.
4 In I Sent., d. 36, q. 2, a. 1, s.c. 2 in Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi Episcopi Parisiensis, edition nova, ed. Mandonnet, R.P., tomus 1 (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1929), p. 839Google Scholar.
5 Summa theologiae (ST), prologus in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Roma: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S.C. de Propaganda Fide, 1888)Google Scholar, p. 5ab: ‘Consideravimus namque huius doctrinae notivios, in his quae a diversis conscripta sunt, plurimum impediri: partim quidem propter multiplicationem inutilium quaestionum, articulorum et argumentorum.’ All citations from the Leonine edition of St. Thomas's works will be cited on the following model: ST I, prologus (Leonine ed., 4.5ab). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
6 See Louis Geiger, ‘Les idées divines dans l'œuvre de S. Thomas,’ in St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274–1974, Commemorative Studies, volume 1, ed. Maurer, Armand (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), pp. 181-182Google Scholar.
7 De veritate q. 3, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 22/1.99:159–63). Cf. ST I, q. 15, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 4.199a).
8 De veritate, q. 3, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 22/1.99:163-182).
9 ST I, q. 15, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 4.199a), esp: ‘Forma autem alicuius rei praeter ipsam existens, ad duo esse potest: vel ut sit exemplar eius cuius dicitur forma; vel ut sit principium cognitionis ipsius, secundum quod formae cognoscibilium dicuntur in cognoscente.’
10 ST I, q. 14, a. 16 (Leonine ed., 4.197a). In the De veritate, St. Thomas articulates a fourfold distinction between speculative and practical knowledge. Knowledge is purely practical when it is actually being ordered and made. It is habitually or practically practical when it could be ordered to action but without the intention to do so. Knowledge is purely speculative when the knower is not naturally suited to produce the objects of the knowledge. It is also speculative when the knower could bring about the things that he knows by his knowledge but is not considering them insofar as they are operable. The builder can consider the properties, genus, and differentiae of a house separately, even though they are never found separately. See De veritate, q. 3, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 22/1.107:85-121). The threefold account in the Summa theologiae condenses the second sort of practical knowledge and the second sort of speculative knowledge into one. For a more detailed explanation of this teaching, see Gregory T. Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), pp. 4–21, especially the chart on p. 11.
11 ST I, q. 15, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 4.204ab), esp.: ‘Secundum ergo quod exemplar est, secundum hoc se habet ad omnia quae a Deo fiunt secundum aliquod tempus. Secundum vero quod principium cognoscitivum est, se habet ad omnia quae cognoscitur a Deo, etiam si nullo tempore fiant; et ad omnia quae a Deo cognoscuntur secundum propriam rationem, et secundum quod cognoscuntur ab ipso per modum speculationis.’
12 ST I, q. 15, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 4.204ab). Cf. De veritate q. 3, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 22/1.108:163–74). It is worth recalling that St. Thomas has changed his position about speculative and practical cognition. In the De veritate, he allows that an idea, properly speaking, can be virtually practical. He only allows the term's strict sense to apply to what is actually practical in the ST.
13 ST I, q. 15, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 4.201b-202a).
14 ST I, q. 15, a. 2, ad 2 (ed. Leonine, 4.202b).
15 De veritate, q. 3, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 22/1.104:158-173), esp.: ‘Forma enim in intellectu dupliciter esse potest. Uno modo ita quod sit principium actus intelligendi, sicut forma quae est intelligentis in quam est intelligens et haec est similitudo intellecti in ipso; alio modo ita quod sit terminus actus intelligendi, sicut artifex intelligendo excogitate per actum intelligendi et quasi per actum effecta, non potest esse principium actus intelligendi ut sit primum quo intelligatur sed magis se habet ut intellectum quo intelligens aliquid operator, nihilominus tamen est forma praedicta secundum quo intelligitur quia per formam excogitatam artifex intelligit quid operandum sit.’ St. Thomas makes the same distinction in the ST using different terms. He distinguishes the form by which (qua) the intellect understands and the form that (quod) the intellect understands. See ST I, q. 15, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 4.202a).
16 ST I, q. 15, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 4.202ab). Cf. ST I, q. 44, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 4.460b).
17 See ST I, q. 85, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 5.336a): ‘Actus autem perfectus ad quem pervenit intellectus, est scientia completa, per quam distincte et determinate res cognoscuntur. Actus autem incompletus est scientia imperfecta, per quam sciuntur res indistincte sub quadam confusione, quod enim sic cognoscitur, secundum quid cognoscitur in actu, et quodammodo in potentia.’
18 Averroes, Aristotelis Opera cum Verrois Commentariis, vol. 8: Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XIIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis et epitome (Venice: Apud Iunctas, 1574)Google Scholar, comment 51, fol. 158ra68–b33.
19 ST I, q. 15, a. 2, ad 1 (Leonine ed., 4.202b): ‘“idea” non nominat divinam essentiam inquantum est essentia, sed inquantum est similitudo vel ratio huius vel illius rei.’
20 ST I, q. 15, a. 2, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 4.202b).
21 ST I, q. 15, a. 2, ad 4 (ed. Leonine, 4.202b).
22 For an extensive investigation into the redactions of SCG I, c. 53, see Louis B. Geiger, ‘Les rédactions successives de Contra Gentiles I, 53 d'aprês l'autographe,’ in S. Thomas d'Aquin aujourd'hui (Bruges, 1963), pp. 221-240, and Boland, pp. 214–225.
23 See the sources cited in note 1.
24 Geiger, ‘Les Idées Divine,’ p. 198: ‘Cependant il n'est pas difficile de voir que les chaptires 51–54 forment un bloc que interrompt l'exposé.’ Chapters 60–62, which treat divine truth, are also an exception to the pattern, but this difference is not relevant to a discussion of divine ideas.
25 Strictly speaking, these questions are phrased oppositely. SCG I, c. 55 asks whether God understands all things simultaneously, whereas ST I, q. 14, a. 7 asks whether God's knowledge is discursive. This variation does not alter the fact that they are addressing the same question.
26 SCG I, c. 50 (ed. Leonine, 13.144a1-8).
27 SCG I, c. 50 (ed. Leonine, 13.144b41–48): ‘Praeterea. Quiccumque cognoscit perfecte aliquid, cognoscit omnia quae sunt in illo. Sed Deus cognoscit seipsum perfecte. Ergo cognoscit omnia quae sunt in ipso secundum potentiam activam. Sed omnia secundum proprias formas sunt in ipso secundum potentiam activam: cum ipse sit omnis entis principium. Ipse igitur habet cognitionem propriam de omnibus rebus.’
28 ST I, q. 14, a. 6 (ed. Leonine, 4.176b). In this text, Thomas specifies that each thing's proper nature consists in its participation in some mode of divine perfection. God perfectly cognizing himself entails cognizing all the ways things can participate in him. The emphasis on participation is perhaps a little clearer than the ‘active potency’ described in SCG I, c. 50. However, the core of the argument is the same: God has proper cognition of other things because he knows how things can proceed from him.
29 ST I, q. 14, prologus (ed. Leonine, 4.166a).
30 SCG I, cc. 51–52 (ed. Leonine, 13.148a1–b39).
31 SCG I, c. 53 (ed. Leonine, 13.150a1–b2).
32 SCG I, c. 53 (ed. Leonine, 13.150b3–151a11).
33 SCG, I, c. 53 (ed. Leonine, 13.151b1–11).
34 SCG I, c. 54 (ed. Leonine, 13.154a1–4): ‘difficile vel impossibile alicui videri potest quod unum et idem simplex, ut divina essentia, sit propria ratio sive similitudo diversorum.’
35 Wippel, Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, The Etienne Gilson Series, n. 16 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1993), p. 26Google Scholar.
36 SCG I, c. 54 (ed. Leonine, 13.154b26–155a25), esp.: ‘Intellectus igitur divinus id quod est proprium unicuique in essentia sua comprehendere potest, intelligendo in quo eius essentiam imitetur, et in quo ab eius perfectione deficit unumquodque: utpote, intelligendo essentiam suam ut imitabilem per modum vitae et non cognitionis, accipit propriam formam plantae.’
37 SCG I, c. 54 (ed. Leonine, 13. 155a25–155b19).
38 SCG I, c. 53 (ed. Leonine, 13.150b4–6): ‘format in seipso quandam intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius, quam significat definitio.’
39 Geiger, ‘Les Idées Divines,’ 200: ‘Ici, il ne se contente pas de distinguer entre l'espèce en tant que forme actualisante et en tant qu'elle est objet.’
40 SCG IV, c. 11 (ed. Leonine 15.32): ‘Dico autem intentionem intellectam id quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta.’
41 SCG I, c. 53 (ed. Leonine, 13.150b5): ‘ratio ipius, quam signifcat definitio.’
42 SCG IV, c. 11 (ed. Leonine, 15.32b35–38): ‘apparet quod aliud est intelligere rem, et aliud est intelligere ipsam intentionem intellectam, quod intellectus facit dum super suum opus reflicitur.’ From this difference, Thomas concludes that the sciences that deal with things (metaphysics, etc.) are other than the science that deals with intentions (logic).
43 SCG IV, c. 11 (ed. Leonine, 15.32b45–33a3).
44 SCG IV, c. 11 (ed. Leonine, 15.33a35–50).
45 SCG IV, c. 11 (ed. Leonine, 15.34a51–b21), esp.: ‘esse autem Verbi divini interius concepti, sive intentionis intellectae, est ipsum suum intelligi.’
46 Wippel, Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, p. 28. Cf. Geiger, ‘Les idées divines,’ p. 203–04.
47 Augustine, De div. qq. 83, q. 46, n. 2 (PL 40.30).
48 Geiger, ‘Les idées divines,’ p. 204.
49 Wippel, Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, p. 29. This reason is plausible, but it does not fully explain why Thomas does not speak of ideas in SCG II or IV. I can see only two ways to account for this absence. The first is to say that since he began speaking of intentio and rationes in SCG I, he chose to be consistent in his language. The second is the suggestion that I will introduce infra.
50 Boland, pp. 224–25.
51 Doolan, p. 115.
52 See De veritate, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3 (ed. Leonine, 22.1.105:244–59).
53 Doolan, p. 117. Emphasis original. Cf. Branick, Vincent P., ‘The Unity of the Divine Ideas,’ The New Scholasticism 42 (1968)CrossRefGoogle Scholar: p. 171n1: ‘It is not up to us to choose the multiplicity or not. There is a structure of reality which precedes our intellection and which forces us to consider God in a multiplicity of ideas, as long as we are working with ideas.’
54 Some argue that Thomas intended the work to be used only to convert the Muslims and pagans. I think Fr. Jean-Pierre Torrell is right to criticize those who reduce the book to such an end (Initiation à saint Thomas d'Aquin, vol. 1, Sa personne et son œuvre, Nouvelle édition profondément remaniée [Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2015], pp. 153–56)Google Scholar. Nevertheless, we must take Thomas seriously when he claims that ‘propositum nostrae intentionis est veritatem quam fides Catholica profitetur, pro nostro manifestere, errores eliminando contrarios’ (SCG I, c. 2 [ed. Leonine, 13.6a14–b1]). He intends this book to be an apology. Thomas writes the SCG to defend the truth against anyone who would reject it. Everyone who reads this work is meant to convert from his errors to the truth. Thus, I could agree with Ferdinand van Steenberghen when he suggests that ‘Thomas écrit manifestement pour les penseurs chrétiens (théologiens ou philosophes) attachés à leur foi; il n'est pas invraisemblable qu'il ait conçu spécialement la Somme contre les Gentils pour l'usage de personnes desinées à prendre contact avec les milieu intellectuels «infidèles», principalement dans des pays musulmans’ (La philosophie au XIIIe siècle, deuxième edition, Philosophes médiévaux 28 [Louvain: Peeters Publishers, 1993], p. 290). I am more inclined, however, to agree with R.-A. Gauthier when he writes (contrary to his earlier opinion), that ‘n'est pas une intention d'apostolat immédiat et limité, mais une intention de sagesse à portée apostolique universelle’ (Introduction Historique à S. Thomas d'Aquin. Contra Gentiles, trans. Bernier, R. and Corvez, M., vol. 1 [Paris: Éditions Universitaires, 1961], p. 87Google Scholar).
55 SCG I, c. 2 (ed. Leonine, 13.6a14-b22), esp.: ‘… propositum nostrae intentionis est veritatem quam fides Catholica profitetur, pro nostro modulo manifestare, errores eliminando contrarios … . quia quidam eorum, ut Mahmetistae et pagani, non convenient nobiscum in auctoritate alicuius Scripturae … . necesse est ad naturalem rationem recurrere, cui omnes assentire coguntur.’
56 SCG I, c. 9 (ed. Leonine, 13.22b16-22).
57 SCG I, c. 3 (ed. Leonine, 13.7a10-b7).
58 SCG I, c. 9 (ed. Leonine, 13.22a13-17).
59 Aristotle consistently critiques the Platonic use of idea (ydea) in many places. See, inter alia, Ethica Nicomachea I, c. 6, 1096a11–97a14 (Aristoteles Latinus, 26/3.146–149), Metaphysica. I, c. 9, 990a32–93a10 (Aristoteles Latinus, 25/3..2.35–42), Metaphysica VII, c. 6, 1031a29–32a12 (Aristoteles Latinus, 25/3.2.141–42), Metaphysica VII, c. 14, 1039a25–b19 (Aristoteles Latinus, 25/3.2.160–61). Averroes echos these critiques at In Moralium Nicomachiorum Expositio I, c. 6 (in Aristoteles opera cum Averrois comentariis [Venice Iunctina, 1553], 4va–4rb), Commentaria in libros Metaphysicorum I (In I Met.), comm. 25–49 (Iunctina, VIII.9rb–13va), In VII Met., comm. 20–21 (Iunctina, VIII.80ra–81ra), In VII Met., comm. 51–52 (Iunctina, VIII.94rb–vb).
60 See, inter alia, Avicenna, Liber de prima philsophia sive scientia divina (Met.), I.5 vol. 1, ed. Simone van Reit (Leiden: Brill, 1977), p. 1:4Google Scholar; Avicenna, Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus, V.5, vol. 2 ed. Reit, Simone van (Leiden: Brill, 1968), p. 129:66–69Google Scholar. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros III (In III De anima), comm. 5 (Crawford, 387 and 411): ‘diffinitio igitur intellectus materialis est illud quod est in potentia omnes intentiones formarum materialium universalium … . intellectus agens facit intentiones in potentia intellectas in actu ita quod recipit eas intellectus materialis.’ For more on Averroes's use of intentio, see Wirmer, David, ‘Averroes on Knowing Essences,’ in Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays, ed. Adamson, Peter and Giovanni, Matteo Di (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 116–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
61 SCG I, c. 53 (Leonine ed., 13.150b3–6): ‘Ulterius autem considerandum est quod intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, intelligendo format in seipso quondam intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipius, quam significant definitio.’
62 Avicenna, Met., III, c. 10 (van Reit ed, I.180:40–182:85). Aquinas refers to this text explicitly in De veritate, q. 3, a. 8, ad 1 (Leonine ed., 22/1.116:69–73), and he alludes to it in ST I, q. 15, a. 2, co. and ad 4 (Leonine ed.,4.202)
63 Aristotle, Met., XII, c. 7 (Aristoteles Latinus, XXV./3.2.259): ‘Ostensum est autem et quia magnitudinem nullam contingiut habere hanc substantiam, verum sine parte et individisibilis est.’ Avicenna, Met. VIII, c. 4 (van Reit, II.399:00–01): ‘Dico igitur quod necesse esse non potest esse eiusmodi ut sit in eo compositio.’ In VIII, c. 5, Avicenna refers to the Necessary Existent as ‘the One’ (van Reit ed., II.505:7). Averroes, In XII Met., comm. 41 (Iunctina, VIII.152ra–153ra).
64 For their views on God's knowledge, see Aristotle, Metaphysica XII, c. 9, 1074b15–75a4 (Aristotles Latinus, 23/3.2.264–66); Avicenna, Met. VIII, c. 6 (van Reit ed., 412–22); Averroes, In XII Met., comm. 51 (Iunctina, VIII.157va–158rb).
65 SCG I, c. 54 (ed. Leonine, 13.155b16-19): ‘In quo etiam aliqualiter salvatur Platonis opinio ponentis ideas, secundum quas formarentur omnia quae in rebus materialibus existunt.’ Emphasis original.
66 For the manuscript, see ed. Leonine, 13.20*–22*. For an analysis of the revisions, see Louis B. Geiger, ‘Les rédactions successives,’ pp. 221–240, and Boland, pp. 214–225.
67 Gilson, Introduction à la philosophie chrétienne, pp. 173–74: ‘Pourtant, il est à peine exagéré de dire qu'au fond, tout ce que Saint Thomas a dit des Idées était dans son espirit une concession de plus faite du language d'une philosophie qui n'était pas vraiment la sienne. C'était assui, n'en doutons-pas, la reconnaissance de l'auctorité théologique de Saint Augustin.’