Gordon Silverstein'sLaw's Allure (2009) advances a two‐part thesis on the power of legal ideas. The first is that legal precedents establish the ideological baselines on which legislative and bureaucratic policies are developed. Silverstein amply demonstrates the validity of this thesis. The second is that by establishing ideological baselines, legal precedents contribute to a version of path dependency (or the idea that early choices determine long‐term developments) that is significantly more constraining than other forms of institutional entrenchment. Put simply, law shackles creativity in politics. This thesis I do not find persuasive, in part because Silverstein offers little evidence for it and in part because a growing body of literature suggests the contrary: the cross‐fertilization of ideas from one field to another—law to politics, for instance—contributes to, rather than retards, creative change. Nonetheless, while its broader ambitions are not satisfied, Law's Allure's narrow thesis—that precedent profoundly shapes policy development—is important and worthy of a major book in itself.

Using multiple case studies, Gordon Silverstein'sLaw's Allure (2009) examines the many ways in which courts interact with other governing institutions. He convincingly argues that legal advocates fare best when they use the leverage created by courtroom victories to increase their influence in other arenas, particularly legislatures. His more ambitious effort to explain when court intervention improves rather than displaces politics is less successful. He favors using court decisions as battering rams to break through the institutional barriers created by our allegedly outmoded Constitution. Such an open‐ended justification for judicial policy making places virtually no limits on the juridification that Silverstein decries for distorting democratic politics.

American political culture is both seduced and repulsed by legal power, and this essay reviews Gordon Silverstein's contribution to understanding the causes and consequences of “law's allure.” Using interbranch analysis, Silverstein argues that law is dangerously alluring as a political shortcut, but ultimately he concludes that law offers no exit from “normal politics” and the hard work of “changing minds.” This essay suggests that Silverstein's framework—his dyadic focus on courts and Congress, constructive and deconstructive patterns, legal formality and normal politics—strips law from its animating context of interests, inequality, and ideology. Without consideration of these larger forces of power, Silverstein's framework misplaces law's ability to “change minds” in perverse and unexpected ways.

Responding to a set of review essays, the author of Law's Allure: How Law Shapes, Constrains, Saves, and Kills Politics (Silverstein 2009) argues that politicians and policy entrepreneurs fail to calculate the risks of juridification—the judicialization of policy combined with the legalization of politics itself—which have expanded and accelerated in the United States in recent decades. Paradigmatic case studies (on subjects including poverty, electoral districting, automated budgeting, war powers, abortion laws, and the regulation of tobacco as well as the environment) illustrate the risks of various patterns of juridification and construct an agenda for future research.

Drawing on two books central to an emerging sociolegal literature about tort—Fault Lines: Tort Law as Cultural Practice, a collection edited by David M. Engel and Michael McCann, and Torts, Egalitarianism and Distributive Justice, a monograph by Tsachi Keren‐Paz—this essay argues that tort law in the United States redistributes wealth in ways that ought to trouble sociolegal scholars and enlist their reformist energy. Read together, the two volumes offer considerable description and critique of a distributive injustice, and lead to important proposals for change.

The late Philip Selznick's final book, A Humanist Science, examines the role of values and ideals in the social sciences, including the study of law and society. Throughout his academic career, Selznick was committed to what he called “legal naturalism,” a sociological version of the natural‐law perspective, while his critics continue to adhere to various forms of positivism. But the age‐old opposition between natural law and legal positivism today may be giving way to the quest for public sociology—a sociology that promotes public reflection on significant social issues and thus functions as a moral and political force. A Humanist Science ends with a strong plea for public philosophy. Public philosophy overlaps with public sociology but is a much stronger concept. Selznick's message of public philosophy may be another of his enduring contributions to the field of law and society.