Stephen Stigler's JHET article, “Statisticians and the History of Economics,” rightly suggested that more attention should be given to analyzing the contributions of statisticians in the development of economic theory. It also asked in passing whether E. E. Slutsky should best be regarded as a mathematical statistician oran economist, Stiglerhimself opting forthe former characterization (Stigler 2002, p. 159). This seemingly innocuous question opens up a lively and interesting range of issues, one to which this historian would like to make a small contribution from both a “Russian studies” and a “history of ideas” viewpoint.

Often papers begin with an idea. Once the paper is written, sometimes little sometimes much effort goes into finding a title. This lecture worked the other way round. It started with the title, which I passed on to Roy Weintraub, my successor as President of the Society, when I still had but the vaguest idea ol what I would write. When Roy heardmy title he pointed me to a passage from C. Vann Woodward, that he hadhimself quotedin Stablizing Dynamics:

Lost causes, especially those that foster loyalties and nostalgic memories are among the most prolific breeders of historiography. If survivors deem the cause not wholly lost andperhaps in some measure retrievable, the search of the past becomes more frantic and the books about it more numerous. Blame must be fixed, villains found, heroes celebrated, old quarrels settled, old dreams restored, and motives vindicated. Amid the ruins controversy thrives and books proliferate (quoted by Weintraub 1991, p. 125, from Vann Woodward 1986).

“Iwas born in 1902 in Görlitz, a small provincial town in Germany, and raised in Vienna, the great city of the multinational Austro-Hungarian empire. On my father's side, my family goes back to about 1530 in Saxony, my Lutheran forebears having been farmers, church wardens, judges, and businessmen. My mother was a natural daughter of Frederick III of Germany …”

Yet another account of myself, for yet another encyclopaedia. Italian, this time. Once again, I put pen to paper and collapse the events of fifty years ago to a few familiar milestones. Now what shall I tell these Italians?

“I finished the Gymnasium and took my Dr. Rer. Pol. at the University of Vienna in 1925. Awarded a Rockefeller Memorial Fellowship, I spent the next three years in England, the United States, France and Italy. Returning to Vienna, I soon became Docent, later Professor, at the University, and Director of the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research …”

And then there will be the doctoral thesis, Wirtschaftsprognose, the other Institute, Princeton, and so on. It is remarkable really, the rehearsed inevitability of it all … So often have I gone through exercises of this kind that there are times when I even begin to believe them myself.

Of the published works by William Stanley Jevons, the marginalist theory of value and distribution in the Theory of Political Economy (1871) is principally remembered by economists today. For Jevons in the early 1870s, however, the reception of the Theory (TPE) had “been of the most discouraging character.” The “recognised professor[s] of the science,” for example, had either ignored or, in the case of J. E. Cairnes, “emphatically repudiated it” (Jevons 1875a, p. 4). In November 1874, buoyed by the publication of the first volume of Leon Walras's Elements of Pure Economics and by correspondence with Walras and other European economists, Jevons presented a defense of the marginalist theory and reply to critics in an address titled “The Progress of the Mathematical Theory of Political Economy.” It was delivered to the Manchester Statistical Society, and was extensively reported in the local newspapers. Jevons used those reports to both publicize and obtain comments on the address before the final version was published in 1875. As some of the papers circulated beyond Manchester, London, readers, for example, could also read or hear of his analysis. In that regard, one component of his argument attracted particular attention.

It is an unusual and memorable privilege to address so international a gathering here in North Carolina on the Fourth of July. American nationalism in recent times has not been very broad-minded, and I'm envious of a society that can attract so many participants from all over the world. But the issue of cosmopolitanism and parochialism pertains to academic discipline as well as to nationality. Historians and economists do not always understand one another very well, and while economists are able to bring in bigger incomes and to maintain a higher public profile, historians maintain a certain authority in regard to scholarly writing about the past. Practitioners of history of economics have often been upbraided for failing to write “real” history, and I have been known to write in this vein. At least I am among those who have tried to persuade members of this society of the merits of history, history of science, and science studies as models for writing history of economics. At the same time I have been seduced by the fascination of this field to devote much of my own research to it, and in these efforts I have come to admire and to draw inspiration from what is distinctive in historical writing on economics, as well as what seems most familiar from the standpoint of the historical discipline.

Recent articles have explored from different perspectives the psychological foundations of American institutionalism from its beginning to the interwar years (Hodgson 1999; Lewin 1996; Rutherford 2000a, 2000b; Asso and Fiorito 2003). Other authors had previously dwelled upon the same topic in their writings on the originsand development of the social sciences in the United States (Curti 1980; Degler 1991; Ross 1991). All have a common starting point: the emergence during the second half of the nineteenth century of instinct-based theories of human agency. Although various thinkers had already acknowledged the role of impulses and proclivities, it was not until Darwin's introduction of biological explanations into behavioral analysis that instincts entered the rhetoric of the social sciences in a systematic way (Hodgson 1999; Degler 1991). William James, William McDougall, and C. Lloyd Morgan gave instinct theory its greatest refinement, soon stimulating its adoption by those economists who were looking for a viable alternative to hedonism. At the beginning of the century, early institutionalists like Thorstein Veblen, Robert F. Hoxie, Wesley C. Mitchell, and Carleton Parker employed instinct theory in their analysis of economic behavior. Their attention wasdrawn by the multiple layers of interaction between instinctive motivation and intentional economic behavior. Debates on the role of instinctsin economicswere not confined to the different souls of American Institutionalism, and many more “orthodox” figures, like Irving Fisher or Frank Taussig, actively participated.

It is a matter of fact that happiness is once again one of the foci of interest for economists, the “professors of the dismal science” (Carlyle 1850, p. 43). This is also the conviction of the editor of the “Controversy” on Economics and Happiness in The Economic Journal in 1997: “Economists from different backgrounds … all believe that happiness must play a more central role in economic science once again” (Dixon 1997, p. 1812). Dixon's thesis is twofold: (a) “Once again”: the reference is to the Neapolitan pubblica felicita (public happiness), developedby Genovesi andothers in the mid-1700s. In fact, Dixon sees a link between the new interest on happiness by contemporary economists andthe XVIII century debate on “public happiness” in the Latin countries, and in Italy in particular, as he explicitly says in a footnote; (b) “More central role” according to Dixon, is that happiness nowadays does not play a central role in economics.

Léon Walras was a truly revolutionary economist. Not only did he leave a lasting mark on economic doctrine participating in the Marginalist Revolution, which supplanted the labor theory of value of the classical school, but he also contributed to major changes in economic methodology as being one of the first and most ardent promoters of the use of mathematics in economics. For an actor who played such a great role in the development of economics, how did he conceive his scientific endeavor? This question can be broken down into two different but related questions: First, how did he know that he had found true scientific laws? What was his theory of knowledge? Is it best described as empiricist (claiming that all knowledge comes from experience) or idealist (claiming that reason can achieve knowledge independently of experience)? And, second, what relation did his writings on pure theory bear with his policy prescriptions? Was there a normative bias in Léon Walras's methodology, i.e., were his positive statements molded by his normative inclinations?

This last set of questions has generated much debate, given that Walras actively fought for scientific rigor while not refraining from defending his views on the desired social order. For W. Jaffé, who unearthed his correspondence, a careful study of primary evidence shows that Walras's conception of justice heavily influenced his search for pure truth. The Éléments d'économie politique pure (Éléments), “appears, on the surface, as a competely wert-frei” system, but it is nevertheless “inform[ed]” by “implicit moral convictions” (Jaffé 1977, p. 371). However, D. A. Walker has strongly attacked Jaffe's allegation that Walras's theory of general equilibrium was deliberately constructed as a normative scheme, pointing to Walras's “careful distinctions between normative and positive subject matters” (Walker 1984, p. 466).

In the aftermath of the Great War and the Bolshevik revolution, the years 1920–1925 witnessed a great upsurge of academic writing in Britain on Karl Marx's theory of value. We shall not seek to explain this phenomenon but it may nevertheless be of interest first to sketch, as a contrasting background, the limited interest shown in this topic in the pages of the Economic Journal, 1891–1920. For that journal did indeed, in that period, devote considerable space to matters socialist—taken in a broad sense (see Steedman 1990).

This paper brings together and expands methodological ideas on Joseph Alois Schumpeter that I have discussed in detail and at length elsewhere (Shionoya 1997). Schumpeter is known for his wide-ranging work, and I interpret it as an attempt a universal social science consisting of three systems of thought: i.e., substantive theory, metatheory, and pretheory. These three systems stand for the scope and method of his universal social science.

Harry Dexter White is remembered today as the “other” founding father of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, almost always as an afterthought as homage is paid to his far more renowned British counterpart, John Maynard Keynes. In the months leading up to and beyond the U.S. entry into World War II, White and Keynes independently drafted plans for a postwar stabilization fund aimed at restoring multilateral trade with convertible currencies. They traded plans in 1942 and then worked jointly on increasingly detailed proposals that led eventually to the creation of the IMF and World Bank. White is also remembered as a man who was accused of being a Soviet spy during the war, who died of a heart attack in 1948 just three days after giving a spirited and emotional public defense of his character before the House Un-American Activities Committee, and whose name was dragged out prominently five years later in an ugly battle between the Eisenhower Administration and former President Truman. Squeezed into the shadows between the luminosity of Keynes and the glaring excesses of McCarthyism, White's reputation has long been in need of a more sober inspection in the light of history.

Jeremiah Whittle Jenks currently ranks as one of the more obscure academic economists of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. While other prominent economists of the era such as Richard T. Ely and John Bates Clark have been the subject of many books and articles (Everett 1946, Rader 1966, and Henry 1996, for example) Jenks remains almost unknown and unheralded. For instance, he is scarcely mentioned in the relevant volume of Joseph Dorfman's The Economic Mind in American Civilization (Dorfman 1948, III), despite his very substantial scholarly and public roles in the economics of the day. He was likewise below the radar of Joseph A. Schumpeter's (1954) magisterial, History of Economic Analysis, and Mark Blaug's (1985) Economic Theory in Retrospect. Where Jenks's career has attracted scholarly notice, the aspects examined have focused less on his economic scholarship and more on his public policy roles. (Green 1956, Weinstein 1968, Furner 1975, Parrini and Sklar 1983) The reasons for Jenks's relative neglect are unclear, although several hypotheses will be entertained below.

In promoting spontaneous orders—orders that evolve in a process of cultural evolution—as “efficient,” “beneficial,” and “advantageous,” Friedrich A. Hayek (1899–1992) has often been attributed the belief that there is something desirable about them. For this reason, he has been accused of committing the naturalistic fallacy, that is, of trying to derive an “ought” from an “is.” It appears that Hayek was quite aware of the charge, and vigorously disputed it: “I have no intention to commit what is often called the genetic or naturalistic fallacy” (1988, p. 27).

In 1933, Portugal was officially converted to a corporatist state, a state where it was accepted that the semi-autonomous bodies representing the various branches of economic and social activity would have formal powers in defining public policies. In such a context, an important change also occurred at the level of economic theories and doctrines, in keeping with the novelties emanating from both the legal and political fields.

This paper critiques the way Alfred Marshall is presented in many histories of economic thought, in particular, the typical neglect of the relation of his economic theory and method to his public policy proposals and views on economic evolution. A good example is the textbook of Stanley L. Brue, The Evolution of Economic Thought, which is specifically policy oriented. He notes in his remarks on Marshall's life and method: “Marshall's thinking left room for cautious reform, that is, modest departures from laissez-faire” (2000, p. 295). But the only illustration of this is Marshall's discussion of the welfare effects of industry taxes and subsidies. However, even here Brue concludes (2000, p. 316) with a quote from Marshall: “These conclusions, it will be observed, do not by themselves afford a valid ground for government interference.”

For a long time, Marshall's chief contribution to economic science was considered to be Book V of Principles of Economics, which is the “analytic core” of his thought. Book V, “General Relations of Demand, Supply and Value,” deals with the important theme of economic equilibrium that ipso facto rules out any possibility of coping with economic development. When Alfred Marshall describes Book V, he points out that “it is not descriptive, nor does it deal constructively with real problems. But it sets out the theoretical backbone of our knowledge of the causes that govern value” (1961, vol. 1, p. 324); in short, it “deals with abstractions” (1898, p. 52). The existence of Book V has been supposed by some scholars to be sound enough proof that Alfred Marshall was not interested in the question of economic development. More recently, however, it has been suggested that one of the main Marshallian concerns was economic development,—“the high theme of economic progress,” as he called it (Marshall 1961, vol. 1, p. 461).

One of the basic ideas underlying the established conception of rational behavior is the unlimited substitutability of preferences. Economic agents are assumed to compare and reduce everything to a common denominator: utility. The most obvious example of such preferences can be found in standard consumer theory where complete substitutability of every good is assumed in the sense that a loss of some units of one bundle can always be compensated by gain of some units of another commodity (such preferences are sometimes called Archimedian—see Borch 1968). This conception of preferences has a long history in economic thought and forms the basis of the standard rational choice theory (Hicks and Allen 1934, Samuelson 1938, Hicks 1946, Houthakker 1950).

This paper investigates the actions of a small, yet influential group of American economists who sought to claim economic history for themselves and use it as a springboard to launch a wider transformation of economics. Their actions constitute an episode of dissent in the history of twentieth century economics, albeit an unusual one. These dissenters were not a socially or intellectually marginalized group, but rather a set of privileged scholars who were able to leverage their contacts within the profession and amongst its patrons to further their vision. Their actions could almost be described in Kuhnian terms: they consciously sought to trigger a “paradigm shift” to bring about a social science better suited, in their views, to a world in political and economic turmoil (Kuhn 1962). In spite of the Kuhnian allusion to “scientific revolution,” this paper is not about the 1960s “cliometric revolution,” but about the 1940s and '50s and the little known events that led to the creation of the Economic History Association, the Journal of Economic History, and Explorations in Entrepreneurial History (subsequently Explorations in Economic History).

James M. Buchanan is a unique figure in modern economics. A Nobel Prize winner and a pioneer of public choice theory, he is in some ways a respected pillar of the profession. Yet at the same time, he is an outspoken critic of certain fundamental practices of mainstream economics who refuses to confine his work within the conventional boundaries of the discipline. Whether seen as an innovator or an iconoclast, he has consistently been among the most methodologically and philosophically self-aware of the profession's elite.