This comment is a reaction to an article dealing with farmer–herder relationships in Burkina Faso. It was argued that the relationship between Mossi and Fulbe is not deteriorating as has often been described in the so-called mainstream literature, and that the apparent open animosity between the two ethnic groups can partly be explained as a frontstage discourse with the aim of concealing personal wealth. The comment questions the use of historical data and the extent of secrecy in relation to personal wealth, and criticises the way in which the authors use terms like orthodoxy and mainstream to portray a broad set of ideas and theories.

This article is based on the observation that the large debate on the nature and consequences of so-called indigenous land tenure systems does not sufficiently take into account the perceptions and interpretations of peasants themselves. Consequently, its aims are to provide people with a voice and to analyse their assessment of different forms of access to land, of the modifications undergone in recent times, and their adjustments to this change. The results of this qualitative approach are compared with some statistical information gathered by the authors in the study region – three villages in central Burkina Faso – as well as country-wide. As a result, one may conclude that peasants in this area do not feel insecure about their land tenure situation, and this assessment of their own position is confirmed by empirical data.

In the process of structural adjustment and economic liberalisation, former strong socialist sub-Saharan African countries are experiencing additional challenges in their efforts to develop the private sector, compared to those that had relatively market oriented economies. Tanzania is known for its past strong socialist orientation. This article assesses the country's effort to reform the banking system, state owned enterprises, taxation system and the public services sector, and the emergence of the private sector. Comparisons are made where relevant with the experiences from transition economies in Eastern Europe.

Major reforms have taken place in all the sub-sectors, and there is significant increase in the participation by the private sector in the economy with increased production. Private banks have increased from zero in 1994 to thirteen in 1998. Over 40 per cent of former state owned enterprises have been divested, 50 per cent of which were sold. Some are performing well, contributing to government income and reversing the drain through subsidy. The taxation system has improved. It now recognises the role played by the private sector and has introduced new mechanisms to collect taxes e.g., VAT, and plugging tax evasion loopholes. Private sector investment has increased and major developments are notable in mining and tourism.

Although the overall impact of liberalisation on the areas examined has been positive, significant weaknesses remain, especially in the regulatory frameworks required to prevent abuses of their position by private enterprises. Both corruption and an uncertain legal environment inhibit the realisation of benefits from reform. The ‘trickle down’ of welfare to poorer sections of society has been inadequate, as has the extension of financial services to small businesses and rural areas. Further public investment is required, especially in health, education and infrastructure.

The political revolution of contemporary Africa has so far largely been limited to the centre and to re-establishing the same institutional forms and processes which failed Africa in the 1960s. These regimes are already showing signs of erosion. This problem can be understood through the theory of public goods. Key collective or ‘public’ goods problems impede the collective action necessary for institutional development. Top-down strategies cannot surmount these problems because they cannot integrate and unify the population or structure consensual and sustained collective action.

As currently constituted, national levels of government in Africa will be poor partners with local communities in development, be it of democracy or of the economy. In many cases, national regimes only exist at all because minimal contributing sets or political monopolists controlled, were given, or mobilised the resources to establish constituting rule systems which they used to sustain their existing relative advantages during the break-up of imperial systems. As this advantage is usually at the expense of the majority which lives outside the capitals, resources and policies to improve these areas are slow in coming. The slow, bottom-up process by which a true public constitution is built, one which reflects and elaborates generally held values, is built on existing political relationships, and protects social diversity, has never been allowed to develop.

Refounding the African state must resolve these problems if it is to succeed. Ethnically and religiously diverse peoples will rule themselves better under federal and consociational systems which give local leaders space to lead local institutional development, authority to play a role in national governance, a process to develop consensus on central policy and to check the centre when there is no consensus. This requires a foundation of viable, real, developed structures of local governance if it is to succeed.

Peter Oksen's comments on our paper about farmer–herdsman relations in Burkina Faso raise some interesting issues, notably regarding problems of interpretation of oral and archival sources and regarding the broader relevance of insights gained from an in-depth case study. Before answering straightforwardly to his objections, it is useful to clarify the misunderstanding which appears to exist about the meaning we attribute to ‘symbiosis’ and ‘symbiotic relations’. In our article we restricted the use of these terms to the way in which past relations between farmers and herdsmen, depicted as undifferentiated groups, are often represented. In discussions about the change of these relations, the emphasis is on progressive deterioration, again without attention paid to the possible existence of intra-group differentiation or of heterogeneity of relations across group boundaries. In this regard, it is remarkable that from colonial documents the interests of farmers and herdsmen emerge as equally irreconcilable as they are often considered today, and that, just as at present, competition over scarce natural resources constituted a major factor in inter-group relations. If we therefore reject ‘symbiosis’ as a correct description of formerly existing inter-group relations, we do not intend to imply that complementary links – such as those we describe for present-day relations between Mossi and Fulbe – did not exist in the past. A major aspect of our argument is that inter-group relations, whether past or present, cannot be subsumed under simplifying labels such as ‘symbiosis’. Neither can changes in these relations be understood in terms of uni-directionally processes of deterioration. Hence, present-day ‘complementary’ links across the ethnic boundary – established by certain, but not all, Mossi and Fulbe actors – are but a manifestation of the continued presence of diversity of relations, not of ‘symbiosis’. They point to mutual interests between certain actors belonging to different ethnic groups, not between the groups as such.

Investment in medium and large-scale manufacturing enterprises by Nigerian entrepreneurs has continued to grow; but little is known about their organisation and management in general, or the nature of working conditions and employee commitment in particular. This study examines the relationship between working conditions and employee commitment in twenty indigenously owned private manufacturing firms in Igbo states of southeastern Nigeria. The findings show that these firms have the potential to contribute to the industrial future of the country. However, a substantial number of their workers were dissatisfied with the extrinsic and equity factors of their work, which are stronger predictors of employee commitment than the intrinsic/responsibility component. To build a viable workforce for enterprise success and industrial development, entrepreneurs should invest in the long-term goals of their workers, and learn to balance their own interests with those of their employees.