For more than a decade, the South African Government has tried to suggest that a rethinking of some of the basic tenets of that country's race policy—apartheid—was not only possible, but was actually underway. Starting with the March 1973 appointment of the Theron Commission to look into the position of the then 2·3 million Coloureds of South Africa (persons of mixed-blood), there have by April 1984 been no fewer than three government-appointed commissions of inquiry, two parliamentary select committees, and three President's Council reports—all dealing with such fundamental matters, in addition to the position of the Coloureds, as trade-union rights for blacks, the movement of Africans into urban areas, and—repeatedly—constitutional change.

In the post-World War II period, South African capitalism is considered by many to have been reproduced on the basis of ‘cheap’ African labour-power. This is generally understood to mean that the prosperity of capitalism in the Republic depended on the poverty of the African majority. On the one hand, between 1950 and 1979, gross domestic product grew (in constant 1970 prices) from R4·4 billion to R15·5 billion. On the other hand, Africans on average earned wages that were below subsistence levels as defined by such minimal indices as the poverty datum line, and that were only 5 to 25 per cent as large as those earned on average by whites – see Tables 1 and 2. As generally analysed, both overall growth and the absolute and relative poverty of Africans were the direct result of the apartheid policies of the régime, in particular those responsible for the so-called cheap labour system.

Little exists to document the widespread repression of opposition in Africa since independence. Current studies of the rise of capitalism and the post-colonial state largely ignore institutionalised authoritarianism, which characterises the political side of this process. This article discusses the restraints placed on opposition in Kenya up to 1969. Its salience continues with the creation of a de jure one-party state since the abortive coup of 1982.

This article discusses the situation of Hausa women in the predominantly Muslim City ofKano, Nigeria, and speculates upon the possibilities for changes in their status and life options grounded in the realities of their social environment.

A strong trend in feminist scholarship focuses on the cultural aspects of the rôle of men and women, and relates their apparently universal asymmetries to the structural oppositions of ‘private’ and ‘public’ social spheres. In such studies, women are considered to be oppressed according to the extent that they are confined to a domestic life that excludes activities outside the home, which men control. Women are thus deemed to have gained stature, and to have realised a sense of their own value, only in so far as they are able to transcend the ‘private’ sphere and penetrate the predominantly male or ‘public’ world. In this context, a liberated society for women is posited as one in which men are routinely involved in domestic activities while women are free and able to participate effectively in public functions.

The performance of Africa's external sector during the 1970s has been described in a number of important publications. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the continent's share of world exports declined from 3·9 per cent in 1970 to 3·4 per cent in 1979. The performance of the region's export sector had been sluggish throughout this period, growing at an annual rate of only 0·6 per cent in volume compared to 6 per cent during the last five years of the previous decade. The World Bank report on sub-Saharan Africa described the 1970s as having been characterised by growing balance-of-payments deficits, attributable partly to external factors — notably the two large oil-price shocks, the slow growth in world trade in primary commodities, and the persistently rising price of imported manufactured goods — but partly caused also by domestic factors. Even within the group of developing countries, Africa's share of non-fuel exports is estimated to have declined from over 18 per cent in 1970 to about 9 per cent in 1978. During this decade the volume of imports expanded by an estimated 58 per cent annually — although for the sub-Saharan region the growth rate was only 3 per cent — while the terms of trade worsened significantly. Official development assistance rose substantially as a whole, but offset only a part of the growing deficit.

A study of the Republic of Mali's readmission into L'Union monétaire ouest-africaine provides an illustration of some of the problems inherent in African economic integration as political concerns intrude on development issues. In a broader sense, this case-study displays the difficulties involved in achieving the goal expressed in the very name of the Organisation of African Unity. It also shows the dual pull felt by many post-independence states: a desire for greater autonomy, as well as the necessity of maintaining some important links with the erstwhile colonising power.

Interest in the real potential of small-scale enterprise dates from the early 1970s, when it was gradually realised that the industrialisation policies pursed by many developing countries would not be able to create enough employment. It was observed, moreover, that a large part of the active population was engaged in petty trade and crafts, particularly in urban centres. Thus, in addition to the modern, ‘formal’ type of economic activity, an ‘informal’ sector was identified with the following distinctive features: (1) The production processes are labour-intensive, based on simple technology. (2) The smallness of the various industries enables their owners to work as managers as well as producers, and to have direct contact with their employees, while some relationships may be based on non-economic considerations. (3) The enterprises often break the law — that is, they seldom adhere to legally fixed minimum wages, they frequently neglect to observe safety and other regulations, and they tend to evade registration and tax obligations.

In the middle 1970s, scholars and politicians agree, the Soviet Union began a major effort to penetrate Africa. After a decade of relative indifference to African developments, Soviet arms and advisers, in support of Cuban troops, poured into Angola and Ethiopia. Involvement in these two countries was supplemented by further transfers of arms to a number of other African régimes, and this seemed to signal a dramatically heightened interest in the continent.