Between 1844 and 1848 the Scottish pig iron trade occupied a particularly important place not only in British but also in world economy. In 1830 Scotland produced only 37,000 tons of pig iron, or about 5 per cent of the total British output. By the mid-1840's it produced over 300,000 tons annually, or about 25 per cent of die British output. Of this increased output only one third was used in Scotland, while no less than one quarter left the United Kingdom for abroad. Such a rapid progress rested on peculiarly favorable geological and technical conditions.

The export crisis of the early 1620's, the causes of which formed the subject of an earlier paper, was without doubt one of the most widely discussed topics of the day. It figured largely in the Parliamentary debates of 1621 and 1624; it gave rise to much official inquiry and unofficial documentary discussion; and it produced a number of books which, though published as frank livres de circonstance, have come down to us as representative of the economic views of the period in general. A careful reconsideration of these works in the light of the immediate circumstances that prompted diem would help t o explain die peculiarity of some of the arguments put forward, and would be a valuable essay on die origins of Mercantilist concepts. The aim of the present paper is to select two particular topics which illustrate how close the connection was between die discussion of immediate issues and what passes for more abstract Mercantilist “theory.”

In Presenting this paper to an audience of historians I find myself in a painfully ambiguous position. I am not qualified to talk to you as a historian; therefore what I am going to say will lack the richness of empirical detail that usually characterizes historical papers. On the other hand, in order to qualify as “comparative analysis” this paper ought to have a firm theoretical foundation for its analysis, and accepted standards of reference for its comparisons. Unfortunately, the development economists are still at the beginning of their difficult attempts to isolate the factors that make for economic development, and the complex interaction of these factors has so far eluded systematic analysis and presentation.

The scholars of continental Europe have devoted much attention to the social consequences of rules and customs of inheritance, and there exists a large body of work on this subject by lawyers and agricultural historians. The purpose of this paper is to consider, in the light of this European evidence, the possible significance of such rules and customs for economic development in the nineteenth century.

Since the first American guaranteed wage and employment plans were formulated more than sixty years ago, the concept of guarantees has been championed by diverse economic institutions. This paper will analyze these successive attempts at establishing guarantees in the chronological order in which they have occurred—first, by business enterprise, secondly by various levels of government, and finally, by labor unions.

Within the sweep of Canada's economic progress, I should liketo devote special attention to one period—from about 1900 to the outbreak of World War I—as die period of most rapid growth in the history of Canada since die union of the separate provinces under Confederation in 1867, with die possible exception of die war-stimulated 1940's. I propose to point out certain parallels between that remarkable expansionary period and a much earlier one. I shall also attempt to isolate die important factors responsible for the upsurge of growdi after 1900.

Financial relationships between the federal government and the states were a critical matter in the founding and early operations of the federal government under the Constitution, with the settlement of the Revolutionary War debt the object of chief concern. When the debt was ultimately secured, other matters arose to keep funds passing from one level of government to another. Some of these were of major political importance, while others involving substantial sums made little political impact, being less controversial.

During the last four years before the outbreak of war in 1914 the people of England experienced an unprecedented combination of political strife and labor unrest. The struggle over the budget of 1909 had led to a constitutional crisis over the powers of the House of Lords in 1910–1911; suffragettes were resorting to obstructive and exasperating tactics to win the vote for women; the question of home rule almost resulted in civil war in North Ireland and brought what amounted to a threat of dereliction of duty by high military officers, who could not contemplate the use of force against the opponents of home rule; while the restlessness of labor brought a series of massive strikes in which the rank and file of workers often broke from the discipline of their leaders.

This paper represents an attempt to summarize the first stages of a research project, the completion of which is still remote. Its purpose is to pose one or two basic problems and to indicate the directions along which the answers may lie.

It is obvious that in the decades following its political unification Italy's economy remained very backward in relation not only to that of England, but also to the economies of industrially advancing countries on the continent of Europe. Whatever gauge one may choose for the purposes of comparison, be it qualitative descriptions of technological equipment, organizational efficiency, and labor skills in individual enterprises; or scattered quantitative data on relative productivity in certain branches of industry, or the numbers of persons employed in industry; or the density of the country's railroad network; or the standards of literacy of its population, the same conclusion will result.

The following nore on source material relates to an important aspect of British industrial development in the eighteenth century. Some use of this material has been made by M. W. Flinn of Aberdeen University and myself in our studies of the industry in the Seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but the field of the sources is so wide and relevant to so much of the economic history of Britain in that period that a summary may be of use to future researches in these rich and neglected sources.

The flurry of British investment in American manufacturing industry from 1887 to 1891 was viewed with alarm, particularly in the West. At this time the farmer was preoccupied with the economic power of monopolistic industries and trusts, and so die British investor became deeply involved in this phase of the agrarian battle. In the past, capital from die United Kingdom had entered industrial concerns, chiefly railroads, without wresting the management out of American hands. More recently British investors had been building up and controlling dieir own enterprises in the West. Now, well-established and profitable American businesses were bought and directed from Britain. The farmer regarded this unaccustomed interest in American industrials either as a step toward die formation of great monopolies, or, even worse, as part of an imperialistic design conceived by London bankers to enslave the American people.

We economic historians can sympathize fully with Professor Gerhard in his search for criteria that will help to cut political history into meaningful periods. Like him, we are fully aware that periodizing seems an artificial intellectual trick in face of the fact that life continues even in the midst of destruction. We would add, “So do human wants and the efforts that have to be made for their satisfaction.”

Little more than a century ago India rubber was a curiosity. Today, it is vital to our existence. The purpose here is to examine the basic factors that have influenced the growth of the rubber industry in the United States and the United Kingdom. The method chosen is to review the industry's position before and after the introduction of the automobile, say at 1900 and 1950. Much of what is to be said might be compressed into current economic terminology. Neither disrespect for this procedure nor the inapplicability of many of its concepts to economic history has prevented this course from being adopted.

Modern writers have usually dated die composition of Mun's work about the period 1630-1635. My article (pages 121-33 above) establishes diat much of die argument was the outcome of die trade crisis of 1620-1624, and die quotations and references there given prove that some of die most important sections of die work were first written, diough probably not as part of a book, during diat period. In addition, there are four pieces of internal evidence which help to date die complete work with some certainty.

It would not seem to be stretching matters unduly to assert that widespread agreement could be found on the following related propositions: (1) that the social crises and upheavals in Europe between the two World Wars, and the wars themselves, were not aberrations but are, rather, susceptible of a systematic, coherent explanation; (2) that such an explanation, though it would rest on a myriad of social relationships and processes, would place economic affairs at or near the center of Europe's troubles; and (3) that an understanding of European economic difficulties in the period might be efficiently achieved through an analysis of the factors stimulating and retarding the rate of economic growth of interwar Europe—or, that any thorough explanation would have to include such an analysis.

The Nazis dealt rather cautiously with the German monetary system during die first two years of dieir regime. Hitler was particularly sensitive to questions of “confidence,” and was glad to saddle Schacht with the responsibility of keeping die monetary system from blowing up in die face of die new government. But by the end of 1934, diere were signs that the Nazis were beginning to take Germany out of die stream of what Goering contemptuously called “the so-called free play of economic forces.”