Since the time of Ashley at least, it has not been possible to charge the Catholic church of the Middle Ages with having intended to throttle business enterprise by its doctrine of usury. Very few medieval writers, certainly after the early thirteenth century, wished to outlaw profit when it was a legitimate return on investment. To authoritative theologians and jurists there was a world of difference between usury, that is profit openly demanded or secretly hoped for in a contract of loan (mutuutn), and justifiable returns derived from partnerships, where there was a sharing of the risk and venture of the capital. The doctors operated with distinctions of Roman law by which the mutuum, explicitly referred to in the Vulgate at Luke 6:35, was clearly marked off from other transactions, such as the consensual contracts of partnership (societas), letting and hiring (locatio conductio), and purchase and sale (emptio venditio).

I Have found it necessary to deal speculatively rather than historically with the subject assigned to me. The assembly and the organization of facts presuppose principles of organization and criteria of relevancy. As yet these have not been formulated. Until this lack is repaired, therefore, speculation is bound to swamp history.

The main purpose of this paper is to compare the rates of industrial A growth in various periods of Russian history from the middle of the eighties until the end of the interwar period and to describe briefly the specific factors that promoted or obstructed the process of industrialization of the country. While no definitive conclusions are reached, some of the similarities and differences between industrial developments before and after 1914 are pointed out in the last section of this paper. History in the conditional mood is an enticing pastime. However, I have successfully withstood the temptation to concentrate on estimates of the relative level of industrial output that Russia might have attained in the absence of a revolution.