This analysis of the condition of the working classes in Glasgow in the first half of the nineteenth century is provided in two stages. An average real wage index for 1810–1840 exhibits a marked decline as a result of the high proportion of textile workers in the labor force. Quality indicators, such as housing conditions and mortality rates, deteriorated, and working-class diets at best did not improve. The evidence examined for Glasgow suggests no improvement in the standard of living of the city's working-class population.

In an effort to begin to solve the continuing controversy over how high the standard of living was in Japan prior to industrialization, this paper goes beyond the inadequate quantitative data and examines also qualitative and local evidence. Information on housing and food, urban water quality and waste disposal, and life styles is examined along with representative family budgets and two sets of real wage estimates. The evidence, taken together with life expectancy estimates, suggests that the standard of living in mid-nineteenth-century Japan was not only higher than in the 1700s, but relatively high in comparison to most of the industrializing West.

Among the developed countries, Australia in the period 1890–1940 experienced the fastest growth in population but the slowest in per capita income. When adjusted to incorporate the direct deflation of consumption expenditure, however, the growth of real GDP is raised by one-third, albeit to the still modest level of 0.8 percent annually. Inspection of a number of historical social indicators, not all caught in GDP, gives no support to the hypothesis of stagnant living standards. Finally, increases in life expectancy, a shorter working week, and earlier retirement also suggest substantial improvements in dimensions of standards of living not directly reflected in measured GDP. Conservatively, we estimate that living standards may have doubled over the half-century.

This paper uses independent real wages, earnings, labor force data, and an examination of Kuznet's 1953 data to explore the recent contention that real per capita incomes for most of the American population declined from 1923 through 1929. It concludes that there is little evidence to support this contention.

State-level estimates of income shares for the top one and five percent of the population are presented for 1929, 1933, and 1939. Significant cross-sectional variation is found in 1929, but the range narrows as the shares fall dramatically to 1933. Analysis indicates that property incomes influence the shares but provides little evidence of a tradeoff between per capita income and inequality as measured by the shares.

This paper applies a feminist analysis to the measurement of living standards during the 1970s. It suggests that widely made assumptions of homogeneous pooling and redistribution of income, labor, and expenditures within families mask inequalities and uneven changes in the living standards of wage-working husbands and wives. Two waves of the Panel Study of Income dynamics are used to create two rough indicators, that is, reproduction pay and surplus, to test for inequalities and uneven changes in 1968 and again in 1979. In general, the findings show differential living standards between husbands and wives when assumptions of homogeneous pooling and redistribution are not made. The paper concludes that the suggested rough indicators are useful for the measurement of living standards.

It is obvious that the path taken by Europe and North America is not to be a universal one. If the rest of the world can never live as we have lived in the past half-century and cannot have our material level of living, what goals and direction of change can be found that will offer an acceptable future? The People's Republic of the Congo offers an interesting backgound from which to address this process of reformulation.

The effect of the commercialization of traditional agriculture on the levels of living of peasant households is examined through a case study of El Palmar, Colombia. While there appear to have been widespread, positive, short-mn effects, the long-run consequences appear to be more problematic. It is suggested that commercialization and its consequences are more complex than can be grasped from available aggregate data, and a historical, case-study approach to this topic is recommended to complement macroeconomic studies.

Brazil is often cited as a developing country that has exemplified the trade-off between economic growth and equity. The basis for the claim was the rising inequality in the income distribution between the 1960 and 1970 censuses, combined with an increase in per capita income over the decade. Numerous scholars have analyzed the period, yet there is little or no agreement in the literature regarding either the causes or the extent of this apparent increase in inequality. Using a recently released sample of the 1970 demographic census, the empirical basis for the claim of deteriorating income distribution over the decade is examined here. Applying poverty lines defined for both 1960 and 1970 data sets, the correlates of income variance and poverty are analyzed. The results show that under most reasonable assumptions regarding data deficiencies and appropriate deflators, the fraction of the population in absolute poverty declined only slightly over the decade. Although the poorest households were found among the small farmers and sharecroppers in the rural areas in both 1960 and 1970, a large increase in the incidence of poverty in urban areas occurred over the decade.

This study examines Great Britain's adaptation in the 1920s and 1930s to the decline in the market for its nineteenth-century exports: cotton textiles, ships, iron and steel products, and coal. Continued growth in a mature economy depends at certain points upon structural change, in this case a movement from declining to expanding industries. At such times, I contend, the developing sector tends to grow independently, rather than through transformation of existing productive structures. Growth does not occur primarily through a reallocation of capital and labor from declining to expanding industries and regions.