The individual human being is manifestly the object of every legal system on this planet, and consequently also of international law. The ordinary subject of international law is the international corporate entity: first and foremost (though not exclusively) the State. Yet, the corporate entity is not a tangible res that exists in reality, but an abstract notion, moulded through legal manipulation by and within the ambit of a superior legal system. When the veil is pierced, one can see that behind the legal personality of the State (or any other international corporate entity) there are natural persons: flesh-and-blood human beings. In the final analysis, Westlake was indubitably right when he stated:

That is to say, in actuality, the international rights and duties of States devolve on human beings, albeit indirectly and collectively. In other words, the individual human being is not merely the object of international law, but indirectly also its subject, notwithstanding the fact that, ostensibly, the subject is the international corporate entity.

The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, convened by the Swiss Federal Council, held four sessions in Geneva during the years 1974–1977. On 8 June 1977, the Conference adopted by consensus two Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, the first relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), and the second relating to the protection of victims of noninternational armed conflicts (Protocol II).

The states invited to the Conference were all the states Parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and such states non-Parties as were members of the United Nations. 126 states were represented at the first session, 121— at the second, 106—at the third and 109—at the fourth.

The practice of omitting withdrawal clauses from the constituent treaties of many international organizations was highlighted by Nathan Feinberg in his article on “Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization”, acknowledged as “…the most thorough study of the subject”. In a detailed study of both State Practice and La Doctrine, Feinberg drew the conclusion

The role of the United States as midwife in the Israeli-Egyptian peace process has become a familiar one in recent years. Indeed, the local protagonists have all but taken for granted that their own peacemaking efforts would be catalyzed and reenforced by the United States. The pattern of American involvement has since 1975–76 had a dual aspect: American personnel have been permanently stationed in Sinai, and U.S. assurances have been extended to the parties (especially to Israel) as inducements to the acceptance of painful concessions.

The American presence in Sinai, when initiated in 1975–76, was minimal both in terms of its numbers and its functions. Fewer than 200 U.S. civilians operated the Sinai Field Mission, an early warning system in the strategic Giddi and Mitla mountain passes, whose purpose was to complement the functions of the UN peacekeeping force in the Sinai (the UN Emergency Force or UNEF II).

The second half of the twentieth century is witnessing a tremendous development of the concept of international organizations as “subjects” of international law. These “subjects” are endowed with international legal personality and with powers—express or implied—to achieve their declared objectives.

The corner-stone to this new edifice was erected as long ago as 1949 by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. The Court examined the purposes and principles set out in the Charter of the U.N. and concluded

The entrance of Israeli forces into Lebanon in June 1982 (“Operation Peace for Galilee”) raises far-reaching legal issues that transcend this particular occurrence. One of the issues raised in this context is the legality of the use of armed force by a State to counter terrorists directing their attacks against its citizens from the territory of another State. Israel considered the action it took against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon to be legitimate self-defence, directed not against the territorial integrity of Lebanon, but rather against the armed PLO terrorists operating from it against Israel. Others viewed Israel's actions as aggression, and Israel as an invader violating Lebanon's sovereignty. This invasion, it was asserted, was contrary to international law.