¹ Published in the 1963 Volume of the Brit. Yrbk. Int'l L.; reprinted in Feinberg, N., Studies in International Law (1979) 124Google Scholar (Hereinafter, Studies).

² Akehurst, , “Withdrawal from International Organisations” (1979) 32 Current Legal Problems 143CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Hill, , “The European Economic Community: The Right of Member State Withdrawal”, (1982) 12 Int'l & Comp. L. 335Google Scholar.

³ Studies at 167.

⁴ See Akehurst, loc. cit.

⁵ The treaty establishing the Organization of Eastern Carribean States offers a concrete example of a treaty both providing a right of withdrawal (Art. 24(2)) and concluded for an unlimited duration (Art. 24(1)). Arguing a-contrario one could suggest that absent such an explicit right to withdrawal it could not, with no other supporting evidence, be inferred.

⁶ Studies at 166.

⁷ Studies at 128–9.

⁸ Studies at 129.

⁹ I am relying here on Weiler, and Modral, , “Institutional Reform: Consensus or Majority?” (1985) 10 Eur. L.R. 316Google Scholar.

¹⁰ The European Political Community and the European Defence Community were both proposed in the years 1952–53 as a follow up to the Coal and Steel Community. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Coal and Steel Community prepared a Projet de Traité Portant Statut de la Communauté européenne which together with the treaty establishing the European Defence Community would have taken Europe into a pre-federative structure. In the event, the European Defence Community was accepted by all national parliaments of the ECSC save for a rejection, by small majority on August 30, 1954, in the French National Assembly. This rejection effectively also barred the possibility to ratify the treaty establishing the European Political Community.

¹¹ Article 1 of the Projet de Traité Portant Statut de la Communauté européenne (The European Political Community) provided that “Il est institué par le présent traité une Communauté européenne de caractère supranational. La Communauté est fondée sur l'union des peuples et des Etats, le respect de leur personnalité, l'égalité des droits et des obligations. Elle est indissoluble”, (emphasis added). For text and commentary see Ducci, R. & Olivi, B. (eds.) L'Europa Incompiuta (1970) at 214–248Google Scholar.

¹² Akehurst, op. cit., supra n. 2 at 150–2. For contrary views see Dagtoglou, , “How Indissoluble is the Community?” in Dagtoglou, (ed.), Basic Problems of the European Community (1975) at 258Google Scholar; Lasok, and Bridge, , The Law and Institutions of the European Community (1976) at 25Google Scholar.

¹³ Case 7/71 [1971] European Court Reports (ECR) 1003, 1018.

¹⁴ Studies at 159.

¹⁵ Studies at 159 (emphasis in original).

¹⁶ When Denmark acceded to the European Community in 1973, Greenland was included in the Community as an integral part of Denmark. Subsequently, the internal status of Greenland within Denmark was altered and a system of home government was established on May 1, 1979. In a consultative referendum held on February 23, 1982 a majority of Greenlanders voted their wish to withdraw from the Community. The Greenland Parliament decided on March 26, 1982 that negotiations should be opened with the Community through Denmark, with a view to terminating the application of the Community Treaties to Greenland and establishing Greenland's status as an Overseas Country and Territory in the meaning of Articles 131–136 of the Treaties. After lengthy but amicable negotiations, the withdrawal of Greenland was achieved by virtue of an Agreement reached by the Council of Ministers of the Community on February 20, 1984 which was to take effect by the end of that year. See in general, Dix-huitième Rapport général sur l'activité des Communautés européennes (1984) at 28. See also Supplement 1/83 to the Bulletin of the European Communities, “Commission Opinion on the Status of Greenland”, which includes both the Danish Government Memorandum requesting termination of the application of the Treaties and the Commission Reply.

¹⁷ Federal Loyalty (sometimes referred to as Federal Comity) is a translation of the German concept of Bundestreue. It originates already in the First German Reich and is a constant feature in the German Federal Constitutional tradition. In principle, the concept connotes a general requirement of cooperation, mutual consultation and co-ordination between the Bund and Länder (and, arguably, between the Länder inter se). Judicial application of the principle has limited the ability of either Bund or the Länder, to push any constitutional and politico-economic advantage to their full effect. In the field of international law the most famous political expression of the Bundestreue is the Lindau Compact of 1958 whereby the federal government retains the power to negotiate international agreements but when these come within the sphere of competences of the Länder, the latter must be consulted and agreement received before signature.

¹⁸ Case 804/79 [1981] ECR 1045.

¹⁹ Recital 9 of Judgment. Emphasis added.

²⁰ Citations from Recitals 17–28 of Judgment.

²¹ I am drawing here on some of my earlier writings, e.g., J. Weiler, Israel and the Creation of a Palestinian State (1985) at 106.

²² Evans, , “The Enforcement Procedure of Article 169 EEC: Commission Piscretion” (1979) 4 Eur. L.R. 442, 443Google Scholar.

²³ Rassmussen, , (1980) 5 Eur. L.R. 112, 115Google Scholar.

²⁴ See my Il Sistema Communitaria Europea (1985) for a more detailed analysis of this problem including an analysis of the weakness of the Art. 177 procedure itself.