The Status of Law begins with the suspicion ‘that “law” might have become the problem rather than the solution, and this problem requires further analysis’. Given that law is a social construct, Kratochwil invites us to turn to the sites where this construction takes place. To bring the many constitutions and contestations of law to the fore, he conjures theoretical sparring partners to engage in nine meditations. The genius of this Symposium consists of inviting nine colleagues, each engaging with a different meditation, and inviting a tenth colleague to add this introduction as a way to engage the engagement. By doing practice on practice the Symposium does full justice Kratochwil's move towards looking at the practice ‘in the middle of things’. The resulting field day with Fritz is a piece of intellectual mastery compiled by ‘spirited members of the republic of letters’ that carries the reader along on a journey that reveals and addresses Kratochwil's suspicions about the problem with law. In the end, we know more through sharing the problem and partaking in the joy of addressing it.

Kratochwil's magnificent The Status of Law in World Society's first meditation, a philosophical discursus masquerading as a meditation about meditation, addresses how International Law and International Relations deal so differently with their common concerns. Kratochwil treats these concerns with his usual cogency. Yet, critical links are missing. How do we get from speaking as a normative practice to the status of law in today's world? How does language (even more than law) go from an ‘agency-related notion’ to ‘a pervasive force penetrating all social relations’? The bewitchment of the world through language is ontology's greatest mystery, worthy of endless meditation.

Michael Zürn's Theory of Global Governance is an original, bold, and compelling argument regarding the causes of change in global governance. A core argument is that legitimation problems trigger changes in global governance. This contribution addresses two core features of the argument. Although I am persuaded that legitimacy matters, there are times when: legitimacy appears to be given too much credit to the relative neglect of other factors; other times when the lack of legitimacy has little discernible impact on the working of global governance; and unanswered questions about how the legitimacy of global governance relates to the legitimacy of the international order of which it is a part. The second feature is what counts as change in global governance. Zürn reduces change to either deepening or decline, overlooking the possible how of global governance. In contrast to Zürn's map of global governance that is dominated by hierarchies in the form of international organizations, an alternative map locates multiple modes of governance: hierarchies, markets, and networks. The kinds of legitimation problems that Zürn identifies, I argue, can help explain some of the movement from hierarchical to other modes of global governance.

Today's global governance is qualitatively different from the past, according to Michael Zürn's penetrating analysis. With the rise of epistemic authority, reflexivity, service, and request have come to surpass command and control as key modes of global governance, leading to new forms of legitimation and contestation. I engage with this rich and thought-provoking argument on three counts. First, it remains doubtful that states defer to international organizations because the latter ‘know better’. There exist many gaps in epistemic authority and politics often trump rationality in global governance. Second, it is not clear how global hierarchy, which Zürn equates with ‘pockets of authority’, could emerge out of demands and requests, precisely because epistemic authority is so fluid and prone to contestation. Third, as historically young and increasingly based on service authority as it may be, contemporary global governance still rests on a body of inherited practices whose legitimation principles seem closer to tradition than to reflexive justification.

In order to understand the concept of law, that is to understand what law is and does, Friedrich Kratochwil proposes to look at how we ‘use’ norms and relate them to actions. His approach promises less theoretical impasses and the ability ‘to go on’. These comments contend that a focus on ‘norm practice’ can only provide a particular understanding of how law functions. The article further suggests that the proposition and contestation of conceptions of law, including the uses of law these conceptions enable and legitimize, form part of the social practice of law. This calls for a comparative perspective.

The promise of constitutionalisation is, according to Kratochwil, the existential comfort that comes from having a coherent framework for judgement and action. This apparent epistemological confidence comes at the price of parting with a realistic assessment of the concrete situation, and it conceals that politics operate across all levels all the time. This paper critiques this vision and points beyond the idea of exhaustive frameworks. Figuring out contextually appropriate configurations of constitutionalisation and fragmentation allows for greater agency and pluralism. A more fundamental tension in Kratochwil's work remains, however, his falling back on the abstract to articulate the experiential.

This contribution probes A Theory of Global Governance from a materialist perspective. I focus on three forms of materialisms that have played a significant role in social theory as well as International Relations theory: the materialisms of markets, of artefacts, and of embodied affects. Integrating these materialisms serves to unsettle the conceptualization of global governance and of the politics of authority, legitimacy, and contestation underpinning it. A materialist perspective moves the theory of global governance towards a focus on processes instead of institutions, allowing it to capture both the multiple forms of global governance and their increasingly rapidly shifting forms. The contribution is anchored in a discussion of the global governance of cyber-security.

Moving away from studying actors to studying practices opens a fascinating vista of global governance. Kratochwil provokes inquiry into the practical work actual people do in international relations. He helps to move beyond binaries by offering a pragmatic approach to global governance in a fragmented institutional environment. Yet, his criticism of best practices for their problems of applicability and perverse side-effects misses the existence of different kinds of best practices. Some of them have been highly successful, such as the ‘Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia’. One should not underestimate the potential of practices in both advancing scientific knowledge and ‘real-world’ change.

This article takes the challenges of global governance and legitimacy seriously and looks at new ways in which international organizations (IOs) have attempted to ‘govern’ without explicit legal or regulatory directives. Specifically, we explore the growth of global performance indicators as a form of social control that appears to have certain advantages even as states and civil society actors push back against international regulatory authority. This article discusses the ways in which Michael Zürn's diagnosis of governance dilemmas helps to explain the rise of such ranking systems. These play into favored paradigms that give information and market performance greater social acceptance than rules, laws, and directives designed by international organizations. We discuss how and why these schemes can constitute governance systems, and some of the evidence regarding their effects on actors’ behaviors. Zürn's book provides a useful context for understanding the rise and effectiveness of Governance by Other Means: systems that ‘inform’ and provoke competition among states, shaping outcomes without directly legislating performance.

Prompted by both promises and pitfalls in Michael's Zürn's A Theory of Global Governance, this paper reflects on challenges going forward beyond liberal institutionalism in the study of world politics. Six suggestions are particularly highlighted for future theorizing of global governance: (a) further distance from state-centrism; (b) greater attention to transscalar qualities of global governing; (c) more incorporation of social-structural aspects of global regulation; (d) trilateral integration of individual, institutional, and structural sources of legitimacy in global governance; (e) more synthesis of positive and normative analysis; and (f) transcendence of Euro-centrism. Together these six shifts would generate a transformed global governance theory – and possibly practice as well.

Kratochwil criticizes two important teleological global narratives of universal progress – Luhmannian systems theory and jus cogens – and defends the need for a non-ideal and situated approach to law and politics. Despite the cogency of Kratochwil's analysis, why should we place our hope in his pragmatic program given the complexity of actual decision-making? This paper shows that more needs to be said about the role of hope grounding Kratochwil's account. Which hopes are hopeless, and which warranted? Why should we care and ‘go on’, choosing to be prudential and political rather than focusing on one's inner development or pleasure?

Friedrich Kratochwil engages critically with the emergence of a global administrative law and its consequences for the democratic legitimacy of global governance. While he makes important contributions to our understanding of global governance, he does not sufficiently discuss the differences in the institutional design of new forms of global law-making and their consequences for the effectiveness and legitimacy of global governance. I elaborate on these limitations and outline a comparative research agenda on the emergence, design, and effectiveness of the diverse arrangements that constitute the complex institutional architecture of contemporary global governance.

This response to my critics discusses four claims that are central for A Theory of Global Governance. The first claim is that observing a high level of conflict and contestation in world politics is not proof of the unimportance of global governance, since many of the current conflicts and contestations are about international institutions. The second claim is that the 1990s saw a rise of trans- and international authority beyond the nation-state that is essential for the rise of a global political system. Third, a global system of loosely coupled spheres of authority relies on ‘critical deference’ (reflexive authority) but also contains numerous elements of coercion. And fourth, a technocratic legitimation of intrusive international authorities cannot build on emotions or a sense of belonging. This deficit creates a political opportunity structure that allows for the rise of a myriad of dissenters. The relative importance of them depends on the availability of resources for mobilization and not on the quality of reasons for resistance.

This commentary focuses on Kratochwil's observation about the gap between the pervasiveness of human rights language and its susceptibility to perverse effects and abuse. After demonstrating that Kratochwil shares much of the contemporary skepticism about the alleged foundations and legitimacy of human rights, the comment elaborates on his claims that human rights were and are particularistic and that ‘rights talk’ produces unintended consequences for the individuals whose autonomy was meant to flourish. He questions but ultimately does not answer whether the broader anthropocentric ethos that underpins Western societies, and legal systems, may one day be superseded by ‘non-rightist’ approaches.

Kratochwil's critique of rights as a dominant moral theory that cannot avoid ‘hegemonic’ politics appears to be too crude. This article suggests that more theoretical and practical attention to the responsibilities necessary to implement rights could address some of Kratochwil's concerns. The language of political and ethical responsibilities is often missing from the practical action discourse of human rights. The article emphasizes the multitude of potential ‘agents of justice’ and how they can discharge forward-looking responsibilities in open and discretionary ways.

Kratochwil's diagnostic approach identifies specific failures in particular, historical contexts in order to prescribe practically realisable remedies under non-ideal conditions. The diagnostic approach compares actual alternatives against each other rather than against some ideal. Yet, the basis for such an identification is unclear. By reinterpreting Kratochwil's approach with the help of Buddha's Four Noble Truths, one can understand Kratochwil's existential worldview and his aims, but the medium Kratochwil uses hinders the attainment of those goals. He tries to communicate in writing something (phronesis) that belongs in the world of experience.