We apply insights from “new, new” trade theory to explain a puzzling decline in US firm antidumping (AD) filings in an era of persistent foreign currency undervaluations and increasing import competition. Firms exhibit heterogeneity both within and across industries regarding foreign direct investment (FDI). We propose that firms making vertical or resource-seeking investments abroad will be less likely to file AD petitions, and firms are likely to undertake vertical FDI in the context of currency undervaluation. Hence, we argue, the increasing vertical FDI of US firms makes trade disputes far less likely. We use firm-level data to examine the universe of US manufacturing firms and find that AD filers generally conduct no intrafirm trade with filed-against countries. We also find that persistent currency undervaluation is associated over time with increased vertical FDI and intrafirm trade by US multinational corporations (MNCs) in the undervaluing country. Among larger US MNCs, the likelihood of an AD filing is negatively associated with increases in intrafirm trade. In the context of currency undervaluation, we confirm the existing finding that undervaluation is associated with more AD filings. We also find, however, that high levels of intrafirm imports from countries with undervalued currencies significantly decrease the likelihood of AD filings. Our study highlights the centrality of firm heterogeneity in international trade and investment in understanding political mobilization over international economic policy.

Existing studies of foreign aid suggest that donor countries' economic groups, such as exporters, should be generally opposed to multilateral aid because multilateral flows do not allow donor countries to tie their aid implicitly or explicitly to the promotion of their domestic economic interests. However, economic groups can actually benefit from some types of multilateral aid, and this serves as an incentive for donor governments to support international organizations generating the benefits. I test my argument using data on aid allocated to the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol and the Global Environment Facility, and international trade by commodity. I find robust empirical support for the argument that when donors' domestic economic groups are likely to gain from opportunities created by international environmental organizations' programs, donor governments increase aid allocations to these organizations.

Certain types of militant groups—those suffering from leadership deficits—are more likely to attack civilians. Their leadership deficits exacerbate the principal-agent problem between leaders and foot soldiers, who have stronger incentives to harm civilians. We establish the validity of this proposition with a tripartite research strategy that balances generalizability and identification. First, we demonstrate in a sample of militant organizations operating in the Middle East and North Africa that those lacking centralized leadership are prone to targeting civilians. Second, we show that when the leaderships of militant groups are degraded from drone strikes in the Afghanistan-Pakistan tribal regions, the selectivity of organizational violence plummets. Third, we elucidate the mechanism with a detailed case study of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a Palestinian group that turned to terrorism during the Second Intifada because pressure on leadership allowed low-level members to act on their preexisting incentives to attack civilians. These findings indicate that a lack of principal control is an important, underappreciated cause of militant group violence against civilians.

Status has long been implicated as a critical value of states and leaders in international politics. However, decades of research on the link between status and conflict have yielded divergent findings, and little evidence of a causal relationship. I attempt to resolve this impasse by shifting the focus from status to relative status concerns in building a theory of status from the ground up, beginning with its behavioral microfoundations. I build on and extend previous work through an experimental study of status threats and the escalation of commitment, operationalized here as a new behavioral escalation task using real financial incentives and framed around a narrative of war and peace. I utilize a unique sample of high-profile political and military leaders from the Senior Executive Fellow (SEF) program at the Harvard Kennedy School, as well as a group of demographically matched control subjects, allowing me to evaluate the moderating effect of power on status concerns while also addressing typical concerns about external validity in IR experiments. I find strong evidence that the fear of losing status impedes decision making and increases the tendency to “throw good money after bad,” but that power aids decision making by buffering high-power subjects against the worst effects of status loss.

Although a considerable literature identifies the conditions under which sanctions are more likely to be successful, few studies examine the question of when sanctioning states or senders are willing to enforce their sanctions laws against their firms. Using a game theoretic model, we argue that imposing sanctions creates a strategic dilemma for senders. We demonstrate that senders often have disincentives to enforce their sanctions policies, given that the restriction on economic transactions with targeted states may undermine their firms' competitiveness. The model indicates that sanctions are more likely to succeed when the sender's firm retains a moderate share of the target's market relative to its foreign competitors. However, the model also demonstrates that sanctions are likely to be imposed only when the conditions do not favor their success. The empirical implications of the model are tested using the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set.

International arbitration is a distinctive feature of both contemporary international politics and the ancient world. Explanations of arbitration in the international relations literature generally posit that states engage in arbitration to mitigate the effects of competition in an anarchical system, or that the practice of arbitration reflects democratic norms. However, an examination of arbitration during the paradigmatic case of the Hellenistic period (338–90 bce) casts doubt on the existing literature. Hierarchy rather than anarchy better characterizes the political context in which arbitration took place: the Greeks often organized themselves into alliances or leagues in which a hegemon dominated decision making, or into federal states with a common foreign policy. This hierarchical setting was a necessary condition for international arbitration where the practice of arbitration was a tool to legitimize hierarchical powers. We assemble an original data set of Hellenistic arbitrations, and use qualitative comparative analysis to show that hierarchy was almost always a necessary condition for international arbitration. Process-tracing of arbitration under three political orders—hegemonic kingdoms in the Greek world, Greek federations, and the Roman Empire—shows that arbitration as a particular means of dispute resolution was used as an ideological device to build and legitimize international order. We then analyze the contemporary record, finding a role for hierarchy in modern international arbitration.

Selection effects in crisis bargaining make it difficult to directly measure audience costs because state leaders have an incentive to avoid incurring audience costs. We overcome this inferential problem of selection bias by using a structural statistical model. This approach allows us to estimate the size of audience costs, both incurred and not incurred, in international crises. We show that although audience costs exist for state leaders of various regime types, democratic leaders face larger audience costs than nondemocratic leaders do. Audience costs can be so large that war might be preferable to concessions, especially for leaders of highly democratic states. Audience costs also increase a state's bargaining leverage in crises because the target state is more likely to acquiesce if the challenge carries larger audience costs. We also find evidence that audience costs generate selection effects.

Do human rights prosecutions deter dictatorships from relinquishing power? Advances in the study of human rights show that prosecutions reduce repression in transition countries. However, prosecuting officials for past crimes may jeopardize the prospects of regime change in countries that have not transitioned, namely dictatorships. The creation of the International Criminal Court has further revitalized this debate. This article assesses how human rights prosecutions influence autocratic regime change in neighboring dictatorships. We argue that when dictators and their elite supporters can preserve their interests after a regime transition, human rights prosecutions are less likely to deter them from leaving power. Using personalist dictatorship as a proxy for weak institutional guarantees of posttransition power, the evidence indicates that these regimes are less likely to democratize when their neighbors prosecute human rights abusers. In other dictatorships, however, neighbor prosecutions do not deter regimes from democratizing.

Common wisdom and current scholarship hold that governments need to stand firm in the face of secessionist demands, since permitting the secession of one region can set a precedent for others. For this reason governments will often choose blood rather than risk dissolution. I argue that administrative organization provides states with a third option. Those regions that represent a unique administrative type stand a much better chance of seceding peacefully. Moreover, large articulated states sometimes downsize by administrative category, which helps explain why governments will release one set of units without contest while preventing another set from doing the same. Finally, secessionist movements that do not cohere with any administrative region are the least likely to be granted independence. In sum, the administrative architecture of states provides governments with a means to discriminate between secessionist demands. I test this theory in a large-N study using original data on secessionist movements and administrative units between 1816 and 2011.

A consensus exists that countries that have recently undergone domestic political revolutions are particularly likely to become involved in military conflicts with other states. However, scholars seek to understand when and why revolutions increase the likelihood of international violence. In contrast to existing work focusing on international systemic factors, we argue that revolution fosters conflict in part by affecting states’ domestic political structures. Previous research has shown that revolution tends to bring particularly aggressive leaders to power. We demonstrate that revolutions also frequently result in personalist dictatorships, or regimes that lack powerful institutions to constrain and punish leaders. By empowering and ensconcing leaders with revisionist preferences and high risk tolerance, revolutions that result in personalist dictatorships are significantly more likely to lead to international conflict than revolutions that culminate in other forms of government. Our arguments and evidence help explain not only why revolution so commonly leads to conflict, but also why some revolutions lead to conflict whereas others do not.

Recent research has highlighted combat's positive effects for political behavior, but it is unclear whether they extend to attitudes toward the conflict itself. We exploit the assignment of health rankings determining combat eligibility in the Israel Defense Forces to examine the effect of combat exposure on support for peaceful conflict resolution. Given the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to global affairs, and its apparent intractability, the political consequences of combat become all the more pressing. We find that exposure to combat hardens attitudes toward the rival and reduces support for negotiation and compromise. Importantly, these attitudes translate into voting behavior: combatants are likely to vote for more hawkish parties. These findings call for caution in emphasizing the benign effects of combat and underscore the importance of reintegrating combatants during the transition from conflict to peace.

Conventional wisdom holds that the creation of international, court-like institutions helps countries to peacefully settle trade conflicts, thereby enhancing overall welfare. Many have argued, however, that these institutions remain ultimately ineffective because they merely reflect the distribution of power in the anarchic international system. We argue that international litigation provides economic spillovers that create opportunities for judicial free-riding and explore empirically how litigation in the World Trade Organization affects bilateral trade between countries involved in a trade dispute. We use a matching approach to compare the dynamics of trade flows between countries that experienced a panel ruling with trade relations of observably similar country pairs that did not experience a ruling. Based on this comparison we find that sectoral exports from complainant countries to the defendant increase by about $7.7 billion in the three years after a panel ruling. However, countries that have proactively filed a complaint and carried the main costs of litigation do not systematically gain more than less-active third parties that merely joined an existing trade dispute. This suggests that international judicial institutions can provide positive economic externalities and may thereby lead to a less power-based distribution of the gains from trade.

Is foreign policy influenced by humanitarian concerns, or are concepts such as human security merely rhetoric for traditional power politics? Using a multilevel modeling technique and a unique data set of military and economic European Union (EU) intervention 1989–2008, I find that military and economic interventions by the EU are conducted in response to humanitarian atrocities but that geostrategic concerns also influence EU action. While the EU consistently is more likely to act against countries with greater civilian victimization, the size of the effect is influenced by spatial considerations. The EU is most attentive to human rights violations in non-EU European states, followed by countries in sub-Saharan Africa, while it has been least active in Asia and the Americas.

Greater theoretical consensus and cohesion could offer critical insights for the broader community of international relations scholars into the role that gender plays in spawning and sustaining processes of violence. This review essay examines the role of gender in generating and perpetuating violence and aggression, both in theory and practice. I make four central claims. First, in many studies involving the role of sex and gender in violence, specific causal models tend to remain underspecified. Second, a divergence in fundamental assumptions regarding the ontological basis of sex differences implicitly permeates and shatters this literature. Third, arguments that men and women are more or less likely to fight appear too simplistic; rather, it is worth considering that men and women may possess different motivations for fighting, and fight under different circumstances and for different reasons. Finally, systematic differences in the variant psychologies of men and women regarding the relative merit of offense and defense exert predictable consequences for public opinion surrounding the conduct of war in particular.

According to recent studies, international human rights treaties are ineffective, counterproductive, or else beneficial for only those countries that tend to respect human rights regardless of treaty membership. Analysts often attribute gaps between human rights principles and practices to willful disobedience, self-interested defection, and ineffective enforcement. Using two-stage regression models to analyze compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, I examine whether countries' inability (as opposed to unwillingness) to implement treaty terms is also responsible for the gap between commitment and compliance. I find that one dimension of state capacity in particular—bureaucratic efficacy—enhances levels of compliance with civil, political, and physical integrity rights provisions. These findings lend credence to an important aspect of the managerial approach—that noncompliance is often inadvertent and conditioned by a state's ability to implement treaty terms.

This research note hypothesizes that international agreements including a finite duration provision or with a shorter expected duration should take less time to negotiate. Using a random sample of agreements across different issue areas, it finds statistical support for this hypothesis. Agreements without a finite duration provision experienced a bargaining phase that was twice as long as agreements including a finite duration provision and otherwise short-term agreements. This result not only offers empirical support for the theoretical proposition that a longer shadow of the future leads to increased bargaining delay—it also has important policy implications. International negotiators can include a finite duration provision when they prefer a shorter bargaining phase to a potentially more durable agreement, and they can avoid this feature when they prefer a more durable agreement, although this decision comes with the cost of additional bargaining delay. By treating finite duration provisions as an independent variable, this result also addresses a critique of the research program on the rational design of international institutions that it moves backward by considering only design features as dependent variables.

Donor proliferation and the fragmentation of aid delivery is an important problem besetting foreign aid policy. Increased donor coordination is widely seen as a fix to this problem. This article explores theoretically and empirically the collective action problems and incentives that donors face when coordinating their actions, based on the distinction between private and public goods properties of aid. I introduce the concept of lead donorship, develop a measure that accounts for the exclusive and long-lasting ties between a lead donor and a recipient country, and show that lead donorship is in long-term decline. I test my theory combining spatial autoregressive (SAR) models, nonparametric model discrimination techniques, and data on aid delivery channels. I recover evidence of collusion in the provision of private goods aid in the presence of a lead donor, and lack of coordination and competition in the absence of a lead donor.