The case of Pinochet has aroused enormous interest, both political and legal. The spectacle of the General, whose regime sent so many to their deaths, himself under arrest and standing trial has stirred the hopes of the oppressed. His reversal of fortune, loss of liberty with a policeman, on the door, has been heralded by organisations for the protection of human rights as one small step on the long road to justice. For lawyers generally, the House of Lords' majority decision of 1998 that General Pinochet enjoyed no immunity signalled a shift from a State-centred order of things.1 It suggested that the process of restriction of State immunity, so effectively begun with the removal of commercial transactions from its protection, might now extend some way into the field of criminal proceedings. And it further posed the intriguing question whether an act categorised as within the exercise of sovereign power, so as to relieve the individual official of liability in civil proceedings, may at the same time, as well as subsequent to his retirement, attract parallel personal criminal liability.

While lacking the raw excitement of the live “penalty shoot-out” that was the announcement of the decision of the House of Lords in Reg. v. Bow Street Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet,1 the initial impression of the decision in Reg. v. Bow Street Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)2 was of a solid majority support for the position that Pinochet was not entitled to immunity in the United Kingdom in respect of the criminal acts he is alleged to have committed. Even as Lord Browne-Wilkinson attempted to explain the intricacies of the decision, the matter of immunity appeared settled and of secondary consideration to the “new” requirement of double criminality which alone, it seemed, had resulted in the considerable reduction in the list of crimes for which Pinochet could be extradited to Spain. Closer examination of the reasoning of their Lordships, however, quickly dispels that impression and reveals a range of opinions across a wide spectrum. What agreement there was between their Lordships on the matter of Pinochet's immunity from jurisdiction is diverse and often contradictory. In particular, the Lordships who formed the majority were equally divided on the question as to whether Pinochet was acting within his official capacity when carrying out the acts of which he is accused. Given that immunity rationae materiae appears to be available only in respect of official acts, it is difficult to see how the six could have agreed on the fact that Pinochet was not entitled to such immunity. Indeed, given the fact that Lord Goff (dissenting) was of the opinion that the alleged acts were performed in the course of Pinochet's functions as head of state, there was in fact a majority in favour of the prima facie existence of immunity rationae materiae.

The “revenue rule” is a “well-settled principle of international law that one nation's courts will not enforce the tax claims of another jurisdiction”.1 The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recently held, however, that using US foreign or interstate telecommunications to devise a scheme to defraud a foreign revenue authority is wire fraud under US law. In United States v. Trapilo2 the Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of indictments against alleged smugglers charged with using telephones and fax machines to effect tax-evasive importation of alcohol into Canada. Under Trapilo, which conflicts with a contrary First Circuit decision on almost identical facts, 3 the entire breadth of US wire and mail fraud precedent may apply to punish violations of foreign tax laws. Moreover, the decision substantially erodes the revenue rule.

In the aftermath of the 1995 referendum on Quebec unilateral secession, 1 the then Minister of Justice, Allan Rock, proposed that the legality of a province's attempting to secede unilaterally be referred to the Supreme Court of Canada for a judicial opinion, pursuant to that Court's special advisory jurisdiction.2 Accordingly, on 30 September 1996, the Governor General in Council submitted three questions of law, discussed in detail below, concerning the legal authority of Quebec, under both Canadian and international law, to secede from the Canadian federation. In addition to the government of Canada, two provinces, the two territories, and a number of special interest groups and individuals (all given leave to intervene) submitted written arguments and rejoinders over the course of 1997.3 The government of Quebec did not participate in the hearing and submitted no argument. Accordingly, the Court appointed an (from Quebec) to represent the secessionist interest. The Court heard argument from 16 to 19 February 1998. On 20 August 1998 the Court released its unanimous opinion, rather earlier than expected.4 The Court rejected the legal right of Quebec to separate unilaterally under Canadian constitutional law, and the right to do so under international law as recognised in Canada. Given the latter holding, the Court did not consider further the third question relating to reconciling a possible conflict between the two legal orders. The following extended case comment proposes to outline and discuss briefly the reasoning of the Court, in what is a significant exercise of judicial power in the service of constitutional affairs. The structure of this comment will follow that of the Court's resaoning, dealing first with a preliminary objection, then turninh to question 1(introduction and discussion) and then to Question 2 and 3.5

The decision of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, given on 24 March 1999,1 confirms, by the impressive vote of 6 to 1, the earlier majority ruling that a former head of state enjoys no immunity in extradition or criminal proceedings brought in the United Kingdom in respect of the international crime of torture.

The last contribution on this topic, which was published in the July 1997 issue of the Quarterly,1 examined the Court's remarkable ruling in CIA Security International S.A. v. Signalson SA and Securitel SPRL,2 in which the Full Court decided that where a member State neglects to notify draft national technical regulations to the Commission in breach of the obligations set out in Directive 83/189,3 it may not rely on those regulations in subsequent proceedings before national courts. The Court's ruling attaches a meaningful penalty to State failure to abide by the obligations of notification stipulated by the Directive. It thereby induces compliance with requirements of transparency on which the Commission pins great faith in its “post-1992” strategy for the management of the internal market. The case law since CIA Security has generated a sufficient number of further illuminating rulings to justify a further tour of the area in this contribution.

The Lords were not lost in admiration of section 20 of the State Immunity Act 1978. Lord Browne-Wilkinson described it as “strange” and “baffling”. It is certainly true that (as Lord Browne-Wilkinson continued) “Parliament cannot have intended to give heads of state and former heads of state greater rights than they already enjoyed under international law”.1 Nor was it intended that their rights should be inadvertently curtailed. The State Immunity Bill originally introduced into the House of Lords in 1977 would, by reflecting in UK statute law the European Convention on State Immunity2 make huge inroads into absolute sovereign immunity—tottering but not yet demolished through the repeated onslaughts of Lord Denning. The European Convention was however “essentially concerned with ‘private law’ disputes between individuals and States”.3 It was not intended to have any application to criminal proceedings—in so far as lawyers in 1977 even contemplated criminal proceedings in domestic courts against foreign States in their public capacity. It did not deal with the personal privileges or immunities of heads of state. There were no ready-made treaty rules on heads of state and no clear customary rules either.4

The prominence of the immunity issue in Pinochet 12 rather obscured the fact that the proceedings were ultimately about extradition. Perhaps that was how it should have been because immunity questions are recognised as preliminary matters, going to the very competence of a court to hear and determine the substantive claim. However, there can be questions which are, as it were, even more preliminary than ones about immunity. One example is where a party argues that there is no substance whatever to the right a State claims and which it is seeking to protect from adjudication by relying on one version or another of immunity.3 When the extradition aspects of the case resurfaced in Pinochet 3, the opposite, pre-preliminary situation was presented: did the extradition crimes specified in the warrants from Spain require any answer from Pinochet, such that could he avoid being handed over, without it being necessary for him to raise any claim of immunity?

Article N of the Treaty on European Union (TEU ) called for an intergovernmental conference (IGC) in 1996 to reform the articles of the Treaty for which a revision is provided. Also, it was felt that the institutional question should be addressed before the next wave of enlargement; the institutional structure which was adopted to deal with six member States could hardly be stretched further to include the Eastern European applicant States. A complete re-engineering of the institutional framework was required. Furthermore, the reform of the institutions should tend to increase democracy in the Union.

The last time this column appeared1 there was considerable discussion about the proposals being considered at the then ongoing intergovernmental conference (IGC). Not surprisingly the proposals of the UK government in its Memorandum on the Court of Justice were not adopted in the Treaty of Amsterdam. No institutional changes have been made in relation to the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. So the approval of their Rules of Procedure is still subject to the approval of the Council and their terms of office are still six years but can be renewed.

In September 1997 the government of the United Kingdom announced new policies on the dumping of offshore installations. The new policies centred on a general prohibition of dumping of offshore installations for all but those instances where there was absolutely no alternative.1 They were presented as a sea change from the policies of the previous Conservative government which had required each case to be assessed on its merits and were hailed by some at the time as a major development.2 To date this has been a development with little legislative substance at the UK domestic level.3 At the international level, however, it appears to have produced more substantive changes, primarily by enabling the government to play an important role in the development of new rules under the Ospar Convention 1992.4 And, while the full extent of the United Kingdom's influence on the exact developments is not clear, it is clear that the new rules contain developments which are of importance not only to the parties to the Ospar Convention, but to the international law on the dumping of offshore installations generally. These legal developments will be considered below.

Since the last note on this subject,1 developments have focused on continuing problems: financing new infrastructure; allocation of the true costs of transport among those who generate them; and external relations. In addition, further more detailed legislative measures have been adopted for each mode of transport.

The well established rule that an overseas company that establishes a place of business in Great Britain and does not provide an address for service can be served with process at that place of business1 was thrown into confusion by the insertion into the 1985 Companies Act of several new provisions including a new section 694A(2) which provides that process may only be served on a branch “in respect of the carrying on of the business of the branch”.2 The new rules did not purport to change the situation in relation to a place of business falling short of a branch, and thus created the anomaly that it was apparently easier to serve a place of business than a branch. The proper interpretation of these rules arose in Saab v. Saudi American Bank (Court of Appeal, 2 July 1999).3 Before the case was heard by the Court of Appeal, the new Civil Procedure Rules entered into force on 26 April 1999. Under Part 62(2):

A company may be served by any method permitted under this Part as an alternative to the methods of service set out in—

(a) section 725 of the Companies Act 1985 (service by leaving a document at or posting it to an authorised place);

(b) section 695 of that Act (service on overseas companies); and

(c) section 694A of that Act (service of documents on companies incorporated outside the UK and Gibraltar and having a branch in Great Britain).

Under Part 6.5(6) where a party has not given an address for service, a document may be served on a company not registered in England and Wales at “any place of business of the company within the jurisdiction.”

The Treaty of Amsterdam, expected to come into force this year, opened up new horizons in relation to European civil procedure. Article 65 of the revised EC Treaty will bring various aspects of civil procedure within the scope of Community law, in so far as they are “necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market”.1 It states:

In the last two years, there has been a dearth of legislative initiatives in the field of company law.1 This may be attributed to several reasons. Whilst the company law harmonisation programme is now largely complete, the principle of subsidiarity has to some extent hampered moves toward further harmonisation. Disagreement still reigns over certain crucial issues such as employee participation in corporate management. Also, in the light of the objective to advance EMU, there has been a shift in the Community's priorities. The search for consensus continues in relation to the proposal for a thirteenth company law directive on take-overs and the proposed European Company Statute, although, currently, the national delegations seem to be closer to agreement in relation to the latter than in relation to the former.2

This area of law is dominated by the drive towards harmonisation, and a considerable body of legislation and case law continues to be generated. The vision is of investment in creativity and innovation, leading to growth and competitiveness of a wide range of European industries. Significant progress—sometimes unexpected—can be recorded in certain areas, but it should also be acknowledged that the scale of the problems precludes easy solutions in others.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Turner v. Grovit13 is of particular interest to all those struggling to identify the precise relationship between Community law and English law in the field of jurisdiction, and the extent to which the English court retains a discretionary control over its procedure. The Court was asked to grant an anti-suit injunction to restrain proceedings in Spain. The claimant was employed as a Group solicitor for the Chequepoint Group of companies. He was employed by English companies within the Group, but was relocated to Spain to work at the premises of a Spanish member of the group (CSA). The ultimate owner of these companies was the first defendant, Mr Grovit. The claimant resigned because he felt that he was being asked to undertake activities that were unethical. He brought unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal claims before the Employment Tribunal in London. Shortly thereafter he was sent a letter on CSA paper purporting to terminate his contract. A month after the Employment Tribunal had determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, CSA brought proceedings in Spain claiming that it was the claimant's employer and seeking damages for breach of contract. There was evidence that the defendants had not provided full information to the Spanish court about the English proceedings.

The other development under the justice and home affairs pillar of the Union relevant to European civil procedure is the so-called Brussels II Convention: the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters signed on 28 May 1998. This Convention continues the work of the 1968 Brussels Convention by extending similar principles to the field of matrimonial matters. The earlier Convention is seen as the general convention and the 1998 Convention as a lex specialis which follows the principles of the earlier Convention as far as possible.