Environmental rights such as the right to a sound environment and rights of nature, while playing an increasingly important role in global environmental governance and protection, frequently do not correspond to articulations of fundamental experiences of injustice by communities particularly affected by serious environmental degradation caused by, for example, extractive activities or major infrastructure projects. We present three empirically grounded case studies that employ concepts and methods from anthropology to demonstrate this. The work is still in progress, but sufficiently well advanced to present some findings. Our ethnographic research in Ethiopia and Mongolia reveals that vulnerable local communities take recourse to constitutional environmental rights far less often than expected. The reasons for this range from rule-of-law issues to local perceptions of vulnerability and relevant norms. Conversely, where environmental rights are demanded or claimed at the local level, they are often not translated adequately into the law of the state. Our case study on Ecuador, where rights of nature as a specific type of environmental rights have been included in the constitution, shows that transfers from local practice, while potentially having a transformative effect, may lead to conceptual selectivity, ambiguity, lack of clarity, and overlaps with existing state norms and, hence, redundancies. Environmental rights are, therefore, a moving target whose concrete added value hinges on context—as methods of law and anthropology serve to illustrate.

This Article offers an anthropologically informed rereading of the landmark case Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2010. This rereading is undertaken by “going beyond judgments” temporally—i.e., reconstructing the case from its origins to present—and spatially—i.e., looking at different sources of data and putting them into conversation with one another. This approach draws on anthropology both conceptually and methodologically. Not only does it address “case law” and “litigation” as creations of a variety of social and legal agents, constantly and meaningfully interacting with one another, but it also adopts a “litigant’s perspective” and creates space for acknowledging aspects of the lived experience of the applicants that have been marginalized in legal reasoning. By doing so, this Article shows that, from being strongly imbued with religious considerations, Neulinger and Shuruk came to assume a neutral framing when entering and progressing through the ECtHR. “Going beyond judgments” ultimately foregrounds the image of the Court as an institution addressing and doing different things to different audiences and stakeholders, and showcases some of the ways through which multi-perspectivity and efforts to “humanize the law” may be incorporated into case-law analyses.

Within the criminal justice system, there is always a balancing act between two conflicting tenets: incarcerating the prisoners as a preventive measure, on the one hand, and, on the other, aiming to rehabilitate them. Without a proper transition, it is possible that prisoners will reoffend upon release. German legislation allows corrections officers to grant relaxed terms of imprisonment to prisoners who have proved themselves suitable. However, on June 7, 2018, corrections officers were essentially deprived of this power when the Regional Court of Limburg convicted two corrections officers of negligent killing after a prisoner, to whom they had granted relaxed terms of imprisonment, killed someone during one of his periods of release. In the immediate wake of this controversial judgment, corrections officers throughout Germany were seemingly left with two options: either to remain conscientious and attempt to rehabilitate the prisoners with the underlying risk of being subject to prosecution themselves, or to ensure their own “safety”, thereby jeopardizing prisoners’ crime-free futures. This article provides an overview regarding negligently committed offenses under German law, analyzes what led the trial court to this radical decision, and assesses why the final appeal court overruled the Regional Court’s decision.

In conversation with several chapters of Stefan Grundmann’s, Hans Micklitz’s, and Moritz Renner’s book on New Private Law Theory, this paper reflects on contributions that theories of communication and constitutionalization can make to our understanding of the changing role of private law in a globalizing world. More abstract ideals are checked against an assessment of recent judgments of Dutch courts in cases regarding oil company Shell’s responsibility for environmental pollution in Nigeria. Such theoretical readings of case law, it is held, in the spirit of New Private Law Theory, show new directions that private law theories may choose in order to understand and strengthen the private-legal framework for societal questions of our times.

Do states take court decisions into account when formulating policies? If so, how do they process new judicial input and make policies in response to them? While self-interest and incentives are the usual elements involved in a rational choice explanation of policymaking, behavioralist scholarship casts doubt on whether decisionmakers are able to identify and pursue their interests in a rational manner. We draw on rational and behavioral approaches to formulate different expectations about the process of policymaking and updating in the context of maritime delimitation. We focus on how states formulate policies about the appropriate method of maritime delimitation given relevant decisions of the International Court of Justice. Using a dataset of continental shelf delimitation policies, we find evidence that at least some states change policies in line with court decisions. However, we are unable to distinguish between mechanisms consistent with rational choice and those suggested by behavioralism. We discuss why behavioralist explanations of policymaking processes are difficult to test in a large-N setting. Moreover, we discuss why additional evidence from interviews also proves insufficient, notably due to actors’ tendency to rationalize state policies. We end by suggesting how these problems can be addressed in future research.

New Private Law Theory (“NPLT”) offers itself as almost a natural fit for legal education and in particular—I argue—legal education in the climate crisis. Yet, the world climate hardly features in the book and its impressive resource list. Without claiming to fill any existing gaps in the book, the Article seeks to articulate NPLT’s relevance to sustainable legal education and at the same time tease out what facing the, social, fact of the climate crisis would add to NPLT’s already rich framework.

Criminal offenses committed by legal persons or associations of individuals can only be punished in Germany with a regulatory fine under the German Act on Regulatory Offenses (Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten; OWiG). As the current governing parties (2017–2021)—the CDU, the CSU and the SPD—did not deem this to be an appropriate response to corporate misconduct, the Act to Strengthen the Integrity in the Economy (Gesetz zur Stärkung der Integrität in der Wirtschaft) was set to introduce the Corporate Sanctions Act (Verbandssanktionengesetz; VerSanG), which would have provided a new framework for the punishment of unlawful corporate actions. This legislative project, however, collapsed in the summer of 2021 following years of work. After a brief introduction to the development of corporate criminal liability in Germany, this article outlines the current legal situation under the OWiG before presenting the development and the main contents of the Government Draft of the VerSanG. Subsequently, a more in-depth review of specific—particularly controversial—regulations is provided, which addresses and analyzes the criticism that has been voiced with regard to these provisions. Lastly, the failure of the draft bill, the prospective developments, and the continuing relevance of the Government Draft are considered.

This article argues that the New Private Law Theory (NPLT) recently proposed by Grundmann, Micklitz, and Renner is radically multi-pluralist, in that it combines pluralism along a multitude of dimensions with the absence of any organizing or constraining principle on the meta level. Consequently, the NPLT makes no epistemic commitments about private law truth or ontological commitments about private law reality. The article raises the question of whether a theory which makes no such commitments is a theory at all. Indeed, a site where quite divergent epistemic and ontological commitments are equally acceptable is not usually referred to as a theory but as a democracy. Therefore, the article discusses how NPLT could be turned into a democratic theory of private law. It concludes that to that end, NPLT’s selection of materials should be more diverse, in particular, less economically oriented, less Eurocentric, and more inclusive of various critical perspectives.

The judgment rendered by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on May 27, 2019, deemed Germany’s prosecution service (Staatsanwaltschaft) legally incompetent for the purpose of issuing European arrest warrants (EAW) due to its lack of institutional independence. As a consequence, the question of how the German criminal prosecution system differs from the approaches taken by other European countries issuing European arrest warrants arises and raises the question of whether the German prosecution service truly is insufficiently independent in this respect. Debates amongst legal scholars have ensued in the wake of the CJEU’s judgment—the Court not yet having proffered any solutions regarding the re-establishment of the institutional independence—and this article shall discuss the lack of independence and acquaint the reader with possible solutions.

The author makes brief Considerations on the Treatment of the Theme of the Relationship Between New Technologies and Private Law. In particular, she believes that the criticism of Lessig’s statement according to which “the values of real-space sovereigns will at first lose out” is correct, adding, however, that one must monitor the evolution of new technologies. We are, in fact, at the crossroads of a technological revolution which, as jurists, we are not able to fully understand. The author also questions the position taken in the volume on the US neoliberal approach v. European solidarity approach, inviting the authors to question the difference between the narrative that sees the European system as all about ensuring solidarity and the reality about the economic thinking that informs the different disciplines. Finally, she takes a position on the relationship between ordoliberalism and consumer protection.

On February 26, 2020, the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) declared—for the first time in its history—a criminal prohibitory law (strafrechtliche Verbotsnorm) from the German Criminal Code null and void.1 The provision in question—Section 217 of the German Criminal Code—dealt with the controversial issue of assisted suicide. This case study will briefly examine the previous regulation pertaining to assisted suicide in Germany under Section 217, before scrutinizing its subsequent unconstitutionality as a consequence of the BVerfG’s landmark decision. In order to do so, this article will explore the legal background of the decision, the fundamental rights which were held to have been infringed by Section 217, and propose potential ways of regulating assisted suicide in Germany in the future.

The German legal system and, in particular, German criminal procedure have been severely affected by the Corona Virus pandemic. The Konzentrationsmaxime, the maxim that the main hearing should be consolidated into as short a timeframe as possible in order to expedite proceedings, the Unmittelbarkeitsgrundsatz, the principle that witnesses must be present in person, and the Öffentlichkeitsgrundsatz, the principle that the oral proceedings in criminal litigation should be open to the public in order to guarantee transparency, have all been called into question. The requirement to consolidate the main hearing can no longer be guaranteed due to unavoidable interruptions in the trials in accordance with the newly established Section 10 of the Introductory Law to Germany’s Criminal Procedure Code (Einführungsgesetz zur Strafprozeßordnung; EGStPO) which aims to minimize the risk of infection. Wide-ranging curfews have been imposed so that the general public can no longer leave their homes to attend a court hearing as a spectator. The Beschleunigungsgrundsatz, the principle of expedited criminal proceedings, is being challenged by longer periods of pre-trial detention due to trials having to be suspended in the face of the pandemic. One further obstacle is the measures implemented in order to impede infections with the disease within the period of pre-trial detention whilst other hygiene measures, such as the requirement to wear a face mask in the courtroom, could well clash with the newly established ban on facial concealment (Verhüllungsverbot). In this article, the problems mentioned above are examined in more detail in order to provide an overview of the situation involving criminal proceedings in a Germany firmly in the grip of COVID-19. In addition, the situation reignites previous discussions on the further digitalization of criminal proceedings – this time as a solution for the ongoing threat of infection.