The Petite Bourgeoisie is a stratum that has attrated little academic study. Historians have given it short shrift, the radical scholars dismissing it as the petty bourgeoisie and the aristocratic historians discounting its members as small fry of no significance! And historians are not alone in their neglect, for in economics, political science and sociology there is a similar disdain for those who cannot be cast in the hero's role in any of the major developments of western capitalism. The petite bourgeoisie remains in the wings because to writers of diverse opinions and academic specialisms it has appeared as essentially trivial.

We know much and understand little about the Italian mafia. The amount of factual information surrounding it—whatever that ‘it’ may be—is disproportionately and dramatically greater than our theoretical understanding of this elusive entity. We do not know everything it might be interesting to know, of course, yet in the monumental quantity of scholarly and judicial sources devoted to the mafia, we can find far more information than scholars have been able to make good, cogent sense of. Facts and anecdotes are not only numerous, but of the most diverse and seemingly irreconcilable kinds, and theoretical and analytical shortcomings have made it impossible to accomplish two fundamental and related operations: first, to discriminate between relevant information and contingent ethnographical detail, and between reliable and distorted evidence; second, to find a coherent thread linking whatever disparate pieces of information remain after the first screening operation.

In this paper I want to explore the role of myths of descent and renewal in nourishing a sense of ethnic identity and mobilising ethnic communities for political action. Much of the recent literature on the upsurge in ethnic sentiment, by focussing on the postwar West and concentrating on immediate economic, social and political factors, fails to grasp the deep historical and sociological roots of modern nations and the persistence of ethnic ties and symbols around which nationalists could create their nations. There is a long history of formation and dissolution of ethnie, reaching back to the first recorded cases in ancient Summer, Egypt and Crete, which forms the backdrop to the modern drama of nationalism and the specifically modern revival of ethnicity. Not only are the postwar ethnic autonomy movements simply a recent variation of a wider ethnic and national revival going back to the late eighteenth century in Europe; this latter revival is but the latest of a series of such resurgences, some of them purely local and others widely diffused. In pre-Roman antiquity, just as in the early European Middle Ages, and in the Far East and Africa more recently, that ancient and widespread social formation, the ethnie, has occupied a variable but important position in the hierarchy of human allegiance and has, on occasion, served as a focus for political movements and organisations. Whether we think of the kingdoms of Hittites, Hurrians and Elamites in the second millennium B.C., or the early medieval regna of Franks, Normans and Visigoths, we cannot escape from the fact that these states rested, to a large degree, on a sense of identity and solidarity deriving from elements of their shared culture and their social and political interactions with significant outsiders.

This article looks at three Italian mafia organizations (Cosa Nostra, Camorra, and ‘Ndrangheta). It applies an organizational approach to the understanding of violence in mafia organizations by studying the relationship between their organizational orders and their criminal behavior. The article identifies two different organizational orders, vertical and horizontal, and demonstrates that Italian mafias, although operating in similar environments, can greatly differ from each other, and over time, in terms of their organizational model. Findings suggest that mafias with a vertical organizational order, due to the presence of higher levels of coordination, (1) have greater control over conflict, as proved by the lower number of “ordinary” murders; and (2) have greater capacity to fight state repression, as testified by the greater number of “high-profile” assassinations (e.g. politicians, magistrates, and other institutional members) that they carry out. Evidence is provided using a mixed-methods approach that combines a qualitative, organizational analysis of historical and judiciary sources, in order to reconstruct the organizational models and their evolution over time, with a quantitative analysis of assassination trends, in order to relate organizational orders to the use of violence.

The relationship between Max Weber and Roberto Michels is a fascinating one, both on the biographical and on the systematic level. Almost from the very start Max Weber became interested in the young scholar Michels who had already written extensively about the development of Italian and German Socialism. From 1906 onwards Michels became a regular contributor to the Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, which was edited at the time by Max Weber together with Edgar Jaffé. Although Michels was twelve years younger than Weber, the scholarly contact between them, established through Michels' contribution to the Archiv, soon developed into a lifelong intimate friendship which was soon shared by Marianne Weber and Gisela Michels-Lindner also. This friendship was not without violent ruptures, but it was the most stable and personal relationship which Max Weber ever had. Michels became a member of the Heidelberg circle which met at the Ziegelhäuser Landstraße 35, and visited it whenever he happened to be in Heidelberg, and later, after Michels had moved to Turin, the Webers were regular visitors there. There is a rich stream of letters which bears testimony to this remarkable intimate friendship, which flourished despite the fact that Michels was still at the beginning of a troublesome academic career, while Weber was well established within the German Academic Community.

In what follows I shall discuss a philosophical problem arising out of the practice of anthropologists and sociologists which may be stated, in a general and unanalysed form, as follows: when I come across a set of beliefs which appear prima facie irrational, what should be my attitude towards them? Should I adopt a critical attitude, taking it as a fact about the beliefs that they are irrational, and seek to explain how they came to be held, how they manage to survive unprofaned by rational criticism, what their consequences are, etc? Or should I treat such beliefs charitably: should I begin from the assumption that what appears to me to be irrational may be interpreted as rational when fully understood in its context? More briefly, the problem comes down to whether or not there are alternative standards of rationality.

Empirical life course research is based on prospective or retrospective longitudinal micro data and nationally representative samples of birth cohorts or larger populations. This field of research has developed since the 1970s as one of the major social science instruments of studying the dynamics of both individual lives and societies. The paper reviews critically the contributions of life course studies by comparing the initial expectations with practices and results during the last twenty years.

An uneasy relationship between the army and the society within which it operates is a situation characteristic of most contemporary, relatively developed countries. The major tensions crystallize around three foci: first, the incompatibility between the continuous decline in the centrality and salience of the national security issue and the increased allocation of human andmaterial resources to the military institutions. Second, the societal dilemma between an ideology which advocates the total segregation of the army from the other institutional spheres and the tendencies towards overt or latent role expansion of the military system. Third, the decline of military values and roles as a result of the impact of competing values. As a result of these tensions, the balanced exchange between the social system and the military sub-system tends to be disturbed. The military is often geared to maintaining a level of national security which requires a commitment of resources to this function exceeding the actual input of such resources. Consequently, the performance of the military is often impaired, and the government comes under pressure to increase military spending. Our paper deals with two democratic political systems which, to a considerable extent, avoided this kind of tension between the society at large and its military institutions. The comparison will be between Israel and Switzerland, with the emphasis on the former. The comparison will be made in reference to specific points relevant to the problems under study and will not be a general comparison of the two systems.

Time use surveys are distinguished by their use of a specific type of questionnaire, the daily activity diary, first developed in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, standardized in the framework of a multinational survey headed by Alexander Szalai in 1965–66, then generalized for use in a great number of countries. The diary allows for quantifying the duration of relatively noninstitutionalized activities such as household work and leisure activities.

The main research results obtained with time use studies are presented as they relate to three main themes: debates on the leisure civilization, changes in work rhythms, and gender roles and the synchronizing of social time within the family.

This article discusses the theory and practice of multicultural citizenship in liberal states. Regarding theory, I point to the shortcomings of both ‘radical’ and ‘liberal’ approaches to justify minority rights. Regarding practice, the state-centered notion of multicultural citizenship defects from the decentered accommodation of multicultural minority claims in functionnally differentiated societies. It also runs counter to a trend toward de-ethnicization in liberal states, in which the cultural impositions of the majority on minority groups are growing thin, thus removing the case for minority rights.

Social change is currently occurring in three directions: political democratisation, economic globalisation, and the spread of postmodern culture. The consequent problems cannot be treated by any of the three known methods of macrosocial regulation: the state, the market, the community. ‘Civil society’ has been assigned the role of synthetic and pluralistic rationalisation.

It is well known that the attitudes of the Latin Americans towards race are not the same as those of the inhabitants of Europe and the United States. This observation led scholars as distinguished as Gilberto Freire and Arnold Toynbee to put forward the view that there is no ‘race prejudice’ in Latin America, a view that has been criticised by more recent writers. In Latin America distinctions of ‘race’ are indeed made, but not on the basis of the same premisses as in North America and, though raza and race are the same word, they do not bear the same connotations in Spanish-speaking as in Englishspeaking countries—outside scientific circles, perhaps. ‘Race’ is a system of classifying individuals and, as such, part of each culture, and therefore liable to vary from one to another. But what science has done with the word is another matter.

What, in fact, is the Welfare State? This article traces the emergence of the welfare state as a specific mode of government, describing its distinctive rationality as well as its characteristic forms, functions and effects. It identifies five sectors of welfare governance, the relations between them, and the various forms these take in different times and places. It discusses the contradictory commitments that shape welfare state practices and the problems associated with these practices and contradictions. It situates welfare state government within a long-term account of the changing relations between the social and the economic spheres. And it argues that the welfare state ought to be understood as a “normal social fact”—an essential (though constantly contested) part of the social and economic organization of modern capitalist societies.

Eve's polemic on the relatively insignificant contribution of sociological studies of friendship to the central concerns of the discipline has some force. However, he weakens his case in three main ways. Firstly, his over-reliance on Giddens to demonstrate the contrast in the importance of personalistic relations between ‘traditional’ and ‘late-modern’ societies. See for example Allan Silver. Secondly, Eve's contention that there is an over-reliance on dyadic relationships in the study of friendship is becoming outdated, as demonstrated in the major ESRC project ‘Rethinking Friendship’. Thirdly, Eve underestimates the importance of analyses of friendship in contemporary sociological studies of stratification and power. For example, the so-called velvet revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe were fuelled by the friend-based organisation of radically dissident intellectuals.

In the current context of a growing internationalization of scientific exchanges, the issue of the language of scientific publications – settled in the natural sciences since the 1980s – has now become a central issue for the Social Sciences. Our paper discusses this topical issue through a detailed analysis of the linguistic strategies adopted by two major French social science journals, Population and Revue française de sociologie (RFS), which have chosen to translate into English a selection (RFS) or all (Population) of their articles. In view of the measured effects in terms of visibility in the international scientific field – increasing visibility for the journal Population at the expense of its French edition and a marginal effect for the RFS – we raise questions about the role of national social sciences journals and recall that the specific intellectual mission of these journals lies beyond the pursuit of internationalization.

Contrary to expectations, the EU’s eastward expansion in 2004 did not sound the death knoll of nationalism in the region; rather, it signalled its reinvention and, in some respects, reinvigoration. In this paper, we examine three ways in which nationalism has been redefined in Hungary and Poland in the context of EU enlargement. First, consensus on the desirability of European unification has lessened the importance of left/right party divisions; in its place, the “nation” has provided a fulcrum for inter-party contestation. Second, EU integration has provided nationalists in the region with a backdoor for realising old nationalist ambitions of national reunification across the porous borders of the EU. Third, we examine the way radical nationalist organisations in Hungary and Poland increasingly define themselves in opposition to the EU.

Most authors view trust as a psychological disposition that motivates an agent to cooperative behavior in circumstances where the consequences of the agent’s action are uncertain and especially when this uncertainty depends on the reaction of other agents. This article criticizes this general approach and argues that trust is best seen as the action rather than as whatever it is that motivates it. Trust is defined as an act through which an agent gives to another agent power over him or herself.

The constitutions of the last two centuries are monuments to an eminently modern enterprise: the reconstruction of the political order by rational human effort. Constitution-making is a deliberate attempt at institution-building at the fundamental level of laying down the normative and legal foundations of the political order. Framing a constitution always purports to be an act of foundation; an act intended to break with the past, and with the existing cultural and institutional traditions, in which principled discussions take the place of everyday horse-trading in politics.

This article presents a model of the triangular relationship between minority, majority, and the minority's reference state which is a feature of many ethnic relations. The presence of a reference state can overcome a potential commitment problem between minority and majority if it is perceived to be both militarily strong and moderately irredentist. Empirical material from Croatia, Transylvania, Estonia and Crimea suggests the plausibility of the model. Russia's role as a reference state is particularly interesting.